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“An economist is an expert who will know tomorrow why the things he predicted
yesterday didn’t happen today.”
-Laurence J. Peter




Estimated to be worth more than 225 trillion USD in 2019, real estate is the
world’s largest investment class (Savills 2019). Yet, even within the same country,
housing wealth is largely unequally distributed across space. Cities and high-amenity
places typically account for the lion’s share of it. This unequal distribution results
from tension forces between the demand and supply side of the real estate market
operating at the local level.
On the demand side, perhaps the most crucial factor is the decision of households
about where to live and work according to a variety of subjective and economic
factors. Naturally, the demand for real estate concentrates in high-amenity areas.
These areas are typically more productive and feature desirable characteristics such
as natural amenities and proper public good provision. Unfortunately, the desire
of households to increase their utility by sorting into these high-amenity areas, is
not always met with a likewise propensity to supply housing in these areas. On the
contrary, in many high demand areas, the supply side of the market has failed to
keep up with the demand side. This has lead to skyrocketing prices and affordability
issues. In that regard, the observed unequal value of real estate across space is the
result of a congestion force that drives people away from more productive areas,
thus imposing a burden on the whole society.
A legitimate question is whether we can escape, or at least lessen, the congestion
force coming from real estate markets. Many governments have tried to do so by
implementing a variety of housing policies acting on both the demand and supply
side of the market. Unfortunately, these policies usually neglect the local nature
of the real estate and economic incentives driving the market. This has lead to
unintended consequences. To understand these consequences, this thesis investigates
the endogenous response of economic fundamentals in a spatial framework that
accounts for the localized nature of housing demand and supply.
Specifically, I employ either a theoretical structural approach featuring local
areas or an empirical approach using fine-scale housing data to investigate housing
supply elasticities, housing subsidies, redevelopment option value, and regulation at
the local level.
In Chapter 1, co-authored with Maximilian von Ehrlich and Olivier Schöni, we
provide empirical evidence that increases in the periodic costs of housing lead to
x
a larger supply response than price increases of the same percentage value. We
rationalize this differential in supply responsiveness with an amplification mechanism
arising from adjustments of capitalization rates to changes in the periodic costs.
We document that the amplification of the housing supply price elasticity is less
pronounced in geographically constrained and tightly regulated neighborhoods and
areas having more sophisticated buyers. Our findings hold valuable lessons for public
policies affecting the periodic cost of housing, such as rent control and housing
subsidies.
In Chapter 2, co-authored with Yashar Blouri and Olivier Schöni, we analyze
such a public policy. Specifically, we investigate the spatially heterogeneous impact
of the U.S. federal mortgage interest deduction (MID) on the location and tenure
decisions of households. We develop a general equilibrium model at the county level
featuring an endogenous itemization of housing subsidies. Despite being a vital
tax expenditure, repealing the MID would only slightly lower homeownership rates
while leaving welfare mostly unchanged. The policy is ineffective because it targets
locations with congested housing markets, creating a spatial shift of the housing
demand toward areas that capitalize the subsidy into higher prices. We provide
evidence that a repeal of the MID is to be preferred to an increase of standard tax
deductions as recently implemented under President Trump’s administration.
In Chapter 3, co-authored with Alex van de Minne, we analyze the impact of the
redevelopment potential on commercial real estate transaction prices. First, using
a probit model, we compute the fitted redevelopment potential. This potential is
primarily determined by the difference in net operating income (NOI) per square
foot of land (sql) to the potential highest and best use (HBU) of the property.
This difference reflects the economic obsolescence of a property. Second, we run
a 2SLS model with the fitted redevelopment potential as an instrument for the
redevelopment dummy. We find that having a 100 percent redevelopment potential
increases the property’s price by nine to 17 percent.
In Chapter 4, I develop a methodology and the corresponding survey to construct
a land-use regulation index for over 2200 Swiss municipalities. This index documents
how regulation of residential buildings varies across space. It is composed of ten
sub-indices that capture the different aspects and degrees of local regulation. To
develop these indices, I suggest using land-use regulation data and complementing
it with answers from a comprehensive survey. These indices provide harmonized
xi
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The amplifying effect of capitaliza-
tion rates on housing supply
joint with Maximilian von Ehrlich and Olivier Schöni
2 1. HOUSING SUPPLY ELASTICITY
1.1 Introduction
Existing research emphasizes the importance of housing supply price elasticity for a
variety of economic outcomes. The responsiveness of housing supply affects, among
other things, housing cycles, the allocation of labor across space, and the degree of
capitalization of public policies such as place-based subsidies.1 However, to date,
we know relatively little about the responsiveness of housing supply with respect
to changes in the periodic cost of housing. This is surprising, as urban economic
theory typically focuses on periodic housing costs and many public policies – such
as rent control and housing subsidies – directly act on these costs. In this paper, we
investigate under which circumstances the housing supply responsiveness to changes
in periodic costs differs from the supply responsiveness to price changes, and why
this supply differential varies across regions.
To rationalize our empirical approach, we start by developing a partial equilib-
rium framework featuring housing supply and demand as well as real estate investors.
We show that local changes in the investors’ expectations about periodic housing
costs’ growth and risk premia are decisive to explain differences in supply responses
to price and rent dynamics. Specifically, housing supply responses to price and
periodic cost changes are identical if capitalization rates do not adjust to changes in
the periodic costs. If capitalization rates do adjust, housing supply price elasticities
are either amplified or dampened by this adjustment.
Using detailed georeferenced data on advertised residential properties and
building stock for Switzerland covering the 2005-2015 period, we estimate the
responsiveness of housing supply with respect to price and rent changes. We find
that an increase in rents leads to an about thrice as large supply increase than an
increase of prices of the same percentage value: The supply response following a ten
percent increase in rents (prices) per square meter is approximately 14 percent (four
percent).
These results suggest that, on average, real estate investors revise capitalization
1For instance, Glaeser et al. (2008) investigate the role of housing supply elasticities for price
dynamics, Diamond (2017) links the degree to which local governments can extract rents to housing
supply elasticities, Kline and Moretti (2014) emphasize the importance of housing supply elasticity
for the distributional effects of place-based policies, and Hsieh and Moretti (2019) focus on the
implications of housing supply constraints for the spatial misallocation of labor. See Glaeser
and Gyourko (2018) and Hilber (2017) for a synthesis on the importance of housing supply price
elasticity for various economic outcomes.
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rates downward following a positive demand shock. This amplifies the supply
response to price changes. The supply amplification, and the corresponding adjust-
ment of expectations, is heterogeneous across space, with geographic constrained
and tightly regulated markets, and neighborhoods having more sophisticated buyers
displaying lower values.
Switzerland is a good laboratory to investigate housing supply due to important
heterogeneity in the local factors influencing it. The decentralized form of
government grants low-tier political units (municipalities) large autonomy in matters
relating to land-use planning and fiscal policies. Geographic features of the
landscape, such as elevation, slope, and terrain ruggedness, also vary considerably
across space. These characteristics of the country make the reaction of housing
supply contingent to localized factors. Importantly, in Switzerland, the owner-
occupied and rental markets are approximately of equal size, which facilitates the
estimation of rental and price supply elasticities throughout the country, thereby
allowing us to study the role of capitalization rates for housing supply.2 Finally, the
existence of detailed information on individual housing characteristics, allows us to
rule out that differences in supply elasticities are driven by different attributes (e.g.,
quality gap) between selling and rental properties.
Our paper bridges two strands of the literature. The first strand focuses on
the estimation of local housing supply price elasticities. Despite the importance of
housing supply elasticity, papers quantifying it remain scarce. Gyourko and Molloy
(2015) provide a comprehensive review of the literature investigating the estimation
and determinants of housing supply. In his seminal article, Saiz (2010) estimates
housing supply elasticities across U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as a
function of geographic and regulatory constraints. Using a Vector Error Correction
Model, Wheaton et al. (2014) also estimate housing supply elasticities for U.S.
MSA’s, obtaining estimates in line with those of Saiz (2010). Our identification
of local housing supply elasticities builds on recent work by Baum-Snow and
Han (2019), who adopt a structural approach to quantify cross- and within-city
housing supply elasticities for U.S. metropolitan areas, showing that housing supply
elasticities increase monotonically with the distance to city centers. We follow a
similar identification strategy and exploit variation within metro areas. Specifically,
we identify housing supply elasticities using local demand shocks triggered by the
2Other countries with similar homeownership rates include, for example, Austria, Germany,
and South Korea.
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historic spatial distribution of sectoral employment shares and the connectivity of a
neighborhood with local labor markets. As a complementary shift-share instrument,
we use the historic distribution of language shares across Swiss neighborhoods in
combination with the growth of language groups at aggregate levels.
The second strand of the literature focuses on real estate asset markets and
investors’ expectations. Sivitanides et al. (2010) find that capitalization rates behave
similarly to price/earnings ratios, with economic agents myopically forming price
growth expectations based on past dynamics. This is in line with our findings, which
suggest that investors expect further rent growth in locations that have experienced
demand increases in the recent past. By constructing a user cost model incorporating
economic fundamentals, Himmelberg et al. (2005) show that expected house price
appreciation plays an important role in explaining local U.S. price dynamics. Mayer
and Sinai (2007) substantiate these findings by showing the effect of backward-
looking expectations in house price booms. Kaplan et al. (2017) highlight the
role of expectations for the movements in house prices and rents around the Great
Recession. Glaeser and Nathanson (2017) construct a model where buyers are not
fully rational in predicting future price dynamics, which explains their observed
serial correlation.
We also relate to the literature on local geographic and regulatory constraints
(e.g. Aura and Davidoff 2008 and Hilber and Vermeulen 2016) and show that not
only price supply elasticities are determined by regulation but also the adjustment
of capitalization rates.3
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we empirically establish
a link between housing supply responsiveness and buyers’ expectations. This
link is important, as public policies affecting periodic housing costs might lead to
unanticipated consequences in the supply of housing due to changes in expectations.
Second, our empirical analysis quantifies the spatial dynamics of local expectations.
Specifically, we provide novel evidence that the adaptation of buyers’ expectations
occurs at the local level and that such adaptation is consistent with a path-dependent
view of spatial development. Investors expect that places that have gained in
attractiveness (i.e., experienced a positive demand shock) will continue to do so
3Relatedly, Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2012) analyze the role political competition for
residential development. Lin and Wachter (2019) document spillover effects of local regulatory
constraints on neighboring localities, Cosman et al. (2018) analyze housing appreciation and
marginal land supply in a dynamic framework.
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even further in future periods, leading to additional housing development. Third,
we show that housing supply elasticity varies considerably within and across urban
areas due to the fine-scale impact of geographic and regulatory constraints. This
variation leads to a spatially heterogeneous capitalization of global demand shocks
that is unlikely to be observed when estimating housing supply elasticity at the
urban area level, as done by previous research.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the
conceptual framework motivating our empirical analysis. Section 1.3 explains our
empirical identification strategy, and Section 1.4 presents the data and provides
descriptive statistics for the Swiss housing market. We discuss the results in Section
1.5 and provide several robustness checks in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual framework
The following partial equilibrium framework allows us to formalize the identification
assumptions underlying the empirical analysis and rationalize corresponding find-
ings. We specify the supply and demand side of the housing market and outline the
role played by real estate investors.4
1.2.1 Housing developers
As in Glaeser (2008), in each neighborhood n housing developers choose the amount
of housing space to develop. To build housing, developers must pay a price P landn
to acquire land, and a local construction cost cn to purchase building materials and
remunerate labor. Without loss of generality, we capture both local productivity of
the construction sector, as well as unit cost of inputs, in cn. The developers’ profit





n +1l − P landn l), (1.1)
where Pn is the local price of housing per unit of living space, l denotes the amount
of land and h the building height. We assume that the cost component cnh
δintn +1l
is convex with respect to building height (δintn > 0), describing the fact that the
4Appendix 1.A presents a more detailed derivation of the model.
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construction of taller building becomes progressively costlier due to geographic and
regulatory constraints limiting residential development on the intensive margin.5
Developers choose the optimal intensity of development for each homogeneous
unit of land in the neighborhood. The zero profit condition is met and governs the
equilibrium price of land P landn . Total housing supply is given by the product of h
∗
n
and the amount of developable land Ln available in the neighborhood. We assume
that the quantity of land available for residential development in the neighborhood













(inverse) responsiveness of residential land availability (see Appendix 1.A). Total



















where Sn = Sn(L̄n, cn, δ
int
n ) summarizes exogenous housing supply shifters. The









≥ 0 corresponds to the local housing
supply price-elasticity, which depends on the local responsiveness of residential
development on the intensive (δint) and extensive (δext) margin.6
1.2.2 Real estate investors
We build on the framework proposed by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992) and assume
that investors are willing to pay a square meter price Pn for a property generating
a periodic rental income Rn in neighborhood n. Investors thus mediate between
the property market – in which households consume housing services – and housing
developers.7 Investors optimally choose whether to sell or rent out real estate assets,
which implies that the capitalization rate of rental and selling properties is the same.
If it were not so, arbitrage opportunities would arise, leading investors to shift their
5Tall and high-rise buildings typically require specific building materials and specialized workers,
such as architects and engineers, that ensure the stability of its structure. Additionally, geographic,
and regulatory constraints become more binding, as they are more likely to hinder vertical
development.
6It is common in the literature to represent housing supply elasticity with a single structural
parameter ε entering a housing supply function of the form Qs = SP ε, see e.g., Hsieh and Moretti
(2019), Baum-Snow and Han (2019), and Lin and Wachter (2019).
7In the case of owner-occupancy, the investor rents out the real estate asset to himself.
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demand from one real estate asset to the other.8
We depart from the literature by assuming that investors form expectations
about local risk-adjusted returns rn and rent growth gn according to observed
contemporaneous rents and prices, i.e., rn = rn(Rn, Pn) and gn = gn(Rn, Pn). Across
time periods, investors update their expectations based on the capital investment
they have to make and the corresponding rental income they could potentially earn,
thus leading to heterogeneous expectation adjustments across neighborhoods. This
leads to the formula Pn =
Rn
in(Rn,Pn)
, where in = rn(Rn, Pn)− gn(Rn, Pn) is the local
capitalization rate.9
Using this simple framework, we can analyze the propagation of changes in the
periodic costs of housing, i.e., rental income, on the supply of housing. The relative


















where εQ,Pn is the standard housing supply price elasticity, and ε
P,R
n is an amplification
coefficient that corresponds to the price elasticity with respect to rent changes. This
latter is determined by the responsiveness of local capitalization rate to rent changes,
i.e., εP,Rn = 1 − εi,Rn . Equation (1.3) tells us that housing supply responses to rent
and price changes differ when the elasticity of prices to rent changes is not unitary.
If the valuation of local real estate assets is very sensitive to local rent changes,
i.e. εP,Rn > 1, housing supply will respond more strongly to rent changes than to
price changes. Investors’ adjustment of growth expectations and local risk captured
by the capitalization rate determine the elasticity of local prices to local rents.
If these factors were independent of rent dynamics, we should observe identical
supply responses to rent and price changes, which is a central hypothesis we test
empirically.10
A parametrization of local capitalization rates is instructive to provide an
8This no arbitrage assumption is at the core of the standard user cost approach employed by
Hendershott and Slemrod (1983), Poterba (1984), and Mayer and Sinai (2007)
9Although the user cost approach is not strictly necessary to derive Gordon’s present value
formula, it is instructive to understand how and why rental and owner-occupied markets are
linked. Importantly, in such a framework renters consume housing services and do not enter the
arbitrage condition of the capital markets.
10Note that Equation (1.3) is valid for any supply function whose price elasticity is described by
a single structural parameter. The structure imposed by Equation (1.2) only serves the purpose
of understanding the identification assumptions underlying the empirical estimation.
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intuition about the way we differ from the literature and to understand the





n , where i0 is the “standard” capitalization rate, which the literature usually
assumes to be exogenously determined by capital markets.11 The parameters γRn
and γPn represent the local elasticity of capitalization rates with respect to rent
and price shocks, other things equal. It’s easy to show that the amplification




This parametrization parsimoniously endogenizes capitalization rates while allowing
for spatial differences in the investors’ discount rate when evaluating real estate
assets. If we set γRn = γ
P
n = 0, we obtain the standard Gordon growth model.
Empirically, we test whether this spatial generalization of the Gordon growth model
is meaningful.12
1.2.3 Residents
The economy is endowed with a continuous measure of N individuals distributed
across neighborhoods. Building on recent work of Monte et al. (2018), each
individual working in industry k decides in which neighborhood n to live and in








where we set the price of the tradable numéraire equal to unity and assume that
individuals spend a share α on housing. The variable W̃ kni denotes the industry-
specific wage of workers living in n and commuting to i.
The utility component bkni captures idiosyncratic preferences that do not depend
on market fundamentals but, rather, on the exogenous tastes of workers for a given
place of residence/place of work combination. We assume such preferences to be
i.i.d. realizations of a Fréchet-distributed random variable with scale parameter Bkni
and shape parameter εk > 1. The greater the value of εk, the less heterogeneous
11Our results generalize to a parametrization that allows for local exogenous capitalization rates
i0n. In Section 1.6, we check the robustness of our results when i0n includes local measures of
liquidity risks and uncertainty in the revenue generated by the property.
12The existing literature on capitalization rates empirically documents a strong heterogeneity
in capitalization rates across space, with urban and high-amenity areas typically displaying lower
capitalization rates. However, the existing urban literature largely neglects such differences. Our
parametrization accommodates such features.
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are locational preferences of workers in a given industry, thus implying a greater
mobility across space.
We model W̃ kni as wage per effective units of labor W
k
ni divided by commuting
costs mni, implying that workers reduce labor supply when commuting from distant
locations. Our focus being on housing markets, we do not explicitly model the
demand side of labor markets, and consider wages W kni as an exogenous variable.
13
Given households’ homothetic preferences, total housing demand Qdn in neigh-


























Nkni is the weighted average income earned in neighborhood




ni and is the total number of households living in n.
14 Equation
(1.5) provides two insights that prove useful when constructing housing demand
shifters. Specifically, we should expect higher housing demand in neighborhoods
that are i) better connected to productive areas, and ii) attractive along one of the
dimension captured by idiosyncratic tastes Bkni. In the next section, we derive two
instruments that capture shifts in housing demand triggered by these two dimensions
while remaining exogenous with respect to housing supply changes.
1.3 Empirical framework
Based on the above framework, we derive empirical specifications to estimate
housing supply elasticities εQ,Pn and ε
Q,R
n , and discuss the corresponding identification
assumption. We start by imposing average supply elasticities εQ,P and εQ,R common
to all neighborhoods. In the next step, we provide a parametrization allowing us to
estimate heterogeneous housing supply responsiveness at the neighborhood level.
13Indeed, the identification strategy exposed in Section 1.3 relies on exogenous changes in local
labor demand. For this reason, we refrain to model labor demand endogenously.
14Please refer to Appendix 1.A for a detailed derivation and a more detailed discussion of
Equation (1.5).
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1.3.1 Partialling out quality differences
The conceptual framework exposed in Section 1.2 implicitly assumes that the quality
of housing goods is homogeneous within the same neighborhood and across rental
and selling properties. The relatively small neighborhoods in our main empirical
analysis justify this assumption to a certain extent as properties sharing similar
housing characteristics tend to cluster together.
Yet, differences in the quality and type of housing goods may remain. To prevent
potential quality bias, in what follows, we remove all price and rent variation across
locations that originate from differences in observable housing characteristics. To
this end, we construct local (log) price and rent indices from hedonic regressions.
Specifically, in each period we separately estimate




t Ajnt + ε
τ
jnt, τ = R, P (1.6)
where τjn denotes either the price or rent of property j in neighborhood n at time
t. The vector Ajnt includes a comprehensive set of attributes such as housing
surface, the average number of rooms, age, age squared, and an indicator for single-
family vs. multi-family houses. ετjnt denotes the error term. We use the estimated
neighborhood-time fixed-effects γτnt as quality-adjusted log-prices (log-rents) lnPnt
(lnRnt).
15 Note that the coefficients βτt are time-variant, such that the valuation of
housing characteristics can flexibly change from period to period.
1.3.2 Model-informed identification of average supply elas-
ticities
Log-linearizing supply Equation (1.2), expressing prices as a function of quantities,
and first differencing, in equilibrium16 we obtain the following empirical specification




∆ lnQn + ∆ lnS
P
n , (1.7)
15Note that all our results are robust to allowing for region-specific valuations of housing
attributes i.e., the inclusion of βrt where regions r are defined as cantons or commuting zones
containing a sufficient number of locations n.
16In equilibrium Qdn = Q
s
n = Qn holds, such that supply and demand superscripts are omitted
in what follows.
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where 1
εQ,P
is the average inverse housing supply elasticity common to all neigh-
borhoods and ∆ denotes a time difference between 2005 and 2015.17 The term
αP denotes the average value of changes in observed supply shifters common
to all neighborhoods and, in a slight abuse of notation, ∆ lnSPn represents the
corresponding mean-centered variable. Time-invariant components are partialled
out from ∆ lnSPn by first differencing, such that only dynamic supply shifters enter
Equation (1.7).
Estimating Equation (1.7) by OLS likely leads to biased estimates of the
parameter of interest due to the endogeneity of ∆ lnQn via the demand side. This
is easily seen by using Equation (1.5) to write changes in housing demand as
∆ lnQn = ∆ ln W̄n + ∆ lnNn −∆ lnRn. (1.8)
Therefore, estimates of 1
εQ,P
in Equation (1.7) are potentially biased due to i) a
correlation of the components of housing demand changes – such as changes in
average wages and number of residents – with changes of unobserved supply shifters
in ∆ lnSPn (omitted variable bias), and ii) the impact of housing prices – via changes
in rents – on housing demand (reverse causality).
According to Equation (1.2) (see Appendix 1.A), ∆ lnSPn can be decomposed into
a sum of local construction cost changes, subsumed in ∆ ln cn, as well as changes in
exogenous shifters of developable land ∆ ln L̄n. Changes in the price of construction
materials and the cost to make land available for residential development are unlikely
to differ across space, mostly due to the small country size. On the contrary, shifts
in housing demand via wages might affect construction costs.
To partially address differences in construction costs across neighborhoods, in a
first step, we control for several supply shifters in Equation (1.7). Let Xn denote
the vector containing such controls.18 In particular, Xn includes construction
cost indices – i.e., changes in labor and material costs – defined for the main
17Estimating the inverse supply function, rather than the direct one, is a common approach in
the literature (e.g., Saiz 2010) that offers several advantages. First, using quality-adjusted prices
and rents resulting from a hedonic regression as dependent variables does not require additional
statistical treatment. This is not case if quality-adjusted prices are used as regressors, as their
standard errors are not valid and need to be bootstrapped. Second, instrumental variables tend to
be more relevant for quantities than for prices, improving the precision of the estimates. Third, it
allows us to instrument the same variable (i.e., Qn) to recover the responsiveness of housing supply
to price and rent changes.
18Note that such controls might also partial out quality differences not fully captured by hedonic
indices.
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national construction markets, the intensity of historic development – as measured
by development density in 1980 – and terrain ruggedness. According to Hilber and
Robert-Nicoud (2013), the historic level of housing development proxies for the fact
that high-amenity areas develop first and tend to adopt more stringent land-use
regulations over time. Controlling for terrain ruggedness takes into account that
plots of land featuring geographic characteristics favorable to development – such
as flat and non-rocky surfaces – are likely developed before those showing adverse
geographic characteristics. Therefore, we expect unfavorable geographic features
to increase rents/prices over time, as developers face higher construction costs for
providing additional housing units on the extensive margin of existing development.
Similarly, we control for the elevation of the land. We further control for the distance
to the nearest central business districts to capture potential time trend differentials
in the labor supply (and demand) across space. These variables might also capture
changes in transportation costs.19
Despite controlling for several supply shifters, omitted variables, and reverse
causality may still bias the estimation of Equation (1.7). To solve this issue, we
propose an instrumental variable approach that aims to exclusively shift housing
demand while leaving housing supply unchanged. Specifically, we require an
instrument, denoted ∆ lnZn, which is relevant for housing demand changes while
remaining exogenous to supply changes conditional on the set of controls in Xn i.e.,
E(∆ lnZn∆ lnS
P
n |Xn) = 0.
As apparent from Equation (1.8), we cannot use observed changes in the
components of the housing demand, as in equilibrium, they are affected by tension
forces between housing demand and supply. Following the recent work by Baum-
Snow and Han (2019), we isolate exogenous changes in labor demand given the










where the indicator function 1(mnit0 < 1 hour) equals one for neighborhoods i
that are located at most at 60 minutes travel time from neighborhood n, and zero
19Of course, these variables also affect housing demand. In this case, including them in the
supply function, is even more important as they reduce endogeneity issues arising from changes in
housing demand according to Equation (1.8).
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otherwise.20 The quantity fknt0 represents the share of employment belonging to
sector k in neighborhood n at time t0.
21 The term ∆ lnF kC(n) is the corresponding
aggregate growth rate of employment in industry k over [t, t0] in region C in which
neighborhood n is located.22
The intuition behind Equation (1.9) is straightforward. We compute a weighted
employment growth of the predetermined sectoral composition in the proximity of
a given neighborhood by imposing a common industry growth equal to the one that
occurred in the region C in which the neighborhood is located. Taking into account
the proximity – in terms of commuting time – to other neighborhoods is of particular
relevance in the case of small spatial units e.g., neighborhoods, as most individuals
likely do not work in the same neighborhood where they live. We use a one-hour
radius for the benchmark analysis as this leads to the strongest predictive power of
the instrument.
Two features in the way we compute ∆ lnZn support exogeneity claims with
respect to unobserved supply dynamics. First, in line with Bartik (1991), we exclude
neighborhood n itself from the computation of ∆ lnFC(n)k. Second, we exclude all
sectors related to construction and real estate from fknt0 and ∆ lnF
k
C(n). Therefore,
the instrument captures weighted changes in labor demand that are not related to
the construction sector.
The instrument defined by Equation (1.9) is a shift-share instrument in line with
Bartik (1991). Recently, Adão et al. (2018), Borusyak et al. (2018), and Goldsmith-
Pinkham et al. (2019) investigated the econometric assumptions necessary for the
validity of shift-share instruments. These instruments are valid if either initial
shares are independent and randomly assigned across observations or initial shares
are endogenous but growth shocks occur randomly across regions. In our setting,
we argue that initial sectoral shares are exogenous with respect to changes in
unobserved supply shifters and local rent/price dynamics. The sectoral distribution
of employment is highly persistent and largely determined by natural amenities and
market access, such that the historic sectoral distribution is unlikely to be correlated
with recent changes of local housing supply shifters ∆ lnSP . Following Goldsmith-
Pinkham et al. (2019), in Section 1.6 we asses the validity of the identifying variation
20Travel time within the same 2x2km neighbourhood has been set to 1 minute.
21We use the NOGA 1 sector classification, which comprises 16 different sectors in the case of
Switzerland. This classification corresponds to the major SIC industry groups in the U.S.
22In our baseline results, we use Cantons as aggregate region C, which represent 26 upper-tier
administrative units. Our results are robust using lower tier regions, such as districts (Bezirke).
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by computing the Rotemberg weights for each sector.
We further support exogeneity claims regarding ∆ lnZn by comparing our
results with those obtained using an alternative shift-share instrument based on the
distribution of language shares.23 Specifically, for each neighborhood we compute
the historical share of language shares and interact them with the cantonal growth of
the respective language group.24 Assuming that the idiosyncratic utility shifter can
be decomposed as Bkni = BnB
k
i in Equation (1.5), we can interpret this instrument
as predicting demand changes via a shift in the idiosyncratic preferences Bn to live
in a neighborhood n.
We close this subsection by briefly discussing the estimation of εQ,Rn . By substi-
tuting the relationship between prices and rents arising from the parametrization of
capitalization rates into Equation (1.7), and isolating Rn, we obtain











, and we assume that the vector Xn capturing observable
supply shifters discussed above is controlled for. The new error term is ∆ lnSRn =
1
εP,R
∆ lnSPn . Because this new error term equals the one of Equation (1.7)
times a constant structural parameter, the previous discussion of the identification
assumptions still holds.25
1.3.3 Local supply responsiveness and the role of geographic
and regulatory constraints
Equations (1.7) and (1.10) assume that inverse supply elasticities with respect to
prices and rents are constant across locations. However, our conceptual framework
suggests that housing supply elasticity varies at the local level, both at the
intensive and extensive margin of residential development. On the intensive margin,
23Saiz (2007) uses a similar approach, who builds a shift-share instrument based on the number
of immigrants moving into U.S. cities.
24See Appendix 1.C for a formal definition of the instrument.
25The exogenous component of the capitalization rate i0 is captured by the rent-specific constant
αR in Equation (1.10). If we assume the parametrization of local capitalization rates exposed in
Section 1.2 and allow for location-specific fundamental capitalization rates i0n, the error term in





∆ ln i0n, such that the exogeneity of the instrument
must also hold with respect to location-specific exogenous capitalization rates. In Section 1.6, we
show that including several controls proxying for i0n do not affect our results.
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the empirical literature points out that supply elasticity might vary considerably
according to regulatory restrictions – such as height restriction, floor to area rations,
etc. – adopted by local governments. According to Hilber and Robert-Nicoud
(2013), attractive places are historically more developed and, as an outcome of
the political game between land developers and owners of developed land, more
regulated. On the extensive margin, Saiz (2010) points out that such constraints are
empirically relevant only when there is enough development to make them binding.26




≈ βavg,τ + βhist,τ ×Q1980n + βconstr,τ × Λn ×Q1980n , τ = R, P, (1.11)
where the observed historic stock in 1980 Q1980n proxies for regulation constraints
on the intensive margin, according to Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013) and Λn is a
measure summarizing the most important geographic and regulatory constraints on
the extensive margin. Inserting such approximation in Equations (1.7) and (1.10),
we then estimate the following equation
∆ln(τn) = α
τ + βavg,τ∆ln(Qn) + β
hist,τ∆ln(Qn)×Q1980n +
βconstr,τ∆ln(Qn)× Λn ×Q1980n + ∆ lnSτn, τ = R, P,
(1.12)
where we control again for Xn (which includes historic development Q
1980
n ) as well
as for the main effect of extensive margin constraints Λn. Two remarks are worth
noting. First, Λn is interacted with the historic stock level Q
1980
n , thus allowing the
impact of regulatory constraints to become more binding in more-developed places.
Having estimated the parameters βavg,τ , βhist,τ , and βconstr,τ , we then recover εQ,τn
using Equation (1.11). Second, the identification assumptions of the price and rent
equation in Equation (1.12) are the same as in Equations (1.7) and (1.10) provided
Q1980n and Λn are exogenous with respect to ∆ lnS
τ .
26For example, protected forest likely hinder residential development only if no other type of
developable land is available in the neighborhood.
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1.4 Data and descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis relies on several data sources. Further information is available
in Appendix 1.B.
1.4.1 Data sources
Housing data – We use proprietary geo-referenced data on advertised residential
properties provided by Meta-Sys. The data set contains approximately 2.1 million
postings of rental properties and about 0.8 million postings of selling residences for
the whole of Switzerland from 2004 to 2016. In addition to asking rents and prices,
the data set includes comprehensive information on housing characteristics. The
Federal Register of Buildings and Habitations published by the Federal Statistical
Office (FSO) provides a census of the residential housing stock of the country.
Changes in the housing stock are measured every five years, providing three time
periods – 2005, 2010, and 2015 – that overlap with our advertisement data. Up to
2015, the register contains approximately 4.8 million housing units for the whole
of Switzerland, 11.5 percent of which were built between 2005 and 2015. The 2000
Building Census (FSO) provides information on whether a dwelling is a primary or
secondary residence in that year.
Socio-demographic and economic data – We use the Federal Population
Census of 2000 (FSO) as well as the Population and Households Survey from 2010 to
2015 (FSO) to infer geo-referenced homeownership rates and to obtain information
on predetermined levels and changes in the local socio-demographic composition
– i.e., nationality and language – of residents living in a given area. The 2000
Federal Population Census provides information on the type of building owner,
distinguishing between institutional investors, private, and public owners. The FSO
publishes a construction index tracking the cost evolution of material and labor in
the construction sector for seven statistical areas. We obtained detailed information
about the spatial distribution of employment and firms by sector from the Structural
Business Statistics (STATENT). We combine this information with data about road
travel time provided by www.search.ch to construct a local measure labor market
access.
Regulatory and geographic data – The Land-Use Statistics of Switzerland
(FSO) provides satellite-based land cover data, allowing us to identify geographic
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constraints, such as lakes, rocks, and glaciers, and areas subject to particular
regulations. Information about regulations on the extensive margin – and protected
areas in particular – is obtained from Cantonal offices of spatial planning and the
Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN).
Other data – We complement the above data with a variety of data on
Swiss administrative units and metropolitan areas (FSO) and elevation (European
Environment Agency). We identify the agglomerations of the 15 main cities in
Switzerland, as defined by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO), and compute
the distance of each neighborhood to the closest city center.
Figure 1.1: Rent, price, and stock dynamics
Notes: Cities include 2x2 km neighborhoods located in one of the 15 main municipalities of
the corresponding biggest urban areas according to 2015 boundaries. The two panels show index
growth from 2005 to 2015 of the considered variables, using 2005 as the base year (=100). Stock
is measured as the total number of dwellings, and rents and prices are measured as advertised
average rents and prices per square meter.
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1.4.2 Data structure and descriptive statistics
We structure the data by partitioning the whole territory of the country into
small square neighborhoods of 2x2 km. We aggregate residential transactions,
housing stock, socio-demographic and economic data, and geographic and regulatory
constraints within these neighborhoods.27 We assign each neighborhood to one of
2,324 municipalities, which represent the lowest governmental tier in Switzerland
and have some influence on land-use regulation.
From 2005 to 2015, rents have increased by approximately 14 percent while
prices have increased by approximately 35 percent at the country level.28 Over the
same period, the housing stock grew by approximately 11 percent. Despite these
general trends, stock, rent, and price dynamics are heterogeneous across space, as
illustrated in Figure 1.1. Specifically, Figure 1 shows stock, rent, and price index
growth in cities (Panel A) and the countryside (Panel B) from 2005 to 2015, using
2005 as the base year (=100). Over the considered period, housing stock grew
almost twice as much in the countryside areas than in cities, hinting at the fact
that in cities, further development is hindered by a lack of developable land in
conjunction with geographic and regulatory constraints. Given this comparatively
lower responsiveness of housing development in cities, it is not surprising that rents
and prices grew more in these areas than in the countryside. Interestingly, from
2007 onward, rents and price dynamics have started to diverge considerably – with
prices growing at a faster pace – which implies that capitalization rates have been
revised downward in these locations.
In Figure 1.2, we show the most important geographic and regulatory constraints
for housing development in Switzerland. Geographic features preventing any form
of development are an important component of the Swiss landscape. We define
undevelopable land as land that is located above 2000 meters and whose land cover
corresponds to unproductive vegetation, vegetation-free areas, or rocks, and glaciers.
Water bodies significantly reduce the amount of developable land in the proximity of
major agglomerations, as virtually all major CBDs are adjacent to a lake or river.29
27Our results are robust to alternative neighborhood sizes, as discussed in Section 1.6.
28For new tenancy agreements market rents apply in Switzerland. To prevent abusive increases,
property owners can adjust rents for existing tenancy agreements only if some formal criteria are
met. However, several exceptions in the regulation allow landlords to adjust rents to local market
levels.
29This is mainly due to the competitive advantage of areas in the proximity of water bodies
during the Industrial Revolution and the subsequent urbanization of Switzerland.
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Figure 1.2: Constraints to development
Notes: We define geographic constraints as undevelopable land, which corresponds to plot of land
located above 2000 meter, or whose land use classification corresponds to unproductive vegetation,
vegetation-free areas, or rocks and glaciers. Except for forests, red areas summarize regulatory
constraints on the extensive margin. Swiss forests are protected areas since 1876.
In addition to geographic constraints, there are significant regulatory restrictions
in place that prevent or hinder development in specific areas. We refer to measures
that prevent new construction on undeveloped land as regulations on the extensive
margin. Regulations on the extensive margin include forests30, UNESCO cultural
or natural heritage sites, parks, and other high value natural amenity areas. These
restrictions account for approximately 49.1 percent of the Swiss territory. Total
restricted areas – obtained by overlapping geographic and regulatory constraints
at the extensive margin – amount to approximately 67.3 percent of the country’s
surface. The remaining 32.7 percent of the country’s surface (white area in Figure
30In response to growing industrialization of the country, in 1876, Switzerland passed a federal
law prohibiting further deforestation, de facto freezing forest areas to the level observed at that
time. The law has remained mainly unchanged to the present day. As a consequence, forest areas
in highly populated regions have remained practically unchanged since 1876.
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1.2) is available for development under different regulatory measures determining
the intensity and type of residential development.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Supply elasticity estimates and amplification mecha-
nism
Table 1.1 summarizes average supply elasticity estimates with respect to price
(columns 1, 3, and 5) and rent (columns 2, 4, and 6) changes, respectively. Columns
1 and 2 report estimates based on the shift-share instrument ∆ lnZn derived
from historic industry shares (used as a benchmark), columns 3 and 4 report the
corresponding effects for the shift-share instrument derived from historic language
shares, and columns 5 and 6 show the results when using the two instruments
simultaneously. Since our model framework in Section 1.2 establishes labor market
shocks as a source of shifts in housing demand, we refer to the results based on
industry shares as our baseline estimates.
Responsiveness estimates based on the industry instrument are equal to εQ,R =
1
0.694
= 1.44 for rent and εQ,P = 1
2.367
= 0.42 for price changes. These results show
that, on average, housing supply in Switzerland is relatively elastic to rent changes,




= 3.43. The country’s average response of local capitalization rates to
rent changes is thus εi,R = 1 − εP,R = −2.43, suggesting that investors revise local
rent growth expectations (risk premium) upward (downward) following an exogenous
positive demand shock.31 These results remain mostly unchanged when using the
instrument derived from historic language shares (εP,R = 2.68) and when employing
both instruments simultaneously (εP,R = 2.84).
Reassuringly, the above results support our exogeneity claims about the
instruments. This for two reasons. First, despite having the expected positive
impact on ∆ lnQ, the two instruments capture different variations while leading
31These spatial result are in line with recent findings investigating aggregate time dynamics. By
simulating a dynamic model, Begley et al. (2019) find that a positive demand shock – as captured
by higher population growth – leads to lower capitalization rates. It also aligns with the findings
of Kaplan et al. (2017), who finds that a change in expectations drives the dynamics of price-rent
ratios.
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to very similar estimates.32 In this case, it seems unlikely that if one or both
instruments were endogenous, they would converge toward similar estimates.
Second, the overidentification tests reported at the bottom of columns 5 and 6
do not point toward endogeneity issues. In Section 1.6 we further investigate the
exogeneity of the instrument with respect to the inclusion of potential confounders.
Table 1.1: Inverse supply elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R
∆Log Q 2.367∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗ 2.004∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 2.084∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗
(0.442) (0.287) (0.342) (0.215) (0.316) (0.191)
Amplification 3.411 2.683 2.835
Instruments I I L L I & L I & L
Observations 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498
Kleibergen-Paap F 15.61 15.61 71.39 71.39 42.76 42.76
Overidentification - - - - 0.40 0.87
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level. The Adão et al. (2018) standard errors for columns (1), (2), (3),
and (4) are 0.100, 0.048, 0.386, and 0.198, respectively. The units of observations are obtained by
partitioning Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. Log rents and prices are quality-adjusted with
respect to living surface, number of rooms, age, age squared, and building type. All regressions
control for supply shifters. Supply shifters include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-
distance to the nearest CBD, log-housing stock in 1980, total restricted areas, and change (2005-
2015) in construction costs. See Appendix 1.E for detailed estimation results. Changes in housing
stock ∆Log Q, are instrumented using a shift-share instrument for industries I in columns (1) and
(2), a shift-share instrument for main spoken languages L in columns (3) and (4), and both these
instruments I & L in columns (5) and (6).
We now turn to the analysis of housing supply heterogeneity at the local level.
Table 1.2 summarizes the results when all relevant constraints on the extensive
margin – including water bodies, undevelopable land, forest, and other protected
areas – are considered together in the total restricted area Λn. We follow the same
structure as in Table 1.1 and report the results using the instruments based on
industry shares (columns 1 and 2), language shares (columns 3 and 4), and the
32See first-stage results reported in Appendix 1.E. The coefficients for the two instruments are
positive and highly significant.
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two instruments simultaneously (columns 5 and 6). In addition to the extensive
margin restrictions, we account for the historic level of building development Q1980n ,
thus allowing the impact of regulatory constraints to become more binding in more-
developed places.
Table 1.2: Inverse supply elasticities – heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R
∆Log Q 1.001∗∗ 0.095 1.578∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 1.307∗∗∗ 0.321∗
(0.411) (0.218) (0.305) (0.197) (0.306) (0.176)
Q1980 ×∆Log Q 0.690∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.089) (0.200) (0.109) (0.151) (0.082)
Λ×Q1980 ×∆Log Q 0.241∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.049) (0.115) (0.059) (0.099) (0.048)
Instruments I I L L I & L I & L
Observations 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498
Kleibergen-Paap F 12.98 12.98 23.48 23.48 19.46 19.46
Overidentification - - - - 0.56 0.49
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The units of observations are obtained by partitioning
Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. Log rents and prices are quality-adjusted with respect to
living surface, number of rooms, age, age squared, and building type. All regressions control for
supply shifters, which include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest
CBD, log-housing stock in 1980, total restricted areas, and change in construction costs from 2005
to 2015. Total restricted area (Λ) is standardized and contains constraints on the extensive margin –
water bodies, undevelopable land, forest, and other protected areas. See 1.E for detailed estimation
results. Changes in housing stock ∆Log Q including interaction terms thereof are instrumented
using a shift-share instrument for industries I in columns (1) and (2), a shift-share instrument for
main spoken languages L in columns (3) and (4), and both these instruments I & L in columns (5)
and (6).
The coefficients of the double and triple interaction terms, which capture local
supply heterogeneity, are all highly significant for rental and selling properties.
These estimates suggest that i) historically developed places have more inelastic
housing markets both with respect to rent and price changes, and ii) geographic and
regulatory constraints on the extensive margin are more binding in more-developed
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places.33 The double interaction coefficients are systematically lower for rental than
selling properties. This implies that previous development patterns decrease the
supply elasticity of selling properties to a larger extent than that of rental properties.
Having estimated the coefficients βavg,τ ,βhist,τ , and βconstr,τ for rental and selling
properties, we compute supply elasticities coefficients at the neighborhood level
according to Equation (1.11). To facilitate the visual representation of these
parameters, we aggregate these local supply elasticities at the municipality level
by using the mean values. In Figure 1.3 we show the spatial distribution of local
housing supply price elasticity εQ,Pn (Panel A) and of the corresponding amplification
coefficient εi,Rn (Panel B).
34
Figure 1.3: Local supply elasticities and amplification coefficient
Panel A: Prices εQ,P Panel B: Amplification coefficient εP,R
Notes: Supply elasticity interval defined according to quintiles of the distribution. Local estimates
are computed using Equation (1.12) for 2km side country grid data. Heterogeneity is due to the
sum of relevant geographic and regulatory constraints on the extensive margin and due to the
historic housing stock. Elasticities for cells in which transactions occurred only in 2005 or 2015
– which are thus not included in Equation 3 due to first differencing – are imputed according to
their value of geographic and regulatory constraints. No data corresponds to municipalities whose
area is not the largest relative share of a grid cell.
As apparent from Figure 1.3 (Panel A), housing supply price elasticity varies
considerably across space. Major agglomerations – and even more so areas near
major CBDs – are particularly inelastic, with the municipality of Zurich and
its neighboring agglomerations accounting for the largest area displaying inelastic
33Note that the heterogeneity arising from geographic and regulatory constraints alone is never
significant. To compute our estimates, we always include geographic/regulatory constraints as a
control, thus partialling out a direct effect of this variable on rent and price dynamics. For the
detailed results, see Appendix 1.E.
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housing supply.35 In contrast, countryside areas generally display comparatively
higher elasticity values. However, this is not always true for Alpine regions. Some
alpine regions, especially touristic ones, have low price elasticity values, likely due to
the importance of geographic constraints in conjunction with high levels of historic
development.36
Compared to the housing supply elasticities estimated by Saiz (2010) for the
major U.S. metropolitan areas, the supply side of the Swiss housing market is
significantly more inelastic to price changes. This unresponsiveness can be explained
by the intensive and extensive margin constraints to development. On the intensive
margin, housing development in Switzerland is constrained to low density. Even
major cities, such as Zurich and Geneva, high-rise buildings (i.e., buildings counting
more than seven stories) are the exception rather than the rule. On the extensive
margin, widespread geographic and regulatory constraints hinder new development
even in the countryside.37
As shown in Figure 1.3 (Panel B), the amplification mechanism displays
considerable spatial heterogeneity, with values ranging from 2.68 to 10.57. These
results suggest that central places display the lowest value of εP,Rn , whereas
countryside areas the highest. Following a shock to periodic housing costs, investors
thus revise their expectations and risk premia more in remote areas than in central
ones. This heterogeneous adaptation across space might be explained by the fact
that attractive, and typically heavily restricted and regulated, central places already
command high rent growth expectations and low risk premia. In such places, a
positive demand shock is unlikely to modify investors’ expectations strongly. On
the contrary, it is more likely that investors revise their expectations substantially
following a demand shock in elastic countryside areas where previous demand has
been scarce. This is in line with the hypothesis of a path dependent view of spatial
development. Investors myopically anticipate that places having experienced low
(high) demand in the past will continue to do so in the future, thus (not) updating
their beliefs when such places are indeed subject to a positive demand shock.
35The distribution of both rent and price elasticities is skewed to the left. Average supply
elasticities at a given aggregation level are thus affected by a few extremely inelastic places. In
Table 1.D.1 in Appendix 1.D.1, we rank the responsiveness of housing markets at three different
aggregation levels: cantons, agglomerations, and municipalities.
36The municipalities of Zermatt (VS) and St. Moritz (GR), both famous ski resorts, count
among the 10 percent most-inelastic Swiss municipalities.
37In Appendix 1.D.2, we provide a more detailed comparison of our estimates with those obtained
in the literature, adding further credibility to our estimates.
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1.5.2 Buyers’ sophistication and the revision of local expec-
tations
Our explanation for observed spatial differences in the revision of investors’
expectations is that investors do not (perfectly) anticipate future demand shocks.
To empirically test this proposition, let us assume that some investors are more
sophisticated than others. In particular, more sophisticated investors have access
to a better information set, which allows them to predict future demand growth
more precisely. Given these assumptions, we expect that in places where more
sophisticated investors buy properties, the amplification mechanism (capitalization
rate update) is lower (less negative).
We proxy the presence of sophisticated investors in a given neighborhood with the
share of institutional investors – which include real estate firms, construction firms,
insurers, and pension funds – and second-home buyers. Institutional investors are
professional buyers investing in real estate, mainly to realize capital gains or benefit
from rental income and typically devote considerable resources to conduct market
studies to optimize their investment strategies. In the case of second-home buyers,
Bernstein et al. (2019) have documented that these type of buyers tends to exhibit
fewer biases in their investment decisions.
In the next step, we estimate the following cross-sectional relationship
εP,Rn = α + βωn + Θnγ + υn, (1.13)
where εP,Rn represents the amplification coefficient in neighborhood n (computed
relying on the industry share instrument), and ωn is the predetermined share of
either institutional investors or second homeowners in 2000. The vector Θn contains
the same time-invariant controls as in Table 1.2, which include elevation, elevation
standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, construction costs, log-housing
stock in 1980, total restricted areas, and change (2005-2015) in construction costs.
The variable υn is a stochastic error term.
Table 1.3 shows the estimation results. In columns 1 and 3 we report results based
on the same sample as in Table 1.2, whereas in columns 2 and 4 we perform out-of-
sample predictions based on the elasticity estimates of Table 1.2.38 We perform such
38More precisely, we use the estimates of βavg,τ , βhist,τ , and βconstr,τ reported in Table 1.2
together with observed values of Q1980n and Λn to predict local housing supply elasticities according
to Equation (1.11) in places where there was not a sufficient number of advertised rental or selling
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out-of-sample predictions to include a larger number of neighborhood containing
shares of sophisticated investors, which provides a greater variation in the observed
investor types that we can exploit empirically.
Table 1.3: Investors’ sophistication and amplification effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amplification effect
Share of inst. investor -0.419 -1.273∗∗∗
(0.295) (0.194)
Share of second home -0.483∗∗∗ -0.606∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.118)
Observations 2,498 5,054 2,498 5,168
R-squared 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.87
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The units of observations are obtained by partitioning
Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. Controls include elevation, elevation standard deviation,
log-distance to the nearest CBD, log-housing stock in 1980, total restricted areas, and change
(2005-2015) in construction costs.
The results in Table 1.3 show that a higher share of institutional investors is
indeed associated with a lower amplification effect, although the correlation is barely
not significant in the case of the restricted sample. Similarly, a higher share of second
homeowners predicts a lower amplification effect, albeit the lower magnitude (in
absolute value) of the coefficient seems to suggest that, for a given share of investor’s
type, institutional investors anticipate future demand shocks better than second
home investors, which seems plausible. Interestingly, the relationship between the
amplification effect and second home investors is robust across samples.
1.6 Robustness checks
1.6.1 Modifiable areal unit problem
One may question the stability of our results for different definitions or areal units.
More specifically, according to Briant et al. (2010), our point estimates of (inverse)
properties in the years 2005 and 2015.
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supply elasticities in Table 1.1 might vary depending on the aggregation level. We
thus verify the robustness of our estimates by both decreasing (down to 1 km)
and increasing (up to 3 km) the sides of square the neighborhoods. Additionally,
because they represent the lowest-tier political units in Switzerland, we estimate our
specifications also at the municipality level.
Panels A to C of Table 1.4 illustrate the results. As before, we report estimates
based on the industry instrument (columns 1 and 2), language instrument in
(columns 3 and 4), and both instruments simultaneously (columns 5 and 6). The
average supply elasticity estimates for rents and prices, are quite stable for 1 km, 3
km side cells, as well as at the municipality level. The magnitude of the elasticities
increases somewhat for the 1 km side neighborhoods while they decrease somewhat
at the municipality level. Importantly, for all levels of aggregation, we find evidence
of stronger supply response to rent than price changes, with amplification coefficients
quite stable across specifications and similar to those of Table 1.1.39
1.6.2 Frequency of rent and price observations
We investigate whether grid-cells containing a small number of rental and selling
properties, typically located remote areas, are driving our main results. In Panel
D of Table 1.4 we thus report estimation results when restricting the sample of our
main analysis to 2x2km grid cells containing at least twenty observations for both
rental and selling properties. The estimated coefficients remain almost identical to
those in the benchmark Table 1.1.
1.6.3 Local risk
A further concern might be that local factors influence the fundamental capitaliza-
tion rate i0 introduced above. In this case, local changes ∆i0n are captured by the
error term in Equation (1.10), and, if correlated with the instrument, they might
bias our results. Even though there are no obvious factors that determine local
fundamental capitalization rates that correlate with initial industry shares, we may
analyze this concern by controlling for potential local determinants of ∆ ln i0n. This
includes, most likely, factors describing local risk perceptions of investors.
39For space reason, we do not report them in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R
Panel A: 1km
∆Log Q 4.742∗∗ 2.263 2.779∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 2.855∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗
(2.411) (1.788) (0.618) (0.282) (0.614) (0.290)
Observations 3,958 3,958 3,958 3,958 3,958 3,958
Kleibergen-Paap F 1.23 1.23 23.21 23.21 12.15 12.15
Overidentification - - - - 0.22 0.30
Panel B: 3km
∆Log Q 2.359∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗ 1.940∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 2.027∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗
(0.529) (0.376) (0.287) (0.200) (0.284) (0.188)
Observations 1,667 1,667 1,667 1,667 1,667 1,667
Kleibergen-Paap F 11.56 11.56 93.89 93.89 52.80 52.80
Overidentification - - - - 0.36 0.34
Panel C: Municipalities
∆Log Q 1.902∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 1.992∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗ 1.959∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
(0.297) (0.193) (0.257) (0.204) (0.241) (0.173)
Observations 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673
Kleibergen-Paap F 86.93 86.93 118.89 118.89 75.63 75.63
Overidentification - - - - 0.74 0.62
Panel D: 20 ads
∆Log Q 2.082∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗ 2.255∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗ 2.215∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗
(0.579) (0.283) (0.463) (0.282) (0.408) (0.242)
Observations 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304
Kleibergen-Paap F 21.46 21.46 36.50 36.50 24.69 24.69
Overidentification - - - - 0.80 0.15
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level. For Panels A, B, and, D the units of observations are obtained
by partitioning Switzerland in 1x1, 3x3, and 2x2 km neighborhoods, respectively. The units of
observations for Panel C are the Swiss municipalities. For Panel D we restrict the sample to units
that have at least 20 selling and rental advertisements. All regressions control for supply shifters.
Supply shifters include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD,
log-housing stock in 1980, total restricted areas, and change (2005-2015) in construction costs.
Changes in housing stock ∆Log Q, are instrumented using a shift-share instrument for industries
I in columns (1) and (2), a shift-share instrument for main spoken languages L in columns (3) and
(4), and both these instruments I & L in columns (5) and (6).
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Table 1.5: Robustness confouders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R
Panel A: Confounders 1
∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R
∆Log Q 2.116∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗ 2.366∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗ 2.503∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗
(0.493) (0.355) (0.440) (0.289) (0.463) (0.295)
Confounder VR TOMR TOMP
Observations 2,158 2,158 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498
Kleibergen-Paap F 11.08 11.08 15.52 15.52 15.52 15.52
Panel B: Confounders 2
∆Log Q 2.429∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗ 1.963∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗ 2.236∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗
(0.454) (0.289) (0.379) (0.275) (0.417) (0.280)
Confounder Unem GOwn Own00
Observations 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,467 2,467
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.67 14.67 16.89 16.89 16.10 16.10
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The units of observations are obtained by partitioning
Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. All regressions control for supply shifters. Supply shifters
include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, log-housing stock
in 1980, total restricted areas, and change (2005-2015) in construction costs. Changes in housing
stock ∆Log Q, are instrumented using a shift-share instrument for industries I in all columns.
Panel A columns (1) and (2) control for the vacancy rate in 2000 VR, columns (3) and (4) control
for the time on market for rental properties TOMR, and columns (5) and (6) control for the time
on market for selling properties TOMP. Panel B columns (1) and (2) control for the ownership
rate in 2000 Own00, columns (3) and (4) control for the growth in ownership (2005-2015) GOwn,
and columns (5) and (6) control for the share of unemployment in 2000 Unem.
Panels A and B of Table 1.5 report estimation results when we proxy local risk
by using local vacancy rates (V R, columns 1 and 2 of Panel A), local time on the
market of advertised rental units (TOMR, columns 3 and 4 of Panel A) and selling
units (TOMP , columns 5 and 6 of Panel A), and local unemployment rates (Unem,
columns 5 and 6 of Panel B). Vacancy rates and unemployment rates proxy for the
uncertainty associated with the rental income of a property located in a given area,
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whereas time on market captures its liquidity.40
As is evident from Table 1.5, we can confirm a significantly higher responsiveness
of housing supply to rent changes than to price changes when we individually control
for the above variables. The corresponding amplification effects are very similar to
those of our benchmark results.
1.6.4 Local variation in the type of housing units
As discussed in Section 1.3.1, we partial out differences in the attributes of renting
and selling units across regions. However, one might worry that the observed
housing characteristics that we use for adjusting quality differences might not
fully capture dissimilarities between rental and selling properties. Note that this
problem only matters to the extent that unobserved quality differences correlate
with our benchmark instrument based on industrial composition, which seems
unlikely. Nevertheless, we address this potential concern by controlling for i) the
predetermined level of homeownership rates in 2000 (Own00), and ii) the change in
ownership rates between 2005 and 2015 (GOwn). Controlling for these two variables
allows us to take explicitly into account variations in the composition of housing
goods across neighborhoods. Panel B of Table 1.5 documents that the results remain
mostly unchanged.
1.6.5 Rotemberg weights
The identification of both our shift-share instruments (industry and language) comes
from the initial shares. More precisely, we assume that initial shares of industries
and languages measure the differential exogenous exposure to a corresponding
global shock (growth in industries and languages at the cantonal level). Since the
predetermined shares are equilibrium outcomes that are affected by price and rent
levels, they probably correlate with the price and rent levels in that period. However,
as shown by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2019), the validity of the instrument hinges
on the assumption that the initial shares are exogenous to changes in prices and
rents, not to the initial levels.
To test this assumption in our framework, we follow Goldsmith-Pinkham
40Sivitanidou and Sivitanides (1999) and Chen et al. (2004) document that vacancy rates and
unemployment can affect local capitalization rates.
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et al. (2019) and compute the Rotemberg weights for the different industries
and languages.41 These weights indicate which industries/languages entering the
instruments are driving the results. In our case, the five most important sectors
are information and communication, wholesale and retail trade, administrative and
support service activities, accommodation and food service activities, and financial
and insurance activities. The three most important languages are German, Italian,
and Portuguese. In the interest of brevity, we report the results in Appendix 1.E.
As suggested by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2019), we test the exclusion
restriction by checking the correlation of the five most important initial share and
possible confounders. As confounders, we use the change (2005-2015) in vacancy
rate, the change (2005-2015) in time on market for rental properties, the change
(2005-2015) in time on market for selling properties, the ownership rate in 2000,
the growth (2005-2015) in ownership rate, and the share of unemployment in 2000.
Reassuringly, this analysis shows that the initial shares are not related to possible
confounders.
1.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the response of housing supply with respect to rent
and price changes across space. Workhorse models in urban economics typically
feature periodic housing costs entering the utility function of individuals, whereas the
empirical literature on housing supply elasticities focuses on prices. This discrepancy
calls for a better understanding of the link between the responsiveness of housing
supply with respect to price and rent dynamics.
Our empirical results indicate that, on average, residential housing supply in
Switzerland reacts more than thrice as strongly to rent changes than to price ones.
We attribute this “amplification effect” to an adjustment of capitalization rates –
which reflect investors’ expectations concerning future rent growth and risk premia –
following an exogenous demand shock. This adjustment is consistent with a myopic
path-dependent view of residential development in the sense that investors believe
that the places that grew more (less) in the past will continue to do so also in
the future. An unexpected positive demand shock to a historically less attractive
area thus triggers a considerable downward revision of investor’s capitalization rates,
41These weights are based on Rotemberg (1983) and Andrews et al. (2017).
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which further increases prices and, in the end, boosts the amount of supplied housing.
Due to geographic and regulatory constraints, we document considerable spatial
heterogeneity in the local supply elasticity with respect to rent and price changes,
respectively. Major urban centers and alpine tourist areas display very inelastic
housing supply, whereas countryside areas usually have a relatively more responsive
housing supply with respect to prices and rents.
We also document that the amplification effect is lower in urban and tourist
areas and higher in the countryside. This spatial variation holds interesting insights
about the way investors perceive and influence residential development across space.
First, investors seem to form expectations regarding future rents growth and/or
assess risk premia heterogeneously across space and at a fine scale (neighborhood)
level, which in turn influences local housing supply. Second, investors seem to revise
expectations and/or risk assessments only to a limited extent in tightly regulated
and geographically constrained places – typically represented by highly developed
urban areas – whereas in less constrained areas belonging to the countryside, they
revise their expectations significantly.
Our results hold an important lesson for policy makers. The impact of policies
aiming to affect the periodic cost of housing – such as housing subsidies and rent
control – seem to have a much larger impact on housing supply, ceteris paribus, than
policies that act on the price of housing goods. Neglecting this impact might lead
to severe unintended consequences for housing policies aiming to stimulate or curb
the housing market via the demand side.
Our analysis is conducted over a period of growing housing demand in the Swiss
market. Whether the estimated supply amplification effect is symmetric and thus
will turn into a dampening effect of housing supply during a downturn of the real
estate market remains an open question. Since housing is durable, we suspect
that a negative demand shock of a similar magnitude as the one we investigated
might even lead to a larger decrease of housing prices and, subsequently, of housing
supply. Testing this hypothesis, however, remains a task for future research covering
a different phase of the housing cycle.




The first order condition (FOC) of the profit function π described in Equation (1.1)
and its corresponding zero-profit condition are given by
∂π
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development intensity in Equation (1.15), we have that the price of land is given by
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Where the constant CL(δ
int
n , cn) captures shifters of the price of land. To determine
the amount of land supplied for development, we assume that local landowners pay
a lobbying cost clandn to convince local authorities to zone land for new development.
Their maximization problem is given by
max
l
(P landn l − clandn lδ
ext
n +1), (1.17)
where the parameter δextn > 0 captures the fact that higher level of development
require higher expenditure. It seems likely that the higher the level of development,
the stronger the opposition of residents (voters) to preserve green areas, thus pushing
owners of undeveloped land to invest more money to convince municipalities to zone
new land for development.
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An alternative interpretation of convex land supply costs, likely pertinent in the
case of Switzerland, is that landowners bear the costs of making a plot of land fit for
residential development. For example, in Switzerland municipalities – which very
often own a considerable amount of land that is zoned for residential development –
bear the costs to connect residential areas to the sewerage system, electric network,
roads, etc. These costs likely increase more than linearly the more new development
occurs far from the center of the municipality.
The FOC for the maximization of the profit of landowners πl is
∂πl
l
= P landn − clandn (δextn + 1)lδ
ext
n = 0, (1.18)










Substituting Equation (1.16) in Equation (1.19), we have that the total amount of
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n ) captures shifters of the land supply function.
1.A.2 Residents
Given that individuals’ idiosyncratic preferences bkni(ω) are Fréchet distributed, it
can be shown that the probability πkni of living in n and working in i for a worker in
























such that the number of residents commuting from n to i and working in industry
k is Nkni = Nπ
k
ni. The number of residents in neighborhood n working in industry k
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1.A.3 Amplification coefficient: Detailed derivations
Using the fact that Pn =
Rn
in


























= 1− εi,Rn (1.24)
Using the present value formula Pn = Rn/in and the endogenous parametrization













































Table 1.B.1: Descriptive statistics
2005 2015
Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD
Endogenous variables
Price (CHF/m2) 4357 1000 10848 1270 5884 1261 13062 1809
Rent (CHF/m2) 17.00 6.47 43.90 3.85 19.35 6.11 39.83 3.96
Cap rate 0.05 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.01
Stocka 1298 3 33753 2399 1445 3 34294 2531
Time invariant
Mean Min Max SD
Intruments
Industry intrumentb 1.33 -1.38 6.72 0.88
Language instrumentb 0.09 -0.28 0.30 0.07
Controls Elevation (m) 0.62 0.20 2.31 0.25
Elevation SDc 0.06 0.00 0.47 0.06
nearest CBD (km)
Distance from
25.03 0.44 121.41 20.48
Stock 1980a 952 3 30147 2088
growth (2005-2015)
Construction costs
0.13 0.12 0.17 0.02
Constraints
Undevelopabled 0.04 0.00 0.81 0.08
Forest 0.26 0.00 0.94 0.18
Other regulationse 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.31




0.07 0.00 1.00 0.09
home buyers
Share of second-
0.11 0.00 0.81 0.12
Notes: aMeasured as the number of individual housing units. Note that the historic stock also
serves as a proxy for the intensity of regulation. bBecause our instruments are weighted growth
rates, they do not have physical units. cSD=standard deviation. dShare of water bodies and
undevelopable land within the neighborhood. eOther regulations include parks, UNESCO areas,
and BLN restrictions. eComputed as the sum of geographic and regulatory constraints on the
extensive margin. The sample is restricted to units of observations for which rents and prices per




Table 1.B.1 summarizes all variables used in our analysis. We report descriptive
statistics for the 2x2 km neighborhoods used in our benchmark specifications. Vari-
ables are classified as endogenous variables, instruments, controls, and moderator
variables, i.e. development constraints and type of investors. For ease of exposition,
we exclusively classify the standard deviation of elevation and the housing stock
in 1980 as controls. However, in our analysis of local supply elasticities based on
country grid data, we also use these variables to proxy for geographic and regulatory
constraints.
1.B.2 Switzerland
Figure 1.B.1: Major Swiss agglomerations in 2015
Figure 1.B.1 shows the country and cantonal boundaries, as well as the 15
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major agglomerations in 2015, according to the Federal Statistical Office (FSO).
Unsurprisingly, in 2015, the larger part of the housing stock was concentrated in
major agglomerations. Approximately 46 percent of the country’s housing stock
was located within 10 km of one of the 15 largest CBDs.
1.B.3 Housing advertisements
Advertisement data for rental and selling properties were provided by Meta-Sys, a
consultancy firm. By gathering daily advertisements from virtually all real estate
platforms in Switzerland, the proprietary data set consists of approximately 2.1
million postings of rental housing units and 0.8 million postings of selling properties
from 2004 to 2016. Importantly, Meta-Sys cleans the data from cross-platform
duplicates such that each advertised housing unit is counted only once in the data.
Table 1.B.2 illustrates the main variables contained in the data set.
Table 1.B.2: Housing advertisements
Variable Units Description
x-coordinate WGS-1984 x-coordinate of the residence.
y-coordinate WGS-1984 y-coordinate of the residence.
Rent CHF
Used to compute the rent/m
2
.
Asking rent per month including additional costs.







Floor space of residence. Used to compute the















Age Year Age of the residence
Time on market Days
market.
The days a rental or selling property is on the
Approximately 10 percent of the advertisements do not have precise geo-
coordinates. Only a particular “geographical center” is available for these obser-
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vations, such as the municipality, canton, or country centroid. Since our analysis
relies on precise geo-coordinates, we drop these advertisements.
Additionally, we lose observations when computing rents or house prices per
square meter, since not all advertisements contain information on the floor space of
the housing unit. Our final data set comprises approximately 1.6 million postings
of rental properties and approximately 0.65 million postings of selling properties.
These postings are aggregated over our within-agglomeration sample, each country-
grid cell, and municipalities in 2004-2005 and 2014-2015.
1.B.4 Federal register of buildings and habitations (GWR)
The Federal Register of Buildings and Habitations takes a census of the entire
residential housing stock of Switzerland. Two features of the data set are worth
noting. First, each building is georeferenced. Second, the register contains
information on the housing stock spanning the last century. From the 1980s, the
building period is recorded every five years. We aggregate data on the housing stock
for our within-agglomeration sample, country-grid cells, and municipalities in the
periods 1980, 2005, 2010, and 2015. Table 1.B.3 describes the variables used from
the building register.
Table 1.B.3: Federal register of buildings and habitations
Variable Units Description
x-coordinate WGS-1984 x-coordinate of the residence.
y-coordinate WGS-1984 y-coordinate of the residence.
Ground floor area m2 Ground floor area of building.
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1.B.5 Federal population census and the population and
households survey
Table 1.B.4: Households characteristics
Variable Units Description
x-coordinate WGS-1984 x-coordinate of the residence.
y-coordinate WGS-1984 y-coordinate of the residence.
Language Language code
the shift-share instrument for languages.
has a different language code. Used to compute
Main language spoken at home. Each language
Homeownership Dummy
in 2005, 2010, and 2015.
in 2000 and to impute the homeownership rate
0 if not. Used to compute the homeownership rate
Dummy variable. 1 if an individual is a homeowner,
Information on households’ socio-demographic characteristics is provided by
the Federal Population Census (FPC) and the Population and Households Survey
(STATPOP). The FPC is a census of the Swiss population that was conducted
with decadal frequency until 2000. From 2010 onward, STATPOP replaced the
census. Each year, STATPOP consists of a representative sample of at least
200,000 households. Both data sources share common information on household
characteristics such as housing expenditure and tenure mode, employment, mobility,
education, language, and religion. Table 1.B.4 describes the variables used in this
study.
Because the FPC provides geo-coded information for the entire Swiss population,
we can compute precise homeownership rates in 2000 for our within-agglomeration
sample, for each country-grid cell, and municipalities. Due to the limited sample
size of STATPOP, this is not possible in the following years. Therefore, we impute
homeownership rates as follows. First, STATPOP allows us to compute reliable
homeownership rates at the district level in 2015 (districts are composed of several
municipalities, remaining fairly small in size). Using the FSO 2015 definition of
districts, we compute the corresponding homeownership rates in 2000 at the district
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level. Second, we compute the growth rate in homeownership at the district level
between 2000 and 2015. Finally, we multiply the initial homeownership rates in
2000 at the neighborhood level with the computed growth rates, thus obtaining the
imputed homeownership rates in 2015.
1.B.6 Regulatory constraints
Table 1.B.5: Supply constraints
Type of heterogeneity Label Area share of
Switzerland
Source
Panel A: Geographic constraints
Water and undevelopable land Undevelopable 31.2% Arealstatistik Schweiz
Standard deviation of elevation
(land ruggedness)
Elevation SD – Arealstatistik Schweiz
Panel B: Regulatory constraints – extensive margin
Forests Forest 27.5% Arealstatistik Schweiz
Other protected areas Other
protected areas
30.7% Federal Office for the
Environment (FOEN)
Panel C: Regulatory constraints – intensive margin
Intensity of regulation Stock1980 - Federal Register of Buildings
and Habitations (GWR)






Table 1.B.5 summarizes the protected areas, as well as the corresponding data
sources used in the present study. One of the objectives of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is to protect the
cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal value. Currently, UNESCO
recognizes 981 cultural or natural heritage sites worldwide, 11 of which are located
in Switzerland. These areas mostly consist of buildings of particular architectural
interest, historic towns, and areas with valuable natural amenities.
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The Federal Inventory of Landscapes and Natural History (BLN) classifies the
most typical and most valuable landscapes of Switzerland. The aim of the inventory
– which was progressively introduced from 1977 to 1998 – is to protect Switzerland’s
scenic diversity and to ensure that the distinctive features of these landscapes are
preserved.
Finally, parks of national importance are characterized by beautiful landscapes,
rich biodiversity, and high-quality cultural assets. Municipalities and cantons
preserve these values and ensure their sustainment for the economic and social
development of their regions.
Figure 1.B.2: UNESCO, BLN, and Parks
Notes: Data source: FOEN. Own graph. Except for lakes, colored areas corresponding to extensive
margin regulations may overlap.
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1.C Shift-share instrument of main spoken lan-
guages
Following Bartik (1991), we compute the shift-share instrument of main spoken
languages according to the following formula






where f jnt0 represents the share of residents speaking language j within neigh-
borhood n at time t0. The term ∆ lnF
j
C(n) denotes the growth rate of residents
speaking language j in the canton in which neighborhood n is located over
[t, t0]. Importantly, we exclude the neighborhood n itself from the computation
of ∆ lnF jC(n). To implement Formula (1.27), we use the share of the eight most
spoken language in Switzerland according to the 2000 population census (remaining
languages are included in a ninth category), and compute the corresponding growth
of these languages at the cantonal level from 2000 to 2015. These languages are
in decreasing order of importance German, French, Italian, Portuguese, English,
Serbian, Albanian, and Spanish. They account for approximately 97 percent of the
Swiss population. See 1.B.5 for further detail on the population census.
1.D Assessing housing supply elasticity estimates
In this section, we aggregate neighborhood-level housing supply elasticity estimates
obtained from Equation (1.11) at the municipal, agglomeration, and cantonal level
and provide a ranking. In the next step, we compare these housing supply elasticity
estimates to other estimates provided in the literature.
1.D.1 Ranking housing supply elasticities
Table 1.D.1 contains a ranking of different areal units, from most to least inelastic,
according to their housing supply responsiveness with respect to price and rent
changes, respectively. These areal units correspond to three levels of aggregation:
cantons, major urban areas, and municipalities. Cantons and municipalities are
second and third-tier political units in Switzerland, whereas urban areas are defined
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by the FSO. Note that the ranking for the three levels of aggregation is nearly the
same with respect to price and rent changes, such that we do not distinguish between
the two changes in the following discussion.
Columns 1-3 of Table 1.D.1 show the ranking for cantons. Except for Basel City,
all cantons feature a rental supply elasticity above one. Unsurprisingly, Basel City,
Geneva, and Zurich appear in the top five most inelastic cantons. These cantons are
among the most urbanized ones in Switzerland, and, additionally, housing markets
of Geneva and Basel City are constrained by country boundaries. The presence of
Ticino and Basel-Landschaft in the upper part of the ranking is justified by the
fact that terrain ruggedness and forests play a major role in constraining housing
supply in these cantons. The most-elastic cantons are Luzern, Thurgau, Appenzell
Innerrhoden, Fribourg, and Jura. In contrast to the most-inelastic cantons, these
five cantons are characterized by a lower degree of urbanization and a comparatively
lower degree of regulatory constraints.
Columns 4-6 of Table 1.D.1 illustrate the supply elasticity ranking of the
15 largest Swiss agglomerations. Note that all agglomerations feature rental
supply responsiveness above one. The agglomeration of Baden-Brugg is the most
inelastic, whereas the agglomerations of Basel and Geneva rank only eighth and
ninth, respectively. Lugano is the second most inelastic major agglomeration in
Switzerland. This is hardly surprising, as its agglomeration area is constrained
by the Lugano Lake and the surrounding hills. Zurich also counts among the
most-inelastic agglomerations. We interpret this ranking of agglomerations with
due caution because the definition of the boundaries of a given agglomeration
seems to be arbitrary with respect to price and rent dynamics. For example, the
FSO defines the agglomeration of Baden-Brugg by a relatively small surface that
closely surrounds the respective city centers. Therefore, it is not surprising that
this agglomeration displays lower supply elasticities than that of Zurich, which
has a considerably larger surface. Similarly, the agglomeration of Geneva and
Lausanne incorporates countryside areas that make the aggregate supply elasticity
considerably more elastic.
Finally, columns 7-9 of Table 1.D.1 show the supply elasticity ranking of
municipalities. To save space, we only report the ten most inelastic and the ten
most elastic municipalities.
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Table 1.D.1: Ranking by supply elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cantons Major agglomerations Municipalities
Rank Price Rent Rank Price Rent Rank Price Rent
BS 0.26 0.93 Baden Brugg 0.56 3.17 Biel/Bienne 0.12 0.33
GE 0.70 4.94 Lugano 0.67 3.86 Genveva 0.12 0.35
ZH 0.74 5.07 Zurich 0.71 4.65 Carouge (GE) 0.15 0.43
TI 0.76 5.06 Neuchâtel 0.71 4.94 Onex 0.18 0.52
BL 0.77 5.38 Winterthur 0.72 5.12 Vevey 0.20 0.57
AG 0.80 5.71 Olten Zofingen 0.74 4.97 Binningen 0.20 0.59
VS 0.81 5.80 Biel/Bienne 0.74 5.22 Basel 0.20 0.62
ZG 0.81 6.02 Genveva 0.75 5.4 Vernier 0.21 0.60
SH 0.81 6.24 Basel 0.76 5.37 Rennens (VD) 0.21 0.65
SO 0.82 6.12 Luzern 0.76 5.77 Olten 0.24 0.69
AR 0.83 6.15 Bern 0.79 5.78
NE 0.83 6.65 St. Gallen 0.80 5.93
NW 0.84 6.23 Zug 0.82 6.16
BE 0.84 6.46 Lausanne 0.85 6.94
SG 0.84 6.52 Fribourg 0.86 7.04
GL 0.85 6.65
SZ 0.85 6.73 Remigen 0.99 10.20
VD 0.85 6.86 Flaach 0.99 10.26
UR 0.86 6.76 Roche (VD) 0.99 10.26
GR 0.87 7.01 Orny 0.99 10.35
OW 0.87 7.08 Perrefitte 0.99 10.38
LU 0.87 7.14 Rebévelier 1 10.40
TG 0.88 7.12 Sisikon 1 10.40
AI 0.90 7.52 Niederried b.I. 1 10.42
FR 0.90 7.67 Frasco 1 10.44
JU 0.91 7.84 Zwischbergen 1 10.57
Notes: Elasticity estimates are obtained by averaging neighborhood-level housing supply elasticity
estimates. Only elasticity values of the ten most inelastic/elastic municipalities are reported. Major
urban areas are identified according to the FSO.
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Among the most-inelastic areas are major urban municipalities such as Biel/Bienne
(BE), Geneva (GE), Basel (BS), and Olten (SO). The remaining ones are suburban
areas located within the proximity of urban municipalities. In contrast, the ten
most elastic municipalities are mostly located in remote areas displaying large land
availability and few geographic/regulatory constraints.
1.D.2 Comparison to literature
We compare our estimated price supply elasticities with those obtained by Saiz
(2010) and Caldera and Johansson (2013).42 We contextualize our results according
to these two papers for the following reasons. Because our methodological approach
is mainly based on Saiz (2010), we can investigate how housing supply elasticities
computed for major U.S. metropolitan areas generalize to the case of Switzerland.
On the other hand, despite adopting a completely different approach that relies on
country-level time series data to estimate a system of simultaneous demand-supply
equations, Caldera and Johansson (2013) provide an average supply elasticity for
Switzerland. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the only paper providing
such an estimate for Switzerland.
Saiz (2010) finds an average supply elasticity of 1.54 (=1/0.65) for U.S.
metropolitan areas when heterogeneity is not considered, suggesting that U.S.
metropolitan areas are more than two times more elastic as Switzerland’s 15
largest agglomerations, which have an average supply elasticity of 0.75 without
heterogeneous effects.43 When considering housing supply heterogeneity with
respect to prices, we also observe differences with Saiz (2010). Taking into
account geographic and regulatory constraints, housing supply elasticities of U.S.
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) vary between 0.6 in Miami (FL) and 5.45 in
Wichita (KS). As shown in Table 1.D.1, for Switzerland we obtain supply elasticities
estimates ranging from 0.26 and 0.91 at the cantonal level, from 0.56 to 0.86 for
major agglomerations, and from 0.12 to 1 at the municipal level.
We impute this difference to two factors. The first factor is the vast difference in
the aggregation level of the units of observation used in the two empirical analyses.
Saiz (2010) works at a more aggregate level: the smallest U.S. MSA is much larger
42Because the literature has focused on the estimation of supply elasticity relative to price
changes, in what follows, we do not discuss our supply elasticity estimates with respect to rent
changes.
43We compute this value by averaging the elasticities of column 5 in Table 1.D.1.
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in terms of area, population, and housing transactions than in any of the 2x2 km
neighborhoods in our data. The aggregation level, in turn, strongly affects the
variation across units of observations. It is reasonable to assume that there is vast
supply heterogeneity within the U.S. MSAs that is eliminated by aggregating data
for these areas.
As shown in Table 1.D.1, the distribution of supply price elasticities changes
according to the aggregation level, with lower and higher values becoming more
uncommon at a higher level of aggregation (i.e., the variance of the estimates
decreases).44
The second factor is the difference in the magnitude of geographic and regulatory
constraints of the two countries. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, Switzerland’s
geographic and regulatory constraints hindering extensive margin development are
extremely widespread across the country’s territory, making housing supply inelastic
by international comparison even in countryside areas. Except for a few extremely
constrained MSAs, in the U.S. there are ample quantities of open land are still
available for residential development.
Interestingly, Caldera and Johansson (2013) find that Switzerland has the lowest
supply price elasticity among a panel of 21 OECD countries, with an average supply
elasticity of 0.15 with respect to price changes. Their estimate is similar to the
supply elasticity estimates of the most inelastic municipalities. Indeed, besides
differences in the magnitude due to the methodological approach, we argue that
the estimate computed by Caldera and Johansson (2013) is strongly influenced
by core municipalities located in Swiss cities. Caldera and Johansson (2013) use
countrywide price indices whose dynamics are driven by core cities – such as Geneva,
Zurich, Lausanne, Basel, and Bern – as these are the places where most properties
are transacted.
1.E Detailed estimation results
Tables 1.E.1 and 1.E.3 replicate the results of Tables 1.1 and 1.2, respectively, and
show all the coefficients. Tables 1.E.2 and 1.E.4 report the first stage results for the
44Despite working at a more aggregate geographical level, Saiz (2010) supply elasticities vary
to a larger degree than in our case. The main reason for this larger variance is likely because his
units of observation (U.S. MSAs) represent a small share of the country’s surface and of the state
in which they are located.
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second stage results shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, respectively.
Table 1.E.1: Details: Inverse supply elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R
∆Log Q 2.367∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗ 2.004∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 2.084∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗
(0.442) (0.287) (0.342) (0.215) (0.316) (0.191)
Elev 0.212∗∗∗ 0.032 0.187∗∗∗ 0.035 0.193∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.042) (0.031) (0.037) (0.029) (0.036) (0.028)
Elev SD 0.176 0.069 0.121 0.077 0.133 0.075
(0.149) (0.097) (0.125) (0.095) (0.127) (0.093)
Log Dist. CBD -0.047∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.040∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.042∗∗∗ -0.009
(0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
Log Q1980 0.008 0.012∗∗∗ 0.007 0.012∗∗∗ 0.007 0.012∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Constr. Cost -0.377 -0.753∗∗∗ -0.137 -0.789∗∗∗ -0.190 -0.781∗∗∗
(0.516) (0.272) (0.428) (0.222) (0.430) (0.216)
Constant 0.083 0.133∗∗∗ 0.115 0.128∗∗∗ 0.108 0.129∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.045) (0.071) (0.045) (0.071) (0.044)
Instruments I I L L I & L I & L
Observations 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498
Kleibergen-Paap F 15.61 15.61 71.39 71.39 42.76 42.76
Overidentification - - - - 0.40 0.87
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The units of observations are obtained by partitioning
Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. All regressions control for supply shifters. Supply shifters
include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, log-housing stock
in 1980, total restricted areas, and change (2005-2015) in construction costs. Changes in housing
stock ∆Log Q, are instrumented using a shift-share instrument for industries I in columns (1) and
(2), a shift-share instrument for main spoken languages L in columns (3) and (4), and both these
instruments I & L in columns (5) and (6).
1.E.1 Rotemberg weights
The sectors that receive the highest Rotemberg weights (rw) in our baseline
estimates are information and communication (rw = 2.601), wholesale and retail
trade (rw = 2.063), administrative and support service activities (rw = 1.997),
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accommodation and food service activities (rw = 0.2843), and financial and
insurance activities (rw = 0.2571). Table 1.E.5 shows the correlations of the
initial employment shares across neighborhoods of the five sectors with the highest
Rotemberg weights with a number of potential confounders.
Table 1.E.2: First stage: Inverse supply elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R
Industries 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Languages 0.271∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Observations 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The units of observations are obtained by partitioning
Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. All regressions control for supply shifters. Supply shifters
include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, log-housing stock
in 1980, total restricted areas, and change (2005-2015) in construction costs.
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Table 1.E.3: Details: Inverse supply elasticities heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R
∆Log Q 1.001∗∗ 0.095 1.578∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 1.307∗∗∗ 0.321∗
(0.411) (0.218) (0.305) (0.197) (0.306) (0.176)
Q1980 ×∆Log Q 0.690∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.089) (0.200) (0.109) (0.151) (0.082)
Λ×Q1980 ×∆Log Q 0.241∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.049) (0.115) (0.059) (0.099) (0.048)
Elev 0.120∗∗∗ -0.006 0.159∗∗∗ 0.022 0.140∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.038) (0.029) (0.036) (0.029) (0.034) (0.028)
Elev SD -0.082 0.041 -0.042 0.070 -0.061 0.056
(0.112) (0.093) (0.134) (0.101) (0.119) (0.095)
Log Dist. CBD -0.012 0.005 -0.022∗ -0.001 -0.018∗ 0.001
(0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006)
Log Q1980 -0.056∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗
(0.013) (0.008) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008)
Constr. Cost 0.099 -0.493∗∗ -0.375 -0.866∗∗∗ -0.098 -0.659∗∗∗
(0.394) (0.238) (0.503) (0.261) (0.378) (0.211)
Λ -0.023 -0.054∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.053∗∗ -0.016 -0.049∗∗
(0.030) (0.021) (0.039) (0.023) (0.033) (0.021)
Constant 0.533∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.059) (0.134) (0.076) (0.097) (0.063)
Instruments I I L L I & L I & L
Observations 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498
Kleibergen-Paap F 12.98 12.98 23.48 23.48 19.46 19.46
Overidentification - - - - 0.56 0.49
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The units of observations are obtained by partitioning
Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. All regressions control for supply shifters. Supply shifters
include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, log-housing stock
in 1980, total restricted areas, and change in construction costs from 2005 to 2015. Total restricted
area is standardized and contains constraints on the extensive margin – water bodies, undevelopable
land, forest, and other protected areas. Changes in housing stock ∆Log Q including interaction
terms thereof are instrumented using a shift-share instrument for industries I in columns (1) and
(2), a shift-share instrument for main spoken languages L in columns (3) and (4), and both these
instruments I & L in columns (5) and (6).
Table 1.E.4: First stage: Inverse supply elasticities heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R ∆Log P ∆Log R
I -0.012 -0.012 -0.016 -0.016
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Q1980 × I 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Λ×Q1980 × I 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
L -0.144∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.041 -0.041
(0.048) (0.048) (0.064) (0.064)
Q1980 × L 0.348∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.223∗ 0.223∗
(0.095) (0.095) (0.128) (0.128)
Λ×Q1980 × L 0.776∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.078) (0.108) (0.108)
Observations 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The units of observations are obtained by partitioning
Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. All regressions control for supply shifters. Supply shifters
include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, log-housing stock
in 1980, total restricted areas, and change (2005-2015) in construction costs.
Table 1.E.5: Correlation of initial employment shares and potential confounders
Sector J G N I K
Change in vacancy rate 0.030 -0.047 0.026 0.013 0.029
Change in time on market
(rental)
-0.004 -0.009 0.012 0.090 -0.012
Change in time on market
(selling)
-0.008 -0.012 0.001 0.047 0.033
Ownership rate -0.080 -0.033 -0.055 0.135 -0.138
Growth in ownership rate 0.090 -0.044 0.064 -0.218 0.097
Unemployment 0.020 0.029 0.002 -0.026 0.075
Changes and growth rates refer to the period 2005-2015; ownership and unemployment refer to
the year 2000. Sector J denotes information and communication, G denotes wholesale and retail
trade, N denotes administrative and support service activities, I denotes accommodation and food
service activities, and K denotes financial and insurance activities.
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2.1 Introduction
Every year, the U.S. federal government forgoes tens of billions of tax revenue
to subsidize homeownership. In 2013, the Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID)
represented about six percent of the U.S. federal income tax revenue, that is about
98.5 billion USD. Yet this substantial tax expenditure is far from being equally
distributed across the country’s territory. In 2013, the average owner-occupier living
in New York County (NY) received 1,813 USD in housing subsidies – about 2.13
times as much as the average owner-occupier in the U.S., whereas owner-occupiers
of Sheridan County (WY) received an average of 222 USD per capita – about one
fourth of the U.S. average housing subsidy. In this paper, we investigate how this
unequal geographic distribution of MID subsidies affects local labor and housing
markets and, ultimately, welfare.
To this end, we start by developing a spatial general equilibrium model featuring
the main characteristics of the U.S. federal income tax system. In our model
individuals respond endogenously to tax incentives by choosing where to live, where
to work, and tenure mode. If they become owner-occupiers, they can decide whether
to deduct from their taxable income a standard deduction, common to both renters
and owners, or the interests paid on a mortgage loan. We calibrate our model to
replicate the observed distribution of renters, owner-occupiers, commuting flows,
and income across U.S. counties. Keeping federal public expenditure constant, we
find that suddenly repealing the MID would lower homeownership rates by only 0.19
percentage points, implying that the Federal Government has to forgo approximately
32, 000 USD of yearly income tax revenue to create a single new owner-occupier. The
repeal would even slightly increase welfare by 0.01 percent, suggesting that every
year U.S. citizens would willingly pay about 37 million USD to abandon the MID.
The slightly positive welfare effect of the repeal is the aggregate result of
heterogeneous responses occurring at the local level, which are mainly given by
the migration response of residents from congested housing markets to more elastic
ones, by a shift of the housing demand from the owner-occupied to the rental market,
and by a decrease of costly commuting flows across counties. As a result of these
responses, the spatial inequality of the income distribution across counties is lowered
by 0.46 percent. When using the structure of the model to quantify the importance
of spatial spillovers for the migration response of renters and owner-occupiers to
2.1. INTRODUCTION 55
the repeal, we find that approximately 33 percent of the residents’ elasticity is due
to non-local indirect effects. These non-local effects are mostly due to the spatial
linkages between locations via commuting, whereas migration and trade are less
important.
In our spatial framework, we allow locations to differ in terms of productivity,
housing supply elasticity, and amenities. The spatial distribution of renters and
owner-occupiers is determined by the opposing effect of agglomeration and dispersion
forces. The accessibility via commuting to productive locations and home markets
effects lead people to concentrate in some locations, whereas housing markets and
idiosyncratic tastes for location and tenure disperse them. In this baseline setting,
MID subsidies counter the dispersion force of housing markets for homeowners,
as they are proportional to the periodic cost of ownership. Due to commuting
linkages between locations, congested housing markets of productive locations do
not necessarily prevent people from working in that location and, vice versa, low-
productivity places might still attract residents. We match our model to observed
data on the distribution of renters, owners, and commuting flows, as well as to
estimated parameters for local housing supply elasticities, trade and commuting
costs elasticities. The unique equilibrium solution of the model allows us to recover
location fundamentals – productivity and individuals’ taste for locations and tenure
– that perfectly mimic the geographic distribution of the observed data.
Housing supply elasticities are of particular importance in our setting, as they
affect the equilibrium response of local housing markets to shifts in the housing
demand. In order to analyze demand shifts between rental and onwer-occupied
markets, we model two separate supply functions for these markets. This allows
us to track tenure-specific equilibrium changes in the periodic costs of housing.1
Following Saiz (2010) methodology, we use U.S. Census data on housing prices and
stock changes between 1980 and 2000 to estimate housing supply elasticities at the
county level. Specifically, we use housing demand shifters exogenous to the economic
channels present in the structural framework to recover the shape of the housing
supply function. Complementing the existing literature, we find novel evidence
that county-level housing supply elasticities show important spatial variation within
urban areas and between urban areas and the countryside.
1A similar approach has been adopted by Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) in the case of skilled and
unskilled workers consuming heterogeneous types of housing goods that are produced by separate
supply functions.
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Figure 2.1.1: County-level MID descriptives in 2013
(a) Average subsidy per homeowner (b) Probability of itemization
Notes: Tax and MID subsidy data stem from Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Housing values
provided by the American Community Survey (ACS) are averaged over 2009-2013. MSAs areas
are defined according to Saiz (2010).
Our spatial framework entails several advantages. First, it allows us to
investigate a variety of tax policies affecting the way housing subsidies are
distributed across U.S. counties. As shown in Figure 2.1.1, a spatial approach
seems pertinent, as the distribution of per capita MID subsidies varies considerably
across locations (Panel A) and itemization rates are spatially concentrated in
congested housing markets displaying high housing prices (Panel B).2 Existing
research has mostly focused on aggregate (MSAs) areas comprising these congested
markets and estimated the average effect of a homogeneous marginal change in
MID subsidies. Second, the spatial linkages present in the structure of the model
allow us to understand and quantify local spatial spillovers generated by the
initial heterogeneous shock of the MID repeal. This quantification is important
to determine the aggregate welfare response of the repeal. In that regard, empirical
research has to suppose that the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)
is fulfilled to estimate the causal impact of MID subsidies, which precludes the
possibility of spatial spillovers within treated areas and from treated areas to non-
treated ones.3 Third, our model allows us to investigate the joint decision of where
2Gyourko and Sinai (2003) point out that the distribution of income-tax subsidies benefiting to
owner-occupiers remains stable over time.
3A standard approach in the literature has been to use a high level of aggregation, such as
MSAs, to alleviate these spatial spillovers. However, as pointed out by Monte et al. (2018), spatial
linkages between locations remain important when using this level of aggregation.
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to live, where to work, and tenure mode. This is a novel mechanism not explored in
the existing structural literature. In the real world, we do expect individuals to react
to tax incentives by adapting their location and tenure choices, thereby altering the
geographic distribution of residents and workers across space.
Simulation results suggest that an unexpected MID repeal would lead to a slight
welfare increase. However, such a repeal would likely be met with hostility by owner-
occupiers. A legitimate question is thus whether the federal government might want
to implement alternative policies to reduce the disparity in the tax treatment of
renters and owner-occupiers. Despite not being its main aim, a recent example
of such a policy is provided by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), which was
promoted by President Trump’s administration and came into force in January
2018. One of the major elements of President Trump’s tax reform is the doubling
of the standard deduction that households (both renters and owner-occupiers) can
deduct from their taxable income.4 We use the general applicability of our structural
framework to evaluate the welfare impact of this increase of the standard deduction.
Following President Trump’s reform, we find that homeowners’ MID itemization
rates drop from 30.4 percent to 0.65 percent and homeownership rates increase by
0.03 percentage points, leading to a welfare decrease of 0.07 percent for the whole
of the country. Put differently, every year U.S. citizens would willingly pay about
544 million USD to avoid this specific feature of the TCJA. The welfare decrease is
mainly due to the subsidization of housing in the countryside, which diverts workers
from productive areas.
The present paper contributes to three strands of the literature. The first strand
investigates the impact of the MID on ownership attainment and various economic
outcomes.5 Recent empirical research suggests that the MID is an ineffective
instrument to increase homeownership. Hilber and Turner (2014) empirically show
that the U.S. federal and state MIDs capitalize into higher prices in major urban
areas characterized by tightly regulated housing market, thus achieving little to
improve homeownership rates. By endogenizing tenure choices and calibrating a two-
region framework for Boston (MA), Binner and Day (2015) argue that it might be
possible to reform the MID while leaving homeownership rates unchanged. Gruber
et al. (2017) empirically analyse a major policy reform in Denmark, which led to
4Some features of the reform, such as the doubling of the standard deduction, are expected to
come to an end in 2025.
5See Hilber and Turner (2014) for a comprehensive review of the literature.
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a substantial reduction of the MID for top-rate taxpayers. Their findings provide
strong evidence that removing the subsidy mainly lowered housing prices and had no
effects on homeownership attainment. Sommer and Sullivan (2018) use a dynamic
macroeconomic model to show that abolishing the MID in the U.S. would lead to a
higher welfare. The equilibrium channels driving this welfare gain are lower house
prices, higher homeownership rates, and lower mortgage debt.
Another strand of the literature investigates the spatial (mis)allocation of workers
and the role of housing supply. Calibrating a model for U.S. metropolitan areas,
Albouy (2009) analyses the impact of the U.S. federal income taxation on the
allocation of workers across space. He persuasively shows that for a given real
income, workers in high-density areas end up paying more taxes than those in more
remote areas. Adopting a structural approach, Diamond (2016, 2017) investigates
the link between housing supply and labor markets. In particular, these studies show
that, because affecting the migration response of workers, housing supply elasticities
can be exploited to identify the slope of the labor demand curve. Fajgelbaum
et al. (2019) investigate how the dispersion of U.S. state income tax rates affects
the location choices of households across states. The authors show that the more
pronounced the differences in income tax rates between U.S. states are, the higher
the welfare loss for the society, as workers spatially misallocate across space due
to tax differentials. Hsieh and Moretti (2019) find that housing supply constraints
misallocate workers by preventing them from working in productive areas, thereby
hindering economic growth.
Finally, we contribute to the structural literature that investigates quantitative
economic geography models by introducing several model extensions, such as
households’ joint decision of residential location, working place, and housing tenure.
Monte et al. (2018) integrate the spatial interdependence of trade, commuting, and
migration in a tractable model. Similarly, Favilukis and Van Nieuwerburgh (2018)
assess the effect of out-of-town home buyers on major cities like New York in a model
where heterogeneous households choose tenure and an optimal portfolio. Employing
a structural framework, Blouri and Ehrlich (2019) characterize optimal regional
policies that a central government can implement under budgetary constraints to
improve welfare and reduce income inequality across locations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
spatial equilibrium model. Section 2.3 describes the data, illustrates the estimation
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of county-level housing supply elasticities, and explains the counterfactual analysis.
Section 2.4 investigates the impact of repealing the MID and analyzes the role played
by spatial spillovers to determine the migration response of local residents to the
repeal. Section 2.5 investigates the welfare implications of making MID itemization
less attractive via a doubling of the standard deduction. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 A quantitative spatial model featuring hous-
ing subsidies
We consider an economy populated by a continuous measure L̄ of workers that are
distributed across N locations (U.S. counties). Extending the theoretical framework
by Monte et al. (2018), each worker decides in which location i to live, in which
location j to supply one unit of labor inelastically, and its tenure model ω ∈ {O,R}.
The federal government levies income taxes at an average rate τ and uses the
collected tax revenue to provide public goods G.6 Workers earn a tenure-specific
after-tax income yωni which is affected by the tax subsidies provided by the federal
government.
2.2.1 Households’ heterogeneous preferences
The indirect utility V ωni(h) of a household h living in location n, working in location












where bωni(h) is an idiosyncratic taste component for a specific combination of place
of residence, place of work, and tenure. We assume that the scalar utility shifter
bωni(h) is the i.i.d. realization of a random variable b
ω
ni having a Fréchet distribution
with a cumulative density function Ωωni(b) = e
−Bωnib−ε . The scale parameter Bωni >
0 determines the average idiosyncratic value workers attach to a specific n/i/ω
combination, whereas the shape parameter ε > 1 characterizes the taste dispersion
for such a combination. The higher the value of ε, the less dispersed the distribution
6In Appendix 2.D we extend our framework to include a progressive tax schedule and show that
our main results are left unchanged.
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of tastes.
The remaining components of the indirect utility are deterministic factors
common to all workers having chosen a specific combination. The variable κni
denotes exogenous commuting costs in terms of utility beared by workers living in
location n and working in i. Public good consumption is denoted by G and real
after-tax income is given by yωni/Pαn rω1−αn , where y
ω
ni denotes after-tax labor income,
Pn is the price index of a basket of tradable goods, and r
ω
n is the tenure-specific
cost of housing per unit of surface. The share of income spent for the composite
consumption good is given by the parameter α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1] governs the
workers’ fondness for public good provision with respect to real after-tax income.
Each location specializes in the production of a single tradable consumption












where cni denotes the aggregate consumption in location n of the good produced in
i. The parameter σ governs the elasticity of substitution between tradable goods.




n , where Rn is the number of
residents in location n and ȳn is location’s n per-capita disposable income. The





. In turn, prices pni equal a local price pi, determined where the
good is produced, multiplied by iceberg trade costs dni between any two locations.
2.2.2 Location-specific disposable income
The amount of per capita disposable income ȳn available in location n for tradable
goods and housing consumption is given by the after-tax income of households and
by the redistribution of public expenditure, mortgage interests, and rental payments
to that location. We start by describing the per capita income yOni of owner-occupiers
living in n and working in i, which differs in three important aspects from the one
of renters having chosen the same commuting pattern. First, owner-occupiers have
to pay mortgage interests to the financial institution providing the mortgage loan.
Second, owner-occupiers receive an additional source of income in the form of an
imputed rent, which corresponds to the rent they would have to pay if they were
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to rent the house in which they currently live in.7 Third, owner-occupiers choose
between itemizing the MID or claiming a standard tax deduction. The after-tax
income of an owner-occupier is thus given by







ζni = max(s, θmni). (2.4)
The term wi denotes labor income, τ ∈ [0, 1] is the flat income tax rate set by the






is the imputed rent, which depends on the share λOni of
owner-occupiers living in n and working in i and their corresponding aggregate
housing consumption HOni.
8 The tax subsidy ζni is affected by two exogenous
parameters, the standard tax deduction s and θ ∈ [0, 1], which governs the share
of MID deductible from the taxable income. We introduce this second parameter
to simulate changes in the deductibility of housing subsidies.9 Because renters can
only claim the standard tax deduction, their per capita disposable income is given
by
yRni = wi − τ(wi − s). (2.5)
Note that in contrast to a standard user-cost approach, Equation (2.3) is not
necessarily equal to Equation (2.5). This because workers’ idyonsincratic preferences
for location and tenure cause frictions between the rental and owner-occupied
market, thereby leading to income differentials.
We now discuss the redistributive component of location’s n income. We assume
that public good expenditure, mortgage interests, and rental payments do not leave
the economy. Rather, they accrue to a global portfolio held by a mix of federal
contractors, financial institutions, and landlords. We follow Monte et al. (2018) and
assume that in each location the holders of the portfolio consume tradable goods and
7As pointed out in literature, for example by Sinai and Gyourko (2004) and Sommer et al. (2013),
the non-taxation of imputed rental income represents a fiscal disincentive for owner-occupiers to
become landlords and rent out their property.
8In our setting, owner-occupiers benefit from capital gains in the housing market via an increase
in their imputed rental income. In Appendix 2.D.1 we extend the model to include property taxes,
which decrease imputed rental income.
9A repeal of MID subsidies, as implemented in our counterfactual simulations, corresponds to
the case θ = 0 such that ζni=s.
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housing proportionally to the number of residents in that location. The portfolio












where HRkf is the total housing consumption of renters living in n and working








n ) represents the total amount of
mortgage interest and rental payments in the economy.










where Rωn is the tenure-specific number of residents. Expected disposable income ȳ
ω
n






nk + Π, (2.8)
where λωni|n is the tenure-specific share of workers residing in n and working in i,






2.2.3 Federal public good provision
Federal tax revenue is levied on the taxable labor income of renters and owner-
occupiers. Provision of the federal public good G entering the utility of workers
















The provision of G varies according to tax subsidies s and ζnk that renters and owner-
occupiers deduct from their wages. Higher subsidies imply a lower tax revenue
10There are two reasons for not adding portfolio income Π to the income yωnk of renters and
owner-occupiers. First, we don’t want the real portfolio income to modify location and tenure
choices of workers. If this were not the case, a household could decide to move to a given location
to earn a higher portfolio income, which seems unrealistic. Second, according to the American
Community Survey, over 2009-2013 about 81 percent of owner-occupiers in the U.S. did not get
any income from interests, dividends, or rental income.
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and thus lower public good provision. Counterfactual simulations based on the
parameters s and θ are thus unable to isolate the direct income effect of housing
subsidies on workers’ decisions. To solve this problem, we follow Fajgelbaum et al.
(2019) and allow the federal government to adjust the average income tax rate to
keep the provision of the public good unaffected by changes in the subsidies.11
2.2.4 Housing markets
Households’ housing expenditure in our baseline model is tenure specific due to
their idiosyncratic tastes for a given tenure mode in a specific location, and the
fiscal incentive provided by housing subsidies. Given Cobb-Douglas preferences, the




ni = (1− α)yωniL̄λωni, (2.10)
where Hωni is the aggregate tenure-specific housing demand of workers living in n
and working in i and rωn is the periodic housing cost. The tenure-specific total
housing expenditure Hωn in location n is obtained by adding the expenditure of
renters/owner-occupiers over all workplaces i and by including housing consumption
from the holders of the portfolio. This leads to
rωnH
ω
n = (1− α)ȳωnRωn , (2.11)
where the right-hand side of Equation (2.11) is equal to
∑
i(1− α)(yωni + Π)L̄λωni.
Owner-occupiers subscribe mortgages with an absent financial institution charg-
ing periodic mortgage interests at an exogenous rate χ set by international capital
markets. Aggregate mortgage interests of owner-occupiers living in location n and




niPOn · ξ · χ, (2.12)
where Pωn is the value of housing per unit of surface and ξ is the loan-to-value ratio.12
11In Appendix 2.C.3 we relax this assumption and carry out counterfactual simulations where
we allow public good provision to adjust in response to a change in the housing subsidies.
12Note that the global portfolio affects mortgage payments only via the periodic cost of owner-
occupation. If this were not the case, a higher portfolio income would increase mortgage payments,
which seems unrealistic.
64 2. HOUSING SUBSIDIES
To convert the house value Pωn into a periodic (annual) cost rωn , we use the usual
finite horizon present value formula rωn = ιPωn , where ι =
χ
(1+χ)(1−(1+χ)−t) and t is the
lifespan of the residential unit.
We now turn to the supply side of the housing market. To analyze demand shifts
between rental and owner-occupied markets, we divide the two markets by modelling
two separate supply functions. This allows us to track tenure-specific equilibrium
changes in the periodic costs of housing. In line with Hsieh and Moretti (2019) and
Monte et al. (2018), we define tenure-specific housing supply in location n as
Hωn = H̄
ω
nPω, ηnn , (2.13)
where H̄ωn in an unobserved scale parameter and ηn ∈ [0,∞] is the local housing
supply elasticity. Note that we make the simplifying assumption that the elasticity
of the two markets is the same. Put differently, we allow for unobserved supply
shifters contained in H̄ωn , such as housing characteristics, to affect the supply of rental
and owner-occupied properties, but we restrict the relative supply responsiveness to
a price shock to be the same across the two markets. The hypothesis of same
responsiveness seems reasonable if we assume that factors such as regulatory and
geographic constraints do not impact the supply elasticity of the two markets











Under perfect local competition and constant returns to scale as in Armington
(1969), each location specializes in the production of one type of tradable con-




where ān is a local exogenous productivity fundamental and Ln is the amount of
workers. External agglomeration economies are captured by the parameter ν ≥ 1,
which increases the productivity of workers. Due to this agglomeration parameter,
workers supplying labor in larger labor markets are more productive, earning, ceteris
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paribus, higher nominal wages.
Because of the constant elasticity of substitution in Equation (2.2) the aggregate
value of bilateral trade flows Xni is




where profit maximizing firms cause prices to equal marginal production costs: pni =
dniwi
ai
. Using these profit-maximizing prices, we can compute location’s n expenditure





















To clear traded goods markets, location’s n workplace income must equal its





2.2.6 Labor mobility and tenure choice
Workers are mobile and jointly choose the location n where to live, the location i
where to work, and tenure mode ω to maximize their indirect utility V ωni across all
possible choices. Let V̄ (h) denote this maximum utility level:
V̄ (h) = max
n,i,ω
V ωni(h). (2.20)
As explained in Section 2.2.1, the stochastic nature of the indirect utility V ωni(h)
comes from an idiosyncratic preference term bωni that is Fréchet distributed. Because
bωni shifts multiplicatively the deterministic component of V
ω
ni, the indirect utility is
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The share of workers λωni living in n, working in i, and having tenure ω is given
by the probability that the utility provided by this specific combination exceeds





rk, ∀r, k, l). Using the fact that the variable maxr,k,l V lrk is also Fréchet
distributed and that λωni = E[P (maxr,k,l V
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The parameter ε, which governs the dispersion of idiosyncratic tastes, affects the
mobility degree of workers. In the case of no taste heterogeneity across locations and
tenure (ε→∞), local labor supply is perfectly elastic, implying perfect population
mobility. The expected utility for residence n and workplace i is

















where the expectation is computed according to the distribution of idiosyncratic
preferences and δ = Γ( ε−1
ε
) is a Gamma function which depends on ε. Inserting
commuting shares Equation (2.22) into expected utility for the residence and
workplace combination Equation (2.23) yields

















In equilibrium, we assume that workers do not want to change their place of
residence, place of work, and tenure. This implies that the observed number of
workers having chosen a specific combination must be equal to the corresponding
number resulting from the distribution of idiosyncratic tastes. More precisely,
summing over the probabilities across workplaces k, yields the number of tenure-
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Similarly, summing over the probabilities across place of residence k, yields the





Finally, we ease notation and define the share of workers commuting from n to








n and the total






Given the set of parameters {α, β, ν, σ, ε, ξ, χ, s, τ, L̄} and observed or estimated
values for {λωni, wn, rωn , ȳωn , yωni, Rωn , Lωn, ηn, dni}, we characterize the equilibrium of the
baseline model with the following set of conditions. The budget of the federal
government is balanced according to Equation (2.9), local housing markets clear
according to Equation (2.14), local labor markets clear according to Equation (2.17),
tradable goods market clears according to Equation (2.19), the price index formula is
given by Equation (2.18), and the spatial distribution of workers/ residents satisfies
Equation (2.22).
These conditions represent a system of 3N + 3N2 + 1 equations, where N is the
number of locations (U.S. counties), allowing us to recover the location fundamentals
{an, Bωni, πni, G, H̄ωn }. All endogenous variables can be expressed in terms of these
location fundamentals, exogenous variables, and parameters.13
As shown by Monte et al. (2018), this theoretical framework can be reformulated
such that Allen et al. (2016) theorem can be applied to ensure the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
13Appendix 2.C provides further details on how to use the structure of the baseline model to
perform counterfactual simulations.
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2.3 Data and estimation
In this section, we describe the data sources available at the U.S. county level.14
Additionally, we discuss the calibration and estimation of the exogenous parameters
required to conduct counterfactual simulations.15
2.3.1 Data
Parameters provided by the literature: We set the elasticity of substitution
between different varieties of tradable goods equal to σ = 5, as suggested by
Simonovska and Waugh (2014). Following Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011) and
Redding (2016), we set the share of income spent by households for consumption
goods equal to α = 0.7. We set the taste dispersion parameter equal to ε = 3.3,
as in Monte et al. (2018) and Bryan and Morten (2018). Following Fajgelbaum
et al. (2019), the propensity to public goods consumption is given by β = 0.22. The
strength of the agglomeration force is ν = 0.1, as in Allen and Arkolakis (2014).
Trade costs depend on the geographic distance between counties and on an average
trade cost elasticity ψ, such that d1−σni = dist
ψ
ni. The former is computed using GIS
data, whereas the latter is calibrated according to Monte et al. (2018), who estimate
ψ = −1.29. We conservatively set the lifespan of a house equal to t = 40, which
corresponds to the median age of buildings according to the American Community
Survey (ACS) over 2009-2013.
Housing data: Based on data published by Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED), we set the country mortgage interest rate equal to χ = 0.04. This rate
corresponds to the mean mortgage interest rate offered by financial institutions in
2013 for a 30-year fixed mortgage. Using the American Community Survey (ACS),
we collect the share of owner-occupiers at the county level. We calibrate the loan
to value ratio to ξ = 0.51 using the balance sheet of households and nonprofit
organizations provided the Financial Accounts of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (BGFRS). Specifically, we compute the LTV as the ratio of
outstanding home mortgages to the value of real estate assets. Monthly rents and
14Due to data unavailability, we exclude 87 (2.8 percent) out of 3,143 U.S. counties from our
analysis.
15A summary of the calibrated parameters is provided in Appendix 2.A.1. Additionally, in
Appendix 2.A.2 we present descriptive statistics and maps of exogenous and recovered variables.
2.3. DATA AND ESTIMATION 69
the value of owner-occupied houses are provided by the ACS.
Labor and income tax rates: From the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
we collect data on wages by place of work and the number of employees in 2013. By
dividing total wages by employment, we obtain per capita wages by workplace wi.
We use information on average federal income tax rates τ provided by the TaxSim
database of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in 2013.
Commuting flows: Data on bilateral commuting flows λni at the county level
stems from ACS for the years 2009-2013. Because the ACS does not report
bilateral commutes by housing tenure, we assume identical commuting flows for
owner-occupiers and renters in each county.16 We calculate tenure-choice specific
commuting shares λωni by multiplying the share of owner-occupiers and renters per
county with the commuting flow matrix λni.
Income and subsidy data: To obtain disposable income of renters yRni, we use
Equation (2.5) together with data on renters per capita wages wi and tax rates τ .
Owner-occupiers disposable income yOni follows from Equation (2.3) together with
data on per-capita wages wi, where we set θ = 1 in the baseline case. Next, we
derive the mortgage interest rate mni to finance owning properties, which follows
from substituting Equation (2.10) and Equation (2.2.4) into Equation (2.12) and
data on income yOni . We substitute bilateral income y
ω
ni, conditional commuting
shares λni|n, and the total number of workers L̄, into Equation (2.8) to recover ȳ
ω
n .
We solve for per capita expected disposable income ȳn using Equation (2.7) and the
bilateral income of owner-occupiers yOni and renters y
R
ni. Finally, using the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) data we calibrate s = 6, 358 USD to ensure that the share of
households that itemize in the model matches the one observed in 2013.
Recovering location fundamentals: We recover regional productivity by sub-
stituting trade shares Equation (2.17) in the market clearing condition Equation
(2.19). Given values for {Ln, Rn, dni, wn, ȳn}, parameter values for {σ, α}, and
estimates of dni, we recover productivity an, production amenities ān and equilibrium
values for bilateral trade shares. To solve for net regional consumption amenities
16This hypothesis is supported by descriptive evidence provided by the ACS Micro-data on travel
time by housing tenure, which suggests that, on average, renters commute daily only 1.2 minutes
more than owner-occupiers, making it unlikely that their commuting flows significantly differ at
the county level.
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Bωni/κni, we substitute prices from Equation (2.18) and rents Equation (2.14) in
commuting shares Equation (2.22).
2.3.2 Estimation of county-level housing supply elasticities
Following Saiz (2010), we parsimoniously parameterize the inverse local housing
supply elasticity as 1
ηn
= η + ηbuiltSbuiltn , where S
built
n is the predetermined share
of developed land in a given county. The parameters η and ηbuilt represent the
common and local components of the (inverse) supply responsiveness at the county
level, respectively, which have to be estimated. Specifically, the interaction with the
share of developed land proxies the combined effect of geographic and regulatory
constraints on local supply elasticities.17
In the Appendix 2.B.1, we show that the inverse housing supply elasticity 1
ηn
can
be estimated using the following regression equation
∆ logPn = α + η∆ logQn + ηbuiltSbuiltn ∆ logQn + h̄∗n, (2.27)
where ∆ logPn and ∆ logQn represent price per square meter and stock growth
from 1980 to 2000, respectively.18 The error term h̄∗n represents unobserved price
dynamics. Note that Equation (2.27) exclusively exploits spatial (cross-sectional)
variation to identify supply elasticity parameters, such that time dynamics are
exclusively used to partial out time-invariant unobservables at the county level.
Estimating Equation (2.27) by OLS likely leads to biased estimates due to the
simultaneous effect of housing demand and supply in determining equilibrium prices
and stock quantities. To solve this issue, we instrument changes in the housing stock
∆ logQn using exogenous demand shocks that are not modeled in our structural
framework. Specifically, we predict shifts in housing demand at the county level
using i) mean temperature levels in January, ii) fertility rates, and iii) a shift-share
instrument for changes in the ethnic composition of residents.
We motivate the choice of instruments as follows. Counties having attractive
17According to Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013), more attractive places are developed first
and, as a consequence, are more tightly regulated. On the other hand, Saiz (2010) argues that
geographic constraints become binding only in developed places.
18Due to limited data availability, we use the average surface of consumed housing at the region
level provided by the U.S. census to compute prices per square meter. In the Appendix 2.B.3, we
conduct a robustness check by including additional housing characteristics measured at the county
level.
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amenities have progressively become more desirable over time, as pointed out by
Glaeser et al. (2001) and Rappaport (2007). We thus expect temperature to
positively correlate with an increase in demand over time. To the extent that
individuals decide to live in the same county in which they are born – due for
example to high idiosyncratic migration costs – predetermined fertility rates are
also expected to shift housing demand upward as young adults start to bid on local
housing markets, as argued by Chapelle and Eyméoud (2018). Finally, as argued
by Altonji and Card (1991) and Saiz (2007), housing demand is also expected
to evolve according to the (predetermined) ethnic composition of local residents.
We follow and build on this proposition, and assume that the growth in local
residents can be predicted by a weighted average of the growth (at the state level)
of individuals belonging to a specific ethnicity, where the weights are given by the
initial distribution of ethnic groups.19
Median housing prices of owner-occupied housing units and total housing stock
at the county level are provided by decennial U.S. censuses and available on IPUMS
(Manson et al. 2017). GIS raster data on the share of developed land comes from the
”Enhanced Historical Land-Use and Land-Cover Data Sets” provided by the U.S.
Geological Survey. This data set exploits high-altitude aerial photographs collected
from 1971 to 1982.20 Mean January temperature comes from the Natural Amenities
Scale data published by the Department of Agriculture. County-level fertility rates,
measured as live births by place of residence divided by the total population,
are downloaded from IPUMS, which contains the Vital Statistics: Natality &
Mortality Data and the population decennial census data. To calculate the shift-
share instrument, we use ethnicity information using census data from IPUMS.
Table 2.3.1 shows estimated values of the parameters η and ηbuilt in Equation
(2.27). In columns 1 to 3 we report estimation results when using each instrument
separately. Column 4 show estimation results when all three instruments are used
simultaneously. As required by the theory, the sign of estimated parameters is
positive. In particular, the higher the share of developed land in a given county, the
higher ηn, thus resulting into a lower local housing supply elasticity. Additionally,
the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is relatively stable across the instruments
19We use the following main ethnic groups: White, Black or African American, American Indian
and Alaska Native, and Asian and Pacific Islander, and a category encompassing remaining ethnic
groups. See Appendix 2.B.2 for further computational details.
20Because the large majority of the data is collected before 1980, we consider it predetermined
with respect to our period of analysis.
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used to predict housing demand growth.
Table 2.3.1: County-level housing supply elasticity estimates
Dependent variable: Growth of housing prices per m2 between 1980 and 2000 (∆ logP)
Instruments: Log-temperature Fertility rate Shift-share All three
ethnicity instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ logQ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.144) (0.151) (0.147)
Sbuiltn ∆ logQ 1.908
∗∗ 2.026∗∗∗ 1.909∗∗ 2.088∗∗
(0.788) (0.715) (0.845) (0.815)
Observations 3.098 3.098 3.098 3.098
Underidentificationa 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.004
Weak identificationb 8.963 13.890 10.252 15.697
Overidentificationc . . . 0.514
Notes: Clustered standard errors at the state level in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1. a) P-value of the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic. b) Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. The
critical values for 10/15/20 percent maximal IV size are 7.03/4.58/3.95 in columns 1 to 3 and
26.68/12.33/9.10 in column 4, respectively. c) P-value of Hansen J statistic.
Using the estimates of our preferred specification (column 4 of Table 2.3.1), we
compute county-level supply elasticities as ηn = 1/(η + η
builtSbuiltn ). We obtain
supply elasticity values ranging from 0.39 (Queens county, NY) to 2.25 (Banner
county, NB). In Appendix 2.B.3 and 2.B.4, we provide further evidence about the
reliability of our estimates by controlling for potential supply shifters and comparing
our estimates with those of Saiz (2010).
2.3.3 Counterfactual analysis
We use the theoretical framework presented in Section 2.2 to undertake model-based
counterfactual simulations about the spatial implications of the MID. Specifically, we
evaluate two alternative policies that modify how housing subsidies are allocated to
individuals. With the first policy we analyze the economic impacts of suddenly
repealing the MID. In the second counterfactual simulation, we investigate the
general equilibrium effects of a doubling of the standard deduction, as recently
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implemented in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) under President Trump’s
administration.
To quantify the welfare impact of modifying existing housing subsidies, we
introduce the counterfactual ‘hat’ notation developed by Dekle et al. (2007) and
denote a counterfactual change as x̂ = x
′
x
, where x is the observed variable and
x′ its counterfactual value. To avoid modeling potentially complex changes in the
allocation of public good provision by the federal government, we follow Fajgelbaum
et al. (2019) and keep public good provision constant in all our counterfactual
simulations. Using Equation (2.24), we can then write spending-constant (Ĝ = 1)
counterfactual changes in U.S. welfare as











Equation (2.28) makes apparent that a cost-benefit analysis of modifying existing
housing subsidies should take into account not only real income changes, but also
changes in the commuting flows between local areas. A complete description of
the system of equations characterizing counterfactual simulations is presented in
Appendix 2.C.1. To provide a better intuition of our results, in what follows we
separately report counterfactual changes for each one of the endogenous variables
entering Equation (2.28).
2.4 Repealing the mortgage interest deduction
We start our analysis by investigating the welfare impacts of repealing the MID for
owner-occupiers. To this end, we shock the economic system by setting θ = 0 in
Equation (2.4).21
2.4.1 Overall impact
Table 2.4.1 shows aggregate results for the whole of the country. We compute
aggregate counterfactual changes of a given welfare component by computing
a weighted average of changes at the county level. The weighting scheme is
21In Appendix 2.C we provide further details on our counterfactual simulations. In the Appendix
2.D, we show the results of a repeal of the MID in presence of property taxes and a progressive
tax schedule.
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adapted depending on the considered welfare component.22 Columns 1 to 3 show
counterfactual results when location (place of residence and place of work) and
tenure choices are kept fixed as in the baseline scenario. Keeping location and
tenure choices fixed, allows us to investigate the initial income impact of repealing
the MID without diving into the sorting and tenure response of individuals. In
columns 4 to 6 we do allow individuals to adapt their location and tenure choices to
the repeal of the subsidy.23
In columns 1 to 3, owner-occupiers experience a negative income shock, while
renters a positive one. This is because owner-occupiers that were itemizing the MID
cannot do so anymore and renters are those that mostly benefit from a tax rate
reduction of 1.00 percent following the increase in the tax revenue of the federal
government. Because owner-occupiers are more numerous than renters, the overall
income effect is negative. This, in turn, leads to a decrease in the consumption
of tradable goods and to a corresponding decrease in wages. Housing costs also
decrease (increase) for owner-occupiers (renters) following the initial income shock.
The increase in housing costs for renters does not compensate the decrease in the
price of tradable goods and the income increase, resulting in a real income increase.
When individuals are allowed to relocate and choose their tenure mode, repealing
the MID leads to a welfare increase of 0.01 percent. We observe a shift of the housing
demand from the owner-occupied towards the rental market, as shown by the change
in the number of residents reported in columns 4 and 5. In total, homeownership
rate decreases by 0.19 percentage points due to the repeal. This shift of the housing
demand amplifies the response of housing cost changes, leading to even higher (lower)
periodic costs of renting (owning) a property. For renters, the increase in housing
costs considerably dampens the positive real income increase, which only amounts
to 0.03 percent. The decrease in regional income of owner-occupiers outweighs the
decrease in housing cost and price index, leading their real income to decrease by
0.04 percent. Population mobility thus dilutes the real income gain experienced by
renters, allowing owner-occupiers to also benefit – or limit their losses – following
22We weight using the level of the relevant outcome variable observed in the baseline scenario.
Changes in commuting are weighted using baseline commuting flows, changes in residents, income,
price indices, housing costs are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted
by the number of workers.
23The baseline outcomes for the two groups of columns (1 to 3 and 4 to 6) are the same, which
allows us to compare their changes when pertinent. Because location and tenure choices are fixed
in columns 1 to 3, thus leading to a welfare disequilibrium between renters and owner-occupiers, we
do not report counterfactual changes in welfare, commuting flows, and residents for these columns.
2.4. REPEALING THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 75
the repeal.24
Table 2.4.1: Repealing the MID
Keeping location and Varying location and
tenure choices fixed tenure choices
Renters Owners Total Renters Owners Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Counterfactual changes (in %)







n 6=i λni) - - - 0.79 −0.59 −0.14
Residents (R̂n) - - - 0.79 −0.43 -
Regional income (ŷni) 0.15 −0.09 −0.01 0.14 −0.15 −0.08
Wages (ŵi) −0.04 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
Housing costs (r̂n) 0.05 −0.05 −0.02 0.44 −0.30 −0.03
Price index (P̂n) −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
Real income (ŷni/P̂αn r̂
1−α
n ) 0.16 −0.05 0.02 0.03 −0.04 −0.05
Notes: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. Counterfactual tax rates adjust to
keep federal public expenditure fixed. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. In columns
1 to 3 workers do not adjust place of residence, place of work and tenure mode. We allow for these
responses in columns 4 to 6. County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted
averages based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting
are weighted by the number of commuters. Changes in residents, (real) income, rents, and prices
are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the number of workers.
Albeit the considerable size of the MID policy, we attribute the relatively
small decline in homeownership rates to three main factors. First, in contrast to
other studies, in our model workers have idiosyncratic preferences for tenure and
locations, implying that they are imperfectly mobile and do not fully react to real
income changes. Second, those areas in which owner-occupiers do not itemize the
MID because housing values are not high enough are not affected by the repeal.
Additionally, even in extremely expensive locations owner-occupiers can still claim
the standard deduction. Third, in line with the reasoning of Hilber and Turner
(2014), our estimated housing supply elasticities suggest that counties belonging to
24Note that because they face a unique local market price, differences in counterfactual price
index changes between renters and owner-occupiers are exclusively due to differences in the
weighting scheme.
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MSAs are fairly inelastic, thus leading to a capitalization on the subsidy in to higher
housing prices.
Welfare changes presented in Table 2.4.1 draw a global portrait of the welfare
consequences of repealing the MID. However, as noted before, housing subsidies
are unevenly distributed across space, with high productive areas receiving most of
them. This uneven distribution implies that the repeal affects some areas more than
others. In that regard, it is difficult to explain changes in incoming commuting flows
in Table 2.4.1 without considering the geography of the repeal. In the next section,
we thus analyze how the impact of the repeal changes across space and, in particular,
how it affects the location and tenure decision across MSA and countryside counties.
To this end, we exclusively focus on the case with varying location and tenure choices.
2.4.2 Changes in the spatial distribution
Figure 2.4.1 shows selected counterfactual changes that are particularly relevant for
our analysis.25 As it can be seen, the negative impact of the MID repeal on the after-
tax income of owner-occupiers (Panel A) is mostly concentrated in MSAs such as
New York, San Francisco, and Chicago. Unsurprisingly, these are the places where
homeownership rates and housing prices decrease the most (Panels B and C). In fact,
these areas feature high MID itemization rates and low housing supply elasticities.
On the contrary, as shown in Panel A, onwer-occupiers in the countryside experience
even a positive income shock, an effect which was masked by the aggregation scheme
in Table 2.4.1. In countryside areas the decrease in homeownership rates is more
contained (Panel B) and is mostly due to an increase in the periodic cost of ownership
(Panel C) caused by a shift of the housing demand. As evident from Figure 2.4.1, the
impact of the repeal strongly varies between metropolitan areas and the countryside.
In what follows we thus investigate counterfactual changes across these two areas.
Figure 2.4.2 shows a stacked barplot of the impact of repealing the MID for
renters (Panel A) and owner-occupiers (Panel B) living in counties located within
and outside major urban areas. Specifically, Panels A and B of Figure 2.4.2
correspond to columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.4.1, respectively. Panels A and B show
that the largest part of the impacts documented in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.4.1
are driven by MSA regions. Non-MSA areas experience, in general, the same type of
25The interested reader might refer to Appendix 2.C.2 for the full set of maps representing
counterfactual changes.
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welfare impact (same sign) but of lower magnitude. A notable exception to this rule
is the real income of owner-occupiers, which decreases in MSA areas but increases
in the countryside. We explain this opposite effect with the fact that most owner-
occupiers living in counties located in the countryside were not itemizing the MID
in the baseline specification and thus fully benefit from the income tax rate decrease
following the MID repeal.
Figure 2.4.1: Repealing the MID: County-level counterfactual changes
(a) After-tax income of owner-occupiers (ˆ̄yOn )
(b) Homeownership rate (R̂
O
n/R̂n) (c) Periodic cost of ownership (r̂On )
Notes: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. Workers can
change place of residence, place of work, and tenure mode. We depict positive
(negative) growth in green (red). A darker shading represents a stronger effect.
When computing the aggregate effect of Panels A and B of Figure 2.4.2,
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counterfactulal changes for the welfare components of owner-occupiers dominate
those of renters, mostly because they are more numerous. Because the MID repeal
makes MSA counties which previously claimed the MID relatively less attractive
compared to the baseline scenario, the aggregate effect also shows a clear shift of
total residents from MSA to non-MSA areas (see Figure 2.C.1 in the appendix). A
simple analysis of concentration (Gini) indices reveals that the repeal systematically
lowers spatial inequalities of income across counties by 0.46 percent. We observe a
similar reduction in spatial inequality for workers, and residents (see Table 2.C.1 in
the Appendix).
Figure 2.4.2: Repealing the MID: MSAs vs. countryside
(a) Renters (b) Owners
Notes: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. Counterfactual tax rates adjust
to keep federal public expenditure fixed. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. Workers
can change place of residence, place of work, and tenure mode. MSAs are defined according to
Saiz (2010). County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages based on
the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting are weighted by the
number of commuters. Changes in residents, (real) income, rents, and prices are weighted by the
number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the number of workers.
Notably, because the wage response is approximately the same for columns 1 to
3 and 4 to 6, we argue that that increases in agglomeration economies occurring
in the countryside due to the relocation of workers partially counter the loss in
productivity occurring in MSAs. Indeed, renters counter the increase of rental costs
by commuting over longer distances, whereas the decrease of ownership cost allows
owner-occupiers to live closer to their place of work, resulting in a 0.59 percent
decrease in commuting. Overall, commuting decreases by 0.14 percent. Because
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commuting is costly in terms of welfare, this overall commuting decrease improves
welfare.
2.4.3 Housing subsidies and spatial spillovers
An important body of empirical work in economics aims to quantify the causal
impact of place-based policies on a variety of economic outcomes. Recently,
researchers have started to raise doubts about the reliability of empirical estimates
describing the (average) treatment effect of place-based policies due to a potential
violation of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA).26 Questioning
the validity of the SUTVA seems natural when investigating policies affecting
determined areas due to the spatial linkages between regions. In fact, these linkages
might create spatial spillovers from treated to non-treated areas and from treated
areas to other treated areas, thus biasing treatment effect estimates.
As discussed in the previous sections, MID subsidies are itemized, on average,
only in places with congested housing markets displaying high housing costs.
Moreover, housing subsidies are usually unequally distributed across itemizing areas,
creating heterogeneous treatment effects. Virtually all studies aiming to quantify
the impacts of housing subsidies across space rely on empirical analyses exploiting
this variation in the magnitude of the subsidies among recipient regions. However,
the aggregate efficiency of spatially targeted housing subsidies critically depends on
migration and commuting responses, the shift between rental and owner-occupied
demand, and local prices in general. Ignoring the spatial spillovers of the subsidies to
other regions amounts to quantifying partial equilibrium effects.27 In our structural
model, spatial spillovers take the form of complex general equilibrium responses
through labor mobility and trade linkages. Because we calibrate labor mobility
with real-world patterns, these spillovers are not necessarily limited to neighboring
regions.
In this section, we suggest a model-based strategy allowing to quantify the
magnitude of spatial spillovers for residential location choices and thus, indirectly, to
26See Baum-Snow and Ferreira (2015) for a comprehensive review of the issue.
27Some empirical studies try to alleviate the issue of spatial spillovers by excluding observations
in the immediate proximity of treated regions from the control group. From a general equilibrium
perspective, this is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, spatial linkages are not necessarily limited
to neighboring areas. Second, spillovers also occur within treated areas.
80 2. HOUSING SUBSIDIES
determine whether they represent a sizable limitation of empirical studies.28 To this
end, in a first step we formalize the general equilibrium elasticity of local residents to
housing subsidies. In a second step, we disentangle the impact of local and non-local
effects (spatial spillover) on this elasticity.
Understanding residential location choices
Let γR
ω






denote the tenure-specific elasticity of local residents to housing












































where γ·, θ denotes the elasticity of a given variable with respect to housing subsidies.
Equation (2.29) tells us that the relative change in the spatial distribution of
residents due to a relative change in housing subsidies is determined by three main
channels. The first channel is the income response to the subsidy. The second and
third channels describe the relationship between housing subsidies and the price of
tradable goods and housing costs, respectively.29
The first term within the large parentheses always represents a change in the
local attractiveness of a location with respect to income, tradable goods prices, and
housing costs. The second term within the parentheses relates to a counterfactual
change in the attractiveness of all other locations, as their income and prices also
change. Put differently, residents in n might react to changes in housing subsidies
even if location n is not directly affected by the repeal, but its relative attractiveness
is. As such, even in counties where owners do not itemize the MID, the elasticity
of residents might be different from to zero due to spatial spillovers. A few remarks
28A similar analysis can be performed for the elasticity of other outcomes. We focus on the
elasticity of local residents because of its relevance for the policy we analyze.
29As before, we assume that the federal government adjusts tax rates to keep public good
provision constant, such that the elasticity of public goods to housing subsidies is identically zero.
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are worth noting. First, each of the channels in Equation (2.29) is tenure specific
and, as such, can have opposite sign across tenure.
Second, a crucial role in the change of residents is played by the taste dispersion
ε and the share of private expenditure 1− β. Both parameters govern the degree of
mobility of people, affecting their responsiveness to housing subsidies. For example,
when ε → 1, individual taste is all that matters and residents do not respond to
housing subsidies. When ε is higher, people are sensitive to a change in the subsidy.
In a similar vein, the more people care about real income over public good provision,
the stronger the incentives to relocate according to housing subsidies.
Third, the magnitude of the elasticities γ·, θ depends on exogenous location
characteristics. For example, the income elasticity γy
ω
nk, θ is expected to be positive
and large in magnitude in highly productive places located in MSA areas, which
typically have congested housing markets. Similarly, changes in consumption prices
γPn, θ are linked to trade costs. The housing cost response to housing subsidies γr
ω
n , θ
depends on local housing supply elasticities.
Quantifying the importance of spatial spillovers
As shown by Equation (2.29), the elasticity of local residents in county n is composed
of local effects – originating from elasticities where k = n, i.e. γy
ω
nn, θ, γPn, θ and γr
ω
n , θ
– and non-local effects that arise from elasticities in other locations, where k 6= n,
namely γy
ω
nk, θ, γPk, θ and γr
ω
k , θ. We use this distinction to separately quantify the
role played by local and non-local income, consumption prices, and housing cost
effects in the determination of local resident elasticities with respect to housing
subsidies. Specifically, we investigate how much of the observed spatial variation of
local resident elasticities is explained by local and non-local effects.
Specifically, we quantify local resident elasticities and the corresponding local and
non-local components of Equation (2.29) by simulating the MID repeal of Section
2.4. In a second step, we perform a Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition by regressing
local resident elasticities on all possible combinations of the elasticity components
and computing the corresponding R2 for each combination. For each component, we
then calculate the average improvement of the R2 when adding that component as a
covariate to the regression. This average improvement is interpreted as the relative
importance of the component to explain the variation in the elasticity of residents.
Table 2.4.2 shows the results.
82 2. HOUSING SUBSIDIES
Table 2.4.2: Importance of spatial spillovers for residents’ elasticity
Renters Owners
(1) (2)




Panel B: Individual channels
Income local 0.33 0.36
Income non-local 0.21 0.18
Price index local 0.14 0.03
Price index non-local 0.03 0.03
Housing costs local 0.25 0.33
Housing costs non-local 0.05 0.07
Totala 1 1
Notes: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. The header ‘owners’ denotes
owner-occupiers. The reported values correspond to the contribution of a given channel in a
Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition of the residents’ elasticity. a Because Equation (2.29) is an
analytical relationship, linearly regressing local resident elasticities on the full set of components
leads to a perfect fit.
Panel A of Table 2.4.2 evaluates the overall importance of local and non-local
channels for renters and owner-occupiers, without distinguishing which endogenous
channel responds to the subsidies. Our results suggest that 32 percent and 33 percent
of the observed spatial variation in the elasticity of renters and owner-occupiers is
due to responses having occurred in other areas, respectively. When assessing the
relative importance of local and non-local effects for each channel entering Equation
(2.29), as shown in Panel B, we find that income and housing costs represent the
most important channels affecting the residential elasticities of renters and owner-
occupiers, whereas the price index of tradable goods only plays a minor role. A
good part of the importance of the income channel comes from non-local effects
stemming from spatial linkages of the labor market via commuting flows. On the
contrary, non-local effects do not represent a major component of the housing costs
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channel, implying that the migration response of residents is mostly affected when
housing subsidies directly affect local housing markets.
These results seem to suggest that spatial spillovers are an important component
of local elasticities of renters and owner-occupiers to housing subsidies. This
importance highlights potential shortcomings of empirical analyses aiming to
quantify the causal impact of the MID on economic outcomes and welfare.
2.5 Making MID itemization less attractive
Up to now we have concerned ourselves with the evaluation of the welfare impact
of repealing the MID. Despite a repeal seems to be beneficial for the country, it
would likely be met with hostility by voters and owner-occupiers in particular. A
legitimate question is thus whether a government that aims to reduce the disparity in
the tax treatment between renters and owner-occupiers can overcome this hostility
by implementing a policy that makes MID itemization less attractive.
Despite not being its main purpose, a recent example of such a policy is
provided by the TCJA, which was promoted by President Trump’s administration
and came into force in January 2018. One of the major elements of this tax
reform is the doubling of the standard deduction that households can deduct from
their taxable income.30 The areas that benefit the most from the increase in
the standard deduction in real terms are those located in the countryside, where
President Trump’s received most votes during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Unsurprisingly, most pundits expect an important drop in MID itemization rates.
In this section, we thus investigate the welfare impact of doubling the standard
deduction s.31 As in the previous section, we adjust income tax rates to keep federal
public good provision constant.
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Table 2.5.1: Doubling the standard deduction
Keeping location and Varying location and
tenure choices fixed tenure choices
Renters Owners Total Renters Owners Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Counterfactual changes (in %)







n6=i λni) - - - −0.43 −0.55 −0.51
Residents (R̂n) - - - −0.05 0.03 -
Regional income (ŷni) −0.09 −0.09 −0.09 −0.47 −0.51 −0.51
Wages (ŵi) −0.31 −0.24 −0.26 −0.18 −0.13 −0.15
Housing costs (r̂n) −0.16 −0.15 −0.16 −0.40 −0.38 −0.38
Price index (P̂n) −0.33 −0.27 −0.30 −0.13 −0.12 −0.13
Real income (ŷni/P̂αn r̂
1−α
n ) 0.19 0.15 0.16 −0.26 −0.32 −0.31
Notes: We compute counterfactual changes by setting s = 12, 717 USD. Counterfactual tax rates
adjust to keep federal public expenditure fixed. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers.
In columns 1 to 3 workers do not adjust place of residence, place of work and tenure mode. We
allow for these responses in columns 4 to 6. County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated
using weighted averages based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes
in commuting are weighted by the number of commuters. Changes in residents, (real) income,
rents, and prices are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the
number of workers.
2.5.1 Overall impact
Table 2.5.1 shows the simulation results when doubling the calibrated value of
the standard deduction s – which increases from 6, 358 USD to 12, 717 USD – in
Equation (2.4). Columns 1 to 3 show the impact of the tax reform when individuals
cannot adapt location and tenure choices in response to the increase of the standard
deduction, whereas in columns 4 to 6 we allow for such a response.
30Other key elements of the tax reform are reductions in tax rates for businesses and individuals,
family tax credits, limiting deductions for state and local income taxes (SALT) and property taxes,
reducing the alternative minimum tax for individuals and eliminating it for corporations, reducing
the number of estates impacted by the estate tax, and repealing the individual mandate of the
Affordable Care Act.
31Despite our model is calibrated with 2013 data, changes in the tax system between 2013 and
2017 have been minor.
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In our simulations the share of owner-occupiers itemizing the MID drops from
30.4 percent to 0.65 percent after the tax reform comes into force, with only
counties having highly congested housing markets continuing to claim the deduction.
Doubling the standard deduction considerably decreases the tax revenue of the
federal government, which to keep public good provision constant is forced to
increase income tax rates. This increase in tax rates negatively affects the after-tax
income of residents that continue to claim the MID. Taxpayers for which the doubling
of the standard deduction is only marginally beneficial are also hurt by the increase in
tax rates and experience an income decrease. This negative income shock decreases
the consumption of tradable and housing goods, negatively affecting the economy
of the country and leading to a generalized wage decrease. However, because the
cost of living decreases more than the decrease in the after tax income, renters and
owner-occupiers experience a real income increase, with renters experiencing the
biggest increase.
In the case of immobile renters and owner-occupiers, our analysis seems to
suggest that doubling the standard deduction is beneficial, at least in terms of
real income. When people can adapt location and tenure choices with respect to
the baseline scenario, however, we find that the welfare of the country decreases by
0.07 percent. We explain these results as follows. In the mobility scenario, because
being an owner-occupier becomes relatively less attractive in most locations, many
individuals switch tenure and/or relocate to areas displaying more elastic housing
markets.32 This migration response to less productive areas further reinforces the
regional income decrease, which lower the demand of tradable and housing goods
even further with respect to the immobility case. The decrease in the price of
tradable and housing goods is not strong enough to compensate the income decrease,
which leads to a real income decrease, with renters experiencing a slightly less
negative decrease. In turn, because the decrease in commuting flows does not
compensate outweigh the decrease in real income, welfare decreases. Some of
remaining owner-occupiers take advantage of lower housing costs to move closer
to their work place, which results in a decrease of in-commuting.
Because, Table 2.5.1 only shows aggregate results for the whole of the country,
in the next section we provide further evidence on the spatial displacement of the
housing demand from MSAs to non-MSAs caused by the doubling of the standard
32The countrywide ownership rate is slightly reduced by 0.02 percentage points.
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deduction.
Figure 2.5.1: Impact of doubling the standard deduction: MSAs vs. countryside
(a) Renters (b) Owners
Notes: We compute counterfactual changes by setting s = 12, 717 USD. Counterfactual tax rates
adjust to keep federal public expenditure fixed. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers.
Workers can change place of residence, place of work, and tenure mode. MSAs are defined according
to Saiz (2010). County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages based
on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting are weighted by
the number of commuters. Changes in residents, (real) income, rents, and prices are weighted by
the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the number of workers.
2.5.2 Changes in the spatial distribution
Figure 2.5.1 shows the impact for renters (Panel A) and owner-occupiers (Panel B)
living within/outside MSAs of doubling the standard deduction . As it can be seen,
non-MSAs counties are strongly affected by the policy, with a clear shift of residents
to less productive areas. In fact, countryside counties – which usually display more
elastic housing markets – become relatively more attractive than counties located
within MSAs for two reasons. First, the real value of the standard deduction
is considerably higher in the countryside. Second, in these places the standard
deduction capitalizes less into housing costs than in counties with a lower housing
supply elasticity. As is shown in Figure 2.5.1, the shift to the countryside decreases
housing costs in MSAs counties, while housing costs in the countryside increase.
The shift to places with lower agglomeration economies reinforces the decrease in
regional income of owner-occupiers and renters observed in Table 2.5.1. Because
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people have to move outside MSAs to benefit from the doubling of the standard
deduction, we observe that incoming commuting flows of MSA counties strongly
decrease, whereas those of countryside counties increase.
2.6 Conclusions
Over the last decades, the staggering tax expenditure generated by the mortgage
interest deduction has fueled a lively debate among politicians and academicians
regarding its allocative efficiency. Evidence on the economic impacts of the unequal
geographic distribution of housing subsidies is currently missing. To analyze the
economic effects of this unequal distribution, we develop a spatial general equilibrium
model in which individuals respond endogenously to tax incentives by choosing
where to live, where to work, and tenure mode. We calibrate our model with data
for U.S. counties, estimating, in particular, local housing supply elasticities. The
general applicability of the framework allows investigating a variety of simulations
related to income-tax subsidies.
Simulation results suggest that repealing MID subsidies while keeping public
expenditure constant leads to a moderate decrease in homeownership rates while
slightly increasing the country welfare. The welfare gain is mostly due to a spatial
displacement of the housing demand from congested housing markets in urban
areas to more elastic housing markets in the countryside, and to a reduction in
commuting flows between these areas. In contrast to previous research, we quantify
the importance of spatial spillovers for the displacement response of residents due to
a change in the subsidies, finding that they explain about one third of the response.
In a separate simulation exercise, we show that a repeal of the MID is to be preferred
to a lessening of its attractiveness via an increase of standard deductions as recently
implemented under President Trump’s administration.
Our results hold important lessons for the evaluation of housing and tax
policies. Providing housing subsidies or income tax incentives significantly alters
the geographic distribution of residents and workers across space, which in turn
affects the aggregate efficiency of the policy. Non-local effects, arising via labor and
goods markets, also influence the efficiency of the policy, especially in areas having
strong spatial linkages with other ones. This prompts for a serious costs-benefits
analysis of policies that target well-connected regions, such as major urban areas.
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2.A Data appendix
This section contains further information about data calibration, as well as
additional descriptive statistics of the outcome variables of the model.
2.A.1 Model calibration
Table 2.A.1: Calibration of the parameters
Description Notation Value Reference / Source
Share of consumption expenditure α 0.7 Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011)
Share of public expenditure β 0.22 Fajgelbaum et al. (2019)
Agglomeration force ν 0.1 Allen and Arkolakis (2014)
Elasticity of substitution σ 5 Simonovska and Waugh (2014)a
Heterogeneity of preferences ε 3.3 Monte et al. (2018)
Loan to house value ratio ξ 0.51 BGFRS
Mortgage interest rate χ 0.04 ACS
Trade cost elasticity ψ -1.29 Monte et al. (2018)
Life span of housing structures t 40 years ACS
Standard deduction s 6,358$ IRS
Housing supply elasticity ηn - Own estimation
Notes: ACS: American Community Survey, BGFRS: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, IRS: Internal Revenue Service. a) Simonovska and Waugh (2014) estimate 1 − σ equal
to a value of −4, which implies σ = 5.
2.A.2 Summary statistics
We present summary statistics of our exogenous and recovered variables in
Table 2.A.2. Figure 2.A.1 shows the spatial distribution of selected observed and
recovered variables of the model.
Table 2.A.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Production amenities (ān) 1.56 0.68 0.55 10.64 3056
Commuters (L̄
∑










ni) 10.67 36.56 0.01 987.49 3056
Own trade shares, in % (πnn) 41.91 21.99 1.58 99.57 3056
Housing supply elasticity (ηn) 1.69 0.44 0.39 2.25 3056
Wages per-capita (wn) 37.23 8.08 20.14 104.37 3056
Income per-capita (ȳn) 54.85 7.4 40.38 112.07 3056
Owners (ȳOn ) 56.94 7.97 42 119.85 3056
Renters (ȳRn ) 49.46 6.53 37.15 100.66 3056
Workers (Ln) 58.57 206.16 0.14 5939 3056
Owners (LOn ) 37.89 117.28 0.1 2876.75 3056
Renters (LRn ) 20.68 92.27 0.04 3062.25 3056
Residents (Rn) 58.57 189.32 0.08 5734.31 3056
Owners (ROn ) 37.89 106.3 0.04 2689.48 3056
Renters (RRn ) 20.68 87.21 0.04 3044.83 3056
Periodic cost of renting (rRn ) 8.1 2.16 2.95 20.8 3056
Periodic cost of ownership (rOn ) 6.26 3.66 1.7 45.17 3056
Price index (Pn) 7.5 1.15 2.19 10.31 3056
Tax rates, in % (τ) 11.36 0 11.36 11.36 3056
Owner’s tax deduction (ζn) 6.48 0.55 6.36 14.36 3056
Ownership rate (ROn/Rn) 0.72 0.08 0.19 0.94 3056
Sh. of commuters (L̄
∑










ni/LRi ) 0.28 0.13 0.02 0.91 3056
Notes: Commuters, residents and workers are measured in thousand inhabitants, per capita wages,
per capita income and rents are reported in thousand Dollars, Public good provision in million
Dollars, and tax rates and trade shares in percent.
Figure 2.A.1: Overview of variables at the county level
(a) Wages (wn) (b) Residents (Rn)





Notes: We depict positive (negative) growth in green (red). A darker shading represents
a stronger effect.
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2.B Estimation of county-level housing supply
elasticities
In this section, we provide further information on the estimation of county-level
housing supply elasticities and on the reliability of our estimates.
2.B.1 From structure to empirics
We show how the supply Equation (2.13) can be used to derive the empirical
specification Equation (2.27). There are three main reasons to use Equation (2.27) to
estimate (inverse) housing supply elasticities. First, it is based on directly observable
variables, namely changes in housing prices and housing stock growth. Second, it
corresponds to Saiz (2010) specification of housing suppy elasticities, which allows
us to investigate the validity of our estimates at the MSA level (see Section 2.B.4).
Third, it is easier to find instruments that capture relevant cross-sectional variation
of the total housing stock.
Log-linearizing Equation (2.13), first differencing, and rearranging the terms
leads to
∆ logPωn = αω +
1
ηn
∆ logHωn + h̄
ω
n, (2.30)
where the error term h̄ωn corresponds to mean-centered changes of the supply shifter
H̄ωn . According to the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the term ∆ logH
ω
n represents
tenure-specific changes of the total consumption of housing surface. We decompose
this total housing consumption as ∆ logHωn = ∆ log Qn + ∆ log Share of ωn +
∆ log Per capita Hωn , where Qn denotes the total housing stock in a given county.
We can thus rewrite Equation (2.30) as
∆ logPωn = αω +
1
ηn
∆ logQn + h̄
ω,∗
n . (2.31)
The error term h̄ω,∗n now includes changes in the share of residents according to a
given tenure mode and per capita housing consumption. Parametrizing the inverse
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housing supply elasticity 1
ηn
, we obtain
∆ logPωn = αω + η∆ logQn + ηbuiltSbuiltn ∆ logQn + h̄ω,∗n (2.32)
Because we assume the same housing supply elasticity for the rental and owner-
occupied market, we drop the ω notation in the main text and use housing prices
per square meter as dependent variable.
2.B.2 Shift-share instrument based on ethnicity
To calculate the shift-share instrument we follow Bartik (1991) and construct an
exogenous housing demand shock by interacting the predetermined local ethnic
composition of the population with the corresponding growth rates at the state
level. The instrument should capture exogenous shifts of a given ethnicity at the
county level while avoiding endogeneity issues associated with using local growth
rates.
Denoting the shift-share ethnicity instrument for changes in the housing stock








represents the average ethnicity growth at the




residential share of ethnicity k at the beginning of the period. Ethnicity k is defined
according to the classification used in our data source assigning population to White,
Black or African American, American Indian and Alaska Native, and Asian and
Pacific Islander and other ethnicity residents.
2.B.3 Controlling for local supply shifters
One concern of our empirical specification is that unobserved supply dynamics
contained in the error term of Equation (2.27) correlate with the instruments, vio-
lating the exogeneity assumption necessary for the identification of the parameters.
Therefore, in this section we analyze the stability of the estimated coefficients to
the inclusion of control variables in Equation (2.27) that might proxy changes in
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the construction cost of housing and potentially correlate with demand changes. In
particular, we control for changes of per capita payroll in the construction sector
and for changes in the quality of the housing stock over the considered period.
The housing characteristics we investigate are the median number of rooms, median
building year, and share of detached single-family houses in the county. Data on
per capita payroll from 1980 to 1997 stems from County Business Patterns (CBP),
while housing characteristic in 1980 and 2000 is published by the US census. Both
data sets are provided by IPUMS. In addition to housing characteristics, we control
for relative changes in homeownership rates that are included in the dynamics of
the error term according to Section 2.B.1.
Table 2.B.1: County-level housing supply elasticity estimates including controls
Dependent variable: Change in log housing prices (per m2) between 1980 and 2000 (∆ logP)
Instruments: Log-temperature Fertility rate Shift-share All three
ethnicity instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ logQ 0.550∗∗ 0.267 0.248∗ 0.299∗∗
(0.246) (0.187) (0.151) (0.151)
Sbuiltn ∆ logQ 2.196
∗∗∗ 2.654∗∗∗ 2.470∗∗∗ 2.629∗∗∗
(0.737) (0.666) (0.746) (0.759)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2.599 2.599 2.599 2.599
Underidentificationa 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002
Weak identificationb 7.986 12.342 7.709 21.342
Overidentificationc . . . 0.685
Notes: Clustered standard errors at the state level in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1. a) P-value of the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic. b) Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. The
critical values for 10/15/20 percent maximal IV size are 7.03/4.58/3.95 in columns 1 to 3 and
26.68/12.33/9.10 in column 4, respectively. c) P-value of Hansen J statistic.
Table 2.B.1 shows the results. Despite losing about 16 percent of the sample due
to data unavailability at the county level, controlling for supply shifters does not
strongly affect our main elasticity estimates. The coefficient of the main effect does
become less significant for the different instruments, but it remains approximately
within one and a half standard deviation of our main estimates. On the contrary, the
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coefficient of the interaction effect responsible for the heterogeneity of housing supply
elasticities becomes even more significant while displaying the same magnitude. This
seems to suggest that these observed dynamics of the construction sector do not
considerably affect the value of our housing supply elasticities estimates.
2.B.4 Comparison with Saiz (2010) MSAs elasticities
In this section, we compare our housing supply elasticity estimates with those
computed by Saiz (2010). To this end, we assign each county to a Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) and aggregate county-level elasticity using population
weighted averages. As Figure 2.B.1a illustrates, our estimates show a strong positive
correlation of about 0.6 with those of Saiz (2010). However, as evident from this
figure, we tend to recover higher housing supply elasticities as Saiz (2010). The
reason for this higher number is that Saiz (2010) potentially underestimates housing
supply elasticities, as housing transactions occurring within MSAs likely occur in
dense and more inelastic places.
Figure 2.B.1: Comparison of housing supply elasticity with Saiz (2010)
(a) Comparison with Saiz (2010) (b) Saiz (2010)
(c) Own-computation (ηn)
Notes: In Panel A and B we compare our housing supply elasticity with
estimates described in Saiz (2010), which are based on US metropolitan
statistical areas (MSA)and in b) estimates of Saiz (2010), respectively. A
darker shading in the map indicates a higher quantile, i.e. more elastic places.
In Panel C we show recovered housing supply elasticities of our model reported
by quantiles. We compute the median value for counties belonging to the same
MSA and get a correlation coefficient between Saiz (2010) and our measures of
0.6.
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2.C Counterfactual analysis
This section describes the system of equations that we use to simulate counterfactual
policy experiments. Additionally, we provide complementary information on the
simulation results presented in Section 2.4 and 2.5 of the main text.
2.C.1 System of equations
Let x̂ = x
′
x
denote a counterfactual change, where x is an endogenous outcome
variable of the baseline model and x′ is its unobserved counterfactual value after a
shock to the tax subsidies through θ or s. We solve the following system of equations
with respect to counterfactual changes x̂, where observed outcomes x of the baseline
specification play the role of parameters.






Counterfactual changes in the tenure-specific number of residents and workers are
given by counterfactual changes in commuting flows, which can be derived from




































We now turn to counterfactual changes to the per capita labor income of owner-
occupiers. Because they have Cobb-Douglas preferences, households spend a





= (1 − α)yOni. Using the definition of mortgage interest in Equation (2.12)
and expressing prices into a periodic cost as in Equation (2.2.4), we obtain that
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mni = (1−α)φyOni, where φ = ξχ
(1+χ)(1−(1+χ)−t)
χ
defines the size of mortgage interests.
Substituting these terms into Equation (2.3) and rearranging yields the following
elegant expression
yOni =
wi − τ(wi − ζni)
α + φ(1− α)
.
Using this equation, we can write the counterfactual equation of the per-capital




ŵiwi − τ̂ τ(ŵiwi − ζ̂niζni)
α + φ(1− α)
, (2.39)
where counterfactual changes in tax subsidies are given by
ζ̂niζni = max(s, θm̂nimni). (2.40)
Note that because they represent exogenous parameters, we do not employ the hat
notation for s and θ. However, depending on the simulation exercise, the reader
must interpret s or θ in Equation (2.40) as the new value of the parameter that
generates the initial shock to the system of equations.
Renters per capita labor income directly follows from Equation (2.5)
ŷRniy
R
ni = ŵiwi − τ̂ τ(ŵiwi − s). (2.41)
Using Equation (2.8), we can write counterfactual changes in the tenure-specific

























kfmkfm̂kf + (1− α)yRkf ŷRkf λ̂RkfλRkf ), (2.43)
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Counterfactual changes in the tenure-specific cost of housing follow from Equation









We compute counterfactual changes in mortgage interest by substituting Equations


















Finally, we express tenure-specific counterfactual changes in commuting flows
by dividing the counterfactual population mobility condition by the equilibrium

























Note that Equation (2.45) to Equation (2.50) are expressed in terms of counterfac-
tual changes (and not values) because the baseline level of the considered outcome
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is simplified.






















Equations (2.34)-(2.51) hold for each location and allow us to solve the system for





. These changes build up the counterfactual value of the welfare, which using
Equation (2.24) is given by











where counterfactual changes in utility are equalized across space and tenure such
that no welfare arbitrage is possible across location and tenure mode.
2.C.2 Changes in the spatial distribution: Further details
To complement our counterfactual analysis of Section 2.4 and 2.5, we show how
tax subsidy reforms affects the spatial distribution of people, wage, and income
across space when adding renters and owner-occupiers together. Figure 2.C.1 shows
decomposition between MSAs and non-MSAs counties in the case of a repeal of the
MID (Panel A) and for a doubling of the standard deduction (Panel B), respectively.
Additionally, in Table 2.C.1, we illustrate how these changes in the tax subsidies
affect the spatial dispersion of income across locations. Finally, figure 2.C.2 shows
additional maps on the spatial distribution of main outcomes in the case of a repeal
of the MID.
2.C.3 MID repeal: Varying public good provision
The MID repeal directly impacts the tax revenue of the federal government. In
our benchmark model, the federal government adjusts tax rates to maintain public
good provision constant. In this section, we validate our main results by assessing
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the welfare impact of the repeal when the federal government does adjust public
good provision in response to the repeal while keeping income tax rates constant.
Table 2.C.2 shows the results. As it can be seen, in this setting the repeal leaves
the response of location and tenure choices mostly unaffected and leads to a higher
welfare increase. However, renters experience a negative (real) income change, as
they do not benefit from lower income tax rates anymore. Figure 2.C.3 shows that
our results concerning the shift of economic activity from MSA to non-MSA counties
are still valid.
Figure 2.C.1: MSAs vs. countryside: Renters and owner-occupiers
(a) Repealing the MID (b) Doubling the standard deduction
Notes: Panel A depicts counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0 and Panel B depicts counterfactual
changes by setting s = 12, 717 USD. Workers can change place of residence, work and tenure mode.
MSAs are defined according to Saiz (2010). County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated
using weighted averages based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in
commuting are weighted by the number of commuters. Changes in residents, (real) income, prices,
and housing costs are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the
number of workers.
Table 2.C.1: Impact of tax-subsidy reforms on spatial concentration
Repealing the MID Doubling the standard deduction
Renters Owners Total Renters Owners Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Counterfactual changes (in %)
Workers (Ĝini(Ln)) −0.01 −0.06 −0.03 −0.26 −0.39 −0.34
Residents (Ĝini(Rn)) −0.01 −0.06 −0.03 −0.24 −0.38 −0.33
Income (Ĝini(yni)) −0.05 −0.59 −0.46 −3.04 −3.55 −3.46
Real income (Ĝini(yni/Pαn r
1−α
n )) −0.04 −0.40 −0.31 −2.21 −2.56 −2.52
Notes: Columns 1 to 3 report counterfactual changes obtained by setting θ = 0, and columns 4 to
6 report counterfactual changes obtained by setting s = 12, 717 USD. Workers can change place
of residence, work and tenure mode.
Table 2.C.2: Repealing the MID (varying public good provision)
Keeping location and Varying location and
tenure choices fixed tenure choices
Renters Owners Total Renters Owners Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Counterfactual changes (in %)







n 6=i λni) - - - 0.78 −0.59 −0.14
Residents (R̂n) - - - 0.78 −0.43 -
Regional income (ŷni) −0.05 −0.28 −0.21 −0.03 −0.32 −0.25
Wages (ŵi) −0.05 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.03 −0.04
Housing costs (r̂n) 0.02 −0.08 −0.05 0.41 −0.32 −0.06
Price index (P̂n) −0.06 −0.05 −0.05 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03
Real income (ŷni/P̂αn r̂
1−α
n ) −0.02 −0.23 −0.16 −0.13 −0.20 −0.21
Notes: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. Counterfactual tax rates adjust to
keep federal public expenditure fixed. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. In columns
1 to 3 workers do not adjust place of residence, place of work and tenure mode. We allow for these
responses in columns 4 to 6. County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted
averages based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting
are weighted by the number of commuters. Changes in residents, (real) income, rents, and prices
are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the number of workers.
Figure 2.C.2: Repealing the MID (varying public good provision): County-level
counterfactual changes
(a) Wages (ŵn) (b) Residents (R̂n)









ni) (f) Periodic housing cost - Renters (r̂
R
n )
Notes: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. The header ‘owners’
denotes owner-occupiers. Workers can change place of residence, place of work, and
tenure mode. We depict positive (negative) growth in green (red). A darker shading
represents a stronger effect.
Figure 2.C.3: Repealing the MID (varying public good provision): MSAs vs.
countryside
(a) Renters (b) Owners
(c) Renters and owners
Notes: The figure depicts counterfactual changes obtained by setting θ = 0.
The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. Workers can change place of
residence, work and tenure mode. MSAs are defined according to Saiz (2010).
County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages
based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in
commuting are weighted by the number of commuters. Changes in residents,
(real) income, prices, and housing costs are weighted by the number of residents.
Changes in wages are weighted by the number of workers.
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2.D Model’s extensions
In this section, we formalize two model extensions and present counterfactual results
in the case of a MID repeal.
2.D.1 Property taxation
Property taxes account for less than one percent of the US federal tax revenue.
However, because deductible from the taxable income at the federal level, local
property taxes might affect the welfare and sorting decisions of individuals according
to MID subsidies. In this section, we thus investigate the robustness of our results
when households can deduct local property taxes from their taxable income in
addition to MID subsidies.
In what follows we outline which equations of our baseline model change. Let
τ pn denote local (county-level) property tax rates. Because owner-occupiers pay






, their regional income is





















When choosing whether to itemize, owner-occupiers thus weigh the mortgage
interests and property taxes against the standard deduction. We can rewrite the
disposable income of owner-occupiers as
yOni =
wi − τ(wi − ζni)






From Equation (2.55) it is apparent that property taxation decreases the income of
owner-occupiers with respect to our benchmark model.
To keep our model parsimonious , we assume that the tax revenue generated by
property taxation is collected by the federal government and equally redistributed
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λRnk(wk − s) + τL̄
∑
k∈N








This approach allows us focus on the effect of the increase in tax deductions caused
by property taxation without diving into considerations regarding the amount of
local public good provision provided by local governments. In fact, note that the
denominator in Equation (2.55) simplifies in our counterfactual simulations, such
that ζni is the main terms through which property taxation acts on workers’ choices.
In our counterfactual simulations we set τ pn = 0.01 across all location, This rate,
which is based on the ACS 2009-2013, corresponds to the median payment of real
estate taxes for the median housing value. We adjust the standard deduction to
8857 USD to match the observed itemization rate of individuals itemizing the MID.
Table 2.D.1 and Figure 2.D.1 reports simulation results for repealing the MID in
the presence of property taxes.
2.D.2 Progressive tax schedule
In general, tax deductions become more valuable with rising income due to the
progressivity of the tax system. Because tax progressivity makes the MID a
regressive subsidy, it creates an additional systematic link between a location’s
productivity and the tax incentives for owner-occupiers to live in that location.
We test the robustness of our main results with respect to this additional sorting
effect.
In what follows we illustrate how a progressive income taxation affects the
equations of our baseline model. In line with the literature, we model progressive
tax rates by introducing a parameter υ > 0 governing the progressivity.33 The
per-capita income of owner-occupiers is






where ζni = max(s, θmni) and the tax rate relevant for homeowners is given by
33see Eeckhout and Guner (2015), Heathcote et al. (2017) or Fajgelbaum et al. (2019).
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1− τOni = (1− τ)(wi − ζni)−υ. Renters’ income is
yRni = wi − τRi (wi − s), (2.58)
where the relevant tax rate is given by 1− τRi = (1− τ)(wi − s)−υ. The MID thus
creates a tax rate differential between owner-occupiers and renters because it shifts
taxable labor income according to tenure mode. Tax payments of owner-occupiers
and renters are given by
TOni = wi − (1− τ)(wi − ζni)1−υ (2.59)
and
TRi = wi − (1− τ)(wi − s)1−υ, (2.60)
respectively. Per capita tax revenue of the federal government must equal per capita





















average tax rates T
ω
w
for every level of wages wn. This is true for renters and
owner-occupiers if υ > 0 and MID subsidies do not exist (θ = 0). However, if
υ > 0 and MID subsidies are fully deductible (θ = 1), the tax schedule is not
necessarily progressive over the entire wage distribution of owner-occupiers. In fact,
because owner-occupiers spend a constant share of their income for housing, the MID
counteracts the progressive nature of the tax schedule. In this setting, at a specific
cut-off point of the income distribution the tax schedule changes from regressive to
progressive.
Our benchmark model features no tax progressivity (υ = 0), thus imposing
that marginal tax rates are equal to average tax rates. To introduce tax rate
progressivity, we calibrate the progressivity parameter according to Eeckhout and
Guner (2015), who estimate υ = 0.12 for the US income tax system. We adapt the
standard deduction to 6341 USD to match the observed share of people itemizing
MID subsidies according to IRS data. Additionally, we calibrate the tax shifter τ
to match the government revenue of our benchmark chase, such that the results in
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the case of progressive tax rates are not affected by changes in public expenditure
at the federal level. Table 2.D.2 and Figure 2.D.2 report the results of repealing the
MID in the presence of tax progressivity.
Table 2.D.1: Repealing the MID (property taxes)
Keeping location and Varying location and
tenure choices fixed tenure choices
Renters Owners Total Renters Owners Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Counterfactual changes (in %)







n 6=i λni) - - - 0.76 −0.57 −0.13
Residents (R̂n) - - - 0.76 −0.42 -
Regional income (ŷni) 0.13 −0.10 −0.03 0.12 −0.16 −0.10
Wages (ŵi) −0.04 −0.03 −0.03 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03
Housing costs (r̂n) 0.04 −0.06 −0.02 0.43 −0.28 −0.03
Price index (P̂n) −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
Real income (ŷni/P̂αn r̂
1−α
n ) 0.15 −0.06 0.01 0.01 −0.06 −0.07
Notes: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. Counterfactual tax rates adjust to
keep federal public expenditure fixed. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. In columns
1 to 3 workers do not adjust place of residence, place of work and tenure mode. We allow for these
responses in columns 4 to 6. County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted
averages based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting
are weighted by the number of commuters. Changes in residents, (real) income, rents, and prices
are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the number of workers.
Figure 2.D.1: Impact of eliminating MID (property taxes): Decomposing welfare
effects
(a) Renters (b) Owners
(c) Renters and owners
The figure depicts counterfactual changes obtained by setting θ = 0. The
header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. Workers can change place of
residence, work and tenure mode. MSAs are defined according to Saiz (2010).
County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages
based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in
commuting are weighted by the number of commuters. Changes in residents,
(real) income, prices, and housing costs are weighted by the number of residents.
Changes in wages are weighted by the number of workers.
Table 2.D.2: Repealing the MID (tax progressivity)
Keeping location and Varying location and
tenure choices fixed tenure choices
Renters Owners Total Renters Owners Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Counterfactual changes (in %)







n 6=i λni) - - - 1.14 −0.81 −0.17
Residents (R̂n) - - - 1.10 −0.60 -
Regional income (ŷni) 0.21 −0.13 −0.03 0.20 −0.21 −0.15
Wages (ŵi) −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
Housing costs (r̂n) 0.08 −0.07 −0.02 0.64 −0.40 −0.02
Price index (P̂n) −0.04 −0.03 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
Real income (ŷni/P̂αn r̂
1−α
n ) 0.21 −0.09 0.01 0.03 −0.06 −0.11
Notes: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. Counterfactual tax rates adjust to
keep federal public expenditure fixed. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. In columns
1 to 3 workers do not adjust place of residence, place of work and tenure mode. We allow for these
responses in columns 4 to 6. County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted
averages based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting
are weighted by the number of commuters. Changes in residents, (real) income, rents, and prices
are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the number of workers.
Figure 2.D.2: Impact of eliminating MID (tax progressivity): Decomposing welfare
effects
(a) Renters (b) Owners
(c) Renters and owners
The figure depicts counterfactual changes obtained by setting θ = 0. The
header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. Workers can change place of
residence, work and tenure mode. MSAs are defined according to Saiz (2010).
County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages
based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in
commuting are weighted by the number of commuters. Changes in residents,
(real) income, prices, and housing costs are weighted by the number of residents.
Changes in wages are weighted by the number of workers.
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3.1 Introduction
Land is a fundamental input in production and store of wealth of a country. Land
values are critical to understanding the development of urban economies, and they
are an essential source of revenue for local governments. Therefore, it is imperative
to advance our knowledge of what constitutes land values. Location, characteristics,
and the redevelopment option value determine the land value. However, the latter is
often disregarded. The redevelopment option value is the option, without obligation,
of changing the use of land and the physical structure built on that land to the
highest and best use (HBU). Thus, the redevelopment potential affects property
prices and plays a crucial role in how cities evolve.
In this study, we investigate the impact of the redevelopment potential on the
individual value of commercial real estate properties within more than 30 American
cities. We proceed as follows. Using Real Capital Analytics (RCA) data, we
first measure the redevelopment potential as the stated intention by buyers to
buy a property for redevelopment. To deal with the potential reverse causality
bias between redevelopment potential and transaction prices, we instrument the
redevelopment dummy with the fitted redevelopment potential. In the next step, we
thus run a probit model to predict the redevelopment potential of a given property.
We find that the difference between the current net operating income (NOI) per
square foot of land (sfl) and the one associated with the potential highest and best
use (HBU) of the property is a strong predictor of the redevelopment potential.
Finally, we determine the impact of the redevelopment potential on transaction
prices. Results show that having a 100 percent redevelopment potential increases
the property’s price by nine to 17 percent.
Because the choice to redevelop by investors mimics an American call option1, it
can be analyzed in an option pricing framework. Titman (1985) uses the real options
approach to develop a simple equation for pricing vacant land. He shows that under
uncertainty about the optimal future building intensity, it is often beneficial to
delay investment and maintain the option to develop in the future. This is because
the development call option is a levered derivative of the HBU, and this makes it
very volatile. By applying a real option-pricing model to real estate development,
Williams (1991) shows that the optimal date and intensity at which to develop a
1An American option can be exercised at any time up to the maturity date, whereas a European
option can only be exercised at maturity.
3.1. INTRODUCTION 113
property depends on the uncertain future revenues it generates and on its costs
of development. Quigg (1993) is the first study to assess the empirical validity of
the real option-pricing model in the case of real estate assets. Using data on land
transactions for Seattle, she finds that investors are willing to pay a six percent price
premium for plots of land having a development option. Using a similar framework,
Grovenstein et al. (2011) theoretically and empirically determine the real option
values of development and delay for vacant land in the City of Chicago. They find
that the magnitude of the option premium varies substantially across individual
land-use types.
Clapp and Salavei (2010), Clapp et al. (2012a), and Clapp et al. (2012b) devise
a smart technique to estimate the redevelopment option value within the standard
hedonic framework developed by Rosen (1974). They do that by adding the call
option to the net present value of a property and using a measure of development
intensity as a proxy for the redevelopment option value.2 With this approach, the
redevelopment option value is separated from the value of the property in its current
use. However, both values are related to the characteristics of the property. For
example, the present value of the property in its current use decreases with age, but
its redevelopment option value increases with age. The authors also point out that
the quantity of structural capital increases the value of the property in its current use
but decreases the redevelopment option value. In contrast, McMillen and O’Sullivan
(2013) find that under uncertainty over the future price of structural capital, the
redevelopment option value may increase with the quantity of structural capital.
Munneke and Womack (2018) estimate the redevelopment option value by
introducing the probability of redevelopment into the hedonic model. More
specifically, they estimate the probability of redevelopment with a probit model and
include it as an explanatory variable in a hedonic regression. The authors find that
location is a significant determinant of redevelopment and that the redevelopment
option values vary substantially across space.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we estimate the
redevelopment option value using a novel strategy relying on three different proxies
for redevelopment. These proxies are the difference in NOI, floor-to-area ratio
(FAR), and property type to those of surrounding properties developed at the HBU.
2As intensity measures the authors use the maximum floor space allowed minus the floor space
already built, lagged assessed building value divided by assessed land value, and the ratio of the
square footage of the property to the square footage of neighboring new constructions.
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Second, using these proxies, we investigate the determinants leading investors to
buy a property for redevelopment. Third, we examine renovations as a competing
risk to redevelopments. This helps us document the differences in depreciation
channels of a property. Finally, we fill the existing gap in studies analyzing the
redevelopment option value for commercial real estate. In doing so, we differentiate
between residential, office, retail, and industrial properties.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 illustrates
the conceptual framework for the valuation of redevelopment options. Section
3.3 presents the empirical methodology and discuses the identifying assumptions.
Section 3.4 describes the rich data on commercial real estate and the construction
of the proxy variables. Section 3.5 analyzes the results for the different estimation
models and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual framework
In this section, we lay out the fundamental mechanisms behind the valuation
of redevelopment options. Figure 3.2.1 illustrates how the redevelopment option
value is linked to land and property values over several real estate cycles. The
horizontal axis shows the time, and the vertical axis shows the value of the property’s
components. At the points indicated by “D,” the property is (re)developed. Each
time this implies a large investment of capital to build a physical structure on a
given plot of land.
As Geltner et al. (2014) persuasively show with a real option value model, land
is always developed or redeveloped at its HBU as-if-vacant. In other words, the
developer builds the most profitable structure possible for that location at that
point in time.3 The dotted pink line “H” shows the HBU value over time. This
value depends on the location’s surroundings, secular trends, and capital flows that
affect the property value. In our stylized figure, the fluctuations in H represent the
volatility and cyclicality in the real estate market.
The solid black line “P” depicts the property asset value. This is the value
the property would sell for in a well-functioning market. The dashed red line “L”
illustrates the land value as if it were vacant. Following the residual theory of land
value, this must equal the value of current HBU minus the cost of the physical
3Note that the developer takes the construction and demolition costs into account.
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structure required to attain this HBU.4 The jumps in the property asset value
at times D reflects the investment of financial capital to develop or redevelop the
physical structure.
Figure 3.2.1: Property and location value components over time
Notes: This figure is based on Figure 1 from Geltner et al. (2018).
Over time, the property depreciates due to physical, functional, and/or economic
obsolescence. Physical obsolescence refers to the physical wear down of property,
e.g., the chipping or fading of the paint. Functional obsolescence refers to changes in
technology, tastes, and user requirements, e.g., building’s sustainability has become
increasingly important. Lastly, economic obsolescence refers to the case when the
building’s structure is no longer suitable to the HBU, and therefore is the wrong
type. As pointed out by Geltner et al. (2018), this last type of obsolescence reflects
the redevelopment option value.5 When the value of the existing structure and land
is equal (or less) to the value of vacant land and the demolition costs, the property
is redeveloped. Brueckner (1980) and Wheaton (1982) outline this discernment
theoretically.6
4In this figure, we assume that the construction costs remains approximately constant over
time.
5Note that the redevelopment option value increases, over time, as the building structure
depreciates, and the HBU evolves away from the current building structure.
6In bust periods, the HBU may be so low that it is not profitable to redevelop. This was the
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The solid blue line “R” shows the redevelopment option value. Note that the
redevelopment option value is not a separate asset or legal claim, but it is embedded
in the land value. This call option can be exercised at any time upon payment of
the physical structure to attain the HBU. The strike price of the redevelopment
call option includes the demolition cost and the opportunity cost of the existing
structure. This opportunity cost is the loss in NOI during the redevelopment. Right
after a (re)development, the redevelopment option value is very low, because the
opportunity cost of the new existing structure is very high. As time elapses and the
HBU evolves, the redevelopment option value gets deeper in the money.
3.3 Empirical analysis
We build on Clapp and Salavei (2010) and express the (log) price per square foot
P of a property as a linear function of redevelopment potential r and a vector of
market and physical characteristics X:
P = β0 + β1r + β2X + ε, (3.1)
where ε is the error term.7 The sale price P includes the price of land and the value
of the existing structure.
To consistently estimate (3.1) with OLS, the assumption E[rε|X] = 0 must hold.
However, the literature tells us that the redevelopment potential r is a function of
the price per sf P , implying that OLS estimates are plagued by reverse causality
bias. Since, ceteris paribus, we expect that a higher price reduces the redevelopment
potential, the OLS estimate β̂1,OLS is biased downwards.
Typically, reverse causality is dealt with 2SLS models, instrumenting for the
endogenous variable. However, we do not observe redevelopment potential r (a
continuous variable). We only observe a binary variable rd indicating whether or
not a property was bought to be redeveloped. Since our variable of interest is
an endogenous dummy (Vytlacil and Yildiz 2007), we follow Heckman (1978),
Angrist and Krueger (2001), and Adams et al. (2009), and employ the following
case, e.g., in certain areas in Detroit after the Great Recession. In such cases, the redevelopment
option value is zero. The right without obligation of the redevelopment option value means it
cannot be negative.
7We omit property-level subscripts for readability.
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procedure. First, we estimate a probit model of the determinants of redevelopment
rd. The model is given by:
Pr(rd = 1|X,Z) = Φ(θ0 + θ1X + θ2Z + ρ), (3.2)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, Z defines proxies
for the determinants of redevelopment not included in (3.1), and ρ is the error
term. After estimating (3.2), we derive a continuous redevelopment potential r̂p by
predicting fitted values according to the considered variables.
In the next step, we estimate a 2SLS model using the continuous fitted
redevelopment potential r̂p as an instrument for the redevelopment dummy rd. More
precisely, we estimate the equation
P = β0 + β1rd + β2X + ε, (3.3)
where the first stage is given by
rd = γ0 + γ1r̂p + γ2X + ε
′, (3.4)
where ε′ is the error term. Our procedure is valid if our proxies Z only affect price
P through the redevelopment option value. Note that this is different from just
plugging in the fitted potential r̂p directly into Equation (3.3) and running an OLS,
i.e., regressing P on r̂p and X directly. As pointed out by Angrist and Krueger (2001)
this could lead to misspecification and inconsistent estimates. Our specification
has several advantages. First, the IV standard errors are still asymptotically valid
(Kelejian 1971). Second, we take the nature of the endogenous redevelopment
dummy rd into account. Third, we transform the redevelopment dummy rd
into a continuous redevelopment potential r̂d, which allows us to estimate the
redevelopment option value for all the properties according to their characteristics.
3.4 Data and stylized facts
We rely on RCA georeferenced transaction data on commercial properties from 2001
to 2018. RCA captures over 90 percent of all commercial real estate transactions
in the institutional investor space. This unique data set covers more than 30
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American cities. It features property characteristics such as sales prices, NOI, size
of land, FAR, year of sale, property type, location, and construction year. The data
also contains information on the intent of purchase, i.e., whether it is used as an
investment, or if the property will be redeveloped (see Bokhari and Geltner (2018)).
First, we split the data into two subsets. The first subset is data on newly
developed properties, defined as everything built after 2001. This data is used to
construct the proxies Z and is further discussed in Section 3.4.1. The second subset,
are all the properties built before 2001 and is described in this Section. After
filtering out extreme values and dropping missing values, we are left with almost
46,000 transactions between 2001 and 2018 of properties built before 2001. Of these
nearly 46,000 properties, over five percent were purchased with the intent to be
redeveloped, see Table 3.4.1. We split our data in 2001 because of two reasons.
First, the data covers transaction prices from 2001 onwards. Second, commercial
real estate cycles can span decades (Wheaton 1999).
All data comes directly from RCA, except for the NOI per sfl for the
redevelopment properties. In approximately 70 percent of the cases, these properties
have either missing or zero NOI, as the properties were already vacated for
redevelopment.8 Given that we are interested in the potential NOI per sfl of the
existing structure, we impute the missing and zero NOIs as follows. First, we find
the closest ten properties that are not being redeveloped, were built within ten years,
were sold within five years, are within five kilometers, and are the same property type
as the target property. Subsequently, we impute the weighted average NOI per sfl.
The weight is determined by the inverse of the distance to the target property. We
use market and property type-specific NOI indexes provided to us by RCA to correct
the imputed NOIs if the year of sale of the “comparable” is different from the year of
sale of the target property. Note that we only allow for a five-year difference and that
we impute the NOI per square foot of land (sfl) and not structure. This is because
investors want to maximize the income per sfl when they redevelop. The top panel
of Table 3.4.1 shows descriptive statistics of all the transactions in this data set. The
middle panel shows the same descriptive statistics of redevelopment properties, and
the bottom panel shows the descriptive statistics of non-redevelopment properties.
8As is apparent from the data, the structure of properties with missing or zero NOI is still
standing. We exclude development sites from the data.
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Table 3.4.1: Descriptive statistics of data set
variable mean SD 10% 90%
Full sample (45,732 obs.)
Redevelopments 0.055 0.227 0.000 0.000
Sales price per sfl 225.347 538.199 15.089 525.123
NOI per sfl 12.560 28.487 1.190 29.194
Distance to closest CBD (km) 24.464 30.583 5.190 50.056
Age 38.823 23.663 16.000 81.000
Floor area ratio (FAR) 0.940 1.383 0.217 2.410
Redevelopment properties (2,494 obs.)
Sales price per sfl 389.875 823.417 14.954 980.137
NOI per sfl 24.038 45.162 1.576 69.154
Distance to closest CBD (km) 19.217 23.502 2.315 44.855
Age 47.561 26.812 18.000 91.000
Floor area ratio (FAR) 1.232 1.795 0.215 3.232
Non redevelopment properties (43,238 obs)
Sales price per sfl 215.857 515.385 15.100 504.606
NOI per sfl 11.898 27.069 1.174 27.431
Distance to closest CBD (km) 24.767 30.915 5.371 50.290
Age 38.319 23.369 16.000 79.000
Floor area ratio (FAR) 0.923 1.354 0.217 2.350
Notes: All data provided to us by Real Capital Analytics (RCA) for the years 2001 until 2018, for
properties built before 2001. SD is the standard deviation, lower is the 10th quantile quantile and
higher is the 90th quantile. NOI is the Net Operating Income of the property. The floor area ratio
is the amount of square foot divided by the sfl. CBD is the Central Business District, as defined
by RCA. Age is the construction year of a property minus the year sold. The middle panel gives
the descriptive statistics of a subset of our full sample (top panel) of redevelopment properties.
The bottom panel gives the descriptive statistics of the subset of non-redevelopment properties.
Table 3.4.1 contains some interesting stylized facts. There are some clear
differences between redevelopment properties and non-redevelopment properties.
Note that the NOI and sales price per sfl for redevelopment properties are both
approximately double the ones for non-redevelopment properties, while the FAR is
only slightly larger. The FAR is 0.9 for non-redevelopment properties and 1.2 for
redevelopment properties, whereas the NOI is $12 and $24 per sfl, respectively. Sales
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prices per sf are slightly less than double for redevelopment properties ($390) than
for non-redevelopment properties ($215). Redevelopment properties are, on average,
also closer to the central business district (CBD). All of this is consistent with the
literature, i.e., redevelopments are triggered by high land values. As expected, the
age of redevelopment properties is also higher than for non-redevelopment properties.
This is because the redevelopment option value increases with age.
In our estimations, we include matrix X to control for the differences between
redevelopment and non-redevelopment properties. This matrix contains the
property’s current NOI per sfl, which captures most of the unobserved heterogeneity;
current FAR = Structure size
Land size
; the property type; the age of the property9; time
dummies; and location dummies. Thus, including X addresses the selection bias.
3.4.1 Constructing our proxies
As explicated in Section 3.3 the decision to redevelop is endogenous to the price
of the property. To address the reverse causality we construct three proxies
for redevelopment (relevance) that only affect prices through an increase in
redevelopment potential (exogeneity).
We start by looking at the potential HBU of every property in our data. We
construct the HBU, by assessing newly developed properties, making the (non-
controversial) assumption, that developers always maximize their profits and thus,
built according to the location’s HBU. Therefore, we use the sample of newly
constructed properties (constructed after 2001) to construct HBU metrics for our
target properties (constructed before 2001). Our primary variable of interest is the
NOI per sfl of the HBU property. We use this variable to compute the difference
between the current (imputed) NOI of the existing structure, and the current
(imputed) NOI of the HBU structure. This difference is a perfect proxy, as it is not
affected by the property, nor the investor itself. The assumption is that the higher
the potential gains of redevelopment, the higher the redevelopment potential.
For every property constructed before 2001 in our data, we match the closest
ten newly developed properties (properties constructed after 2001), as long as they
are within five kilometers, and are sold and built within five years of the target
9Note that most of the depreciation is captured by the current NOI of the property. What is
left is the deprecation of the capitalization rate. This is sometimes also referred to as the “caprate
creep”.
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property’s transaction. To compute the potential NOI of these properties, we use
the same weighted averaging approach as previously described. We also correct the
imputed NOIs of the newly developed properties using the RCA NOI index if their
transaction year differs the one of comparable properties. Note that the RCA NOI
index are market and property type specific. Our first proxy variable is labeled N ,














where LS is the land size. Note that in theory NOI should capture all the
characteristics of the property. Thus, the difference in NOI to the HBU is an
excellent proxy for redevelopment.
We also construct two additional proxies, which are similar. The first one
is related to the FAR of HBU properties. If newly constructed properties have
higher densities compared to the target property, the land can achieve higher sales
prices. This density proxy is similar to the intensity measures used in previous
redevelopment option value literature for single-family housing, see Clapp et al.















where SS is the structure size.
The second auxiliary proxy compares the type of the property, to the comparable
HBU type of properties and takes a value between zero and one. RCA differentiates
between four property types: residential, retail, industrial, and office. For example,
if the comparable HBU properties are 80 percent residential and 20 percent retail,
and the corresponding property is residential, the variable takes the value 0.8. If the
corresponding property were retail, the value of the variable would be 0.2. A value
of zero (one) for the property type variable indicates that none (all) of the newly
developed properties are of the same property type. That is, the higher the value,
the less economic obsolete is the property. In this case, we assume that the HBU use
of the site can change. All three proxies capture the economic obsolescence channel
that reflects the redevelopment option value. Table 3.4.2 shows some descriptive
statistics of the proxies.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3.4.2 give a clear picture. The difference
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Table 3.4.2: Descriptive statistics of our constructed proxies
variable mean SD 10% 90%


























0.504 1.511 -0.254 1.651
HBU property type similarity 0.354 0.259 0.000 0.700


























1.207 2.657 -0.298 4.252
HBU property type similarity 0.273 0.249 0.000 0.600


























0.463 1.406 -0.252 1.530
HBU property type similarity 0.359 0.259 0.000 0.700
Notes: All variables are the difference between the current existing structures, and the newly
constructed HBU (highest and best use) structures. NOI is the net operating income, LS is the
land size (in square foot), and SS is the size of the structure (in square foot). The “HBU property
type similarity” is computed by looking at what percentage of the HBU properties is the same as
the target property. The middle panel gives the descriptive statistics of a subset of our full sample
(top panel) of redevelopment properties. The bottom panel gives the descriptive statistics of the
subset of non-redevelopment properties.
of NOI to the HBU is, on average, $40 per sfl for redevelopment properties. In
contrast, it is only $20 per sfl for non-redevelopment properties. Note that the
magnitude of these differences are large, considering that the average NOI per sfl
for the existing (redevelopment) property is $24 (revisit Table 3.4.1). For our FAR
variable, we find similar magnitudes. Newly constructed properties have a FAR
that is 1.2 higher compared to the existing redevelopment properties, as opposed
to “only” 0.5 higher FARs compared to the existing non-redevelopment properties.
The descriptive statistics of our property type proxy show that of all the newly
built properties, 27 percent (36 percent) are of the same property type as the target
redevelopment (non-redevelopment) properties. This indicates that when the HBU
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property type changes in an area, the amount of redevelopments increase.
We argue that our three proxies satisfy the exclusion restriction because
these measures epitomize “call options” that only materialize if the property is
redeveloped. These proxies do not have a direct effect on prices. The higher the
value of these “call options” the higher the redevelopment potential. Thus, they
only affect the prices through the redevelopment potential.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Determinants of redevelopment
Table 3.5.1 shows the results for our (reduced form) probit Equation (Equation
3.2). In the first column of Table 3.5.1 we show the results of the probit model
for redevelopments when we include the log difference between the HBU NOI and
the current NOI of every property (logN). We find that the larger (logN), the
higher the potential of redeveloping. Our two other proxies also have the expected
sign, see the second column of Table 3.5.1. The redevelopment potential increases
with the HBU density measure (variable F ) and decreases with the property type
similarity proxy. In the third column, we combine all the proxies. Because of the
high collinearity between NOI and square footage of the structure, combining the
variables N and F results in insignificant estimates for N . Still, looking at our
proxies separately, we find t-statistics of 4.2 for N in the first column, and 10.1 and
-14.9 for the proxies in the second column. Thus, we conclude that our proxies not
only move the redevelopment variable in the predicted direction but also that they
are relevant. Note that the second model (ii) is the one with the best fit in terms of
the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
The estimates of the remaining determinants X also have the expected sign.
First, higher NOI per sfl increases the potential of the redevelopment. This
is because higher NOI entails higher land values (higher economic activity),
which in turn increases the redevelopment potential. However, note that holding
NOI (and other variables) constant, an increase in density (FAR) results in a
lower redevelopment potential. This is because it is more costly to demolish
large structures. The further away a property is from the CBD, the lower the
redevelopment potential, even after controlling for property level NOI and HBU
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Table 3.5.1: Probit model: Determinants of redevelopments
Variable (i) (ii) (iii)



































ln Distance to closest CBD -0.119∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗
(-7.71) (-6.36) (-6.16)
Age 0.027∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(13.70) (11.54) (11.52)
(-11.24) (-9.16) (-9.15)
ln SSLS (FAR) -0.333
∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗
(-14.00) (-12.36) (-12.36)
Time fe Yes Yes Yes
Metro fe Yes Yes Yes
Property type fe Yes Yes Yes
AIC 17,125 16,773 16,775
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable is a
1/0 dummy indicating whether or not the property was bought with the intent of redeveloping it.
NOI is the properties net operating income, LS is the size of the land (in square foot), and SS is
the size of the structure (in square foot). CBD is the closest central business district, as defined
by RCA. HBU is the highest and best use, measured by looking at newly developed properties
surrounding the target property. The “HBU property type similarity” is computed by looking at
what percentage of the HBU properties is the same as the target property. AIC is the Akaike
Information Criterium.
variables. Similarly, age and age squared are also significant after controlling for
property level NOI and HBU variables. It is well established that most depreciation
is embedded into the NOI (which we control for); see Bokhari and Geltner (2018).
Thus, the fact that we still find significant estimates for distance to closest CBD,
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age, and age squared, is most likely caused by “cap rate creep” (the depreciation of
the cap rate). In other words, investors expect that older properties will generate
less NOI in the future, therefore increasing the redevelopment potential.
The fixed effects for year of sale, property types, and MSAs are shown in
Tables 3.A.1 – 3.A.2 in the Appendix. The year of sale dummies control for the
macro-economic environment, which is not explained by the NOI. The highest
redevelopment potential was in 2005, with an estimate of 0.995. The results
show a similar redevelopment potential at the beginning and the end of our data
sample. Although, as previously noted, we control for NOI, and the average NOI
increased considerably between 2000 – 2018. Of all the property types, ceteris
paribus, industrial properties are the most likely to be redeveloped, followed by
retail, office, and residential properties. Since industrial properties are typically
cheaper to demolish, this result is unsurprising. Finally, the MSA dummies control
for local zoning, and the competitiveness of the development industry. Most of these
estimates are not significant. Interestingly, all coefficients for MSAs in Florida are
positive and significant, indicating that there is more development in Florida than
can be explainable by NOI alone. The MSA with the least development, ceteris
paribus, is Portland, Oregon. This is unsurprising, given that Portland is known to
have stringent zoning and geographic restrictions (Saiz 2010).
3.5.2 Redevelopment option value
Table 3.5.2 shows the estimates of the redevelopment option value model. The first
column of Table 3.5.2 shows the OLS results, where redevelopment is a dummy
indicating if a property was bought to be redeveloped. This estimation ignores
the reverse causality between redevelopment and prices. We find a significant and
negative price-redevelopment elasticity of -0.072. However, as argued throughout
this paper, we do not believe this to be a causal relationship. To estimate the
causal relationship between prices and redevelopment, we apply our methodology
described in Section 3.3, and use the fitted values for the redevelopment potential
from Table 3.5.1 as an instrument. The second to the fourth column of Table 3.5.2
shows these results. When instrumenting for redevelopments, we find a strong and
positive coefficient for redevelopment. In the second column we find that whenever
a property has a 100 percent redevelopment potential, the price of the property,
ceteris paribus, increases by 17 percent. Using the other proxies slightly attenuates
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this effect. A 100 percent redevelopment potential increases the price of the property
by nine percent. From the Hausman (1978) test (not shown here, but available
upon request), we conclude that the difference between the IV model estimates
(second to fourth column) and the standard OLS model (first column) estimate are
statistically significant. The first IV model (second column) features the largest
t-statistic, although the fit is equal between the models. See the adjusted R2 and
the root mean squared errors (RMSE) at the bottom of Table 3.5.2.
The remaining estimates have the expected sign and magnitude and hardly
change between the models. Higher NOI and more square feet result in higher
prices. We also find evidence of “cap rate creep”, i.e., the depreciation of cap rates.
Even when controlling for NOI the distance to the CBD is still significant. This
means, that properties further away from the CBD trade with a higher cap rate,
resulting in lower prices.
The year fixed effects (see Table 3.A.3 in the Appendix) reveal that prices
increased until 2007/2008, then dropped, and subsequently increased again after
2011. Given that we already control for NOI, we interpret the year fixed effect
estimates as the inverse of cap rates. As such, cap rates are at its lowest at the end
of our sample in 2018. Furthermore, the property type fixed effects (see Table 3.A.3
in the Appendix) show that apartments trade with the lowest cap rates, followed by
retail, office, and industrial properties. Comparing the MSAs with each other (see
Table 3.A.4 in the Appendix), we conclude that most West coast MSAs trade with
a relatively low cap rate (San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, but also Seattle),
as well as New York, Boston, and Washington DC. We find the highest cap rate in
Jacksonville.
3.5.3 Auxiliary Regressions
As robustness, we estimate two additional models. In the first one, we sightly
change our redevelopment option value proxies. In our primary model we use the
log absolute differences in NOI and FAR per sfl between the HBU and the current
property. For this model, we use the log relative difference in NOI and FAR per sfl
between the HBU and the current property. The additional two variables ∆N and
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Table 3.5.2: Redevelopment option value model
Variable OLS IV (i) IV (ii) IV (iii)
(Intercept) 3.122∗∗∗ 3.122∗∗∗ 3.122∗∗∗ 3.122∗∗∗
(99.29) (99.19) (99.19) (99.19)
Redevelopment -0.072∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(-9.19) (3.68) (2.43) (2.70)
ln NOILS 0.788
∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(220.71) (184.46) (194.53) (194.40)
ln Distance to closest CBD -0.034∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(-13.71) (-11.49) (-12.18) (-12.11)
Age -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(-34.04) (-32.94) (-33.25) (-33.35)
(31.28) (31.14) (31.18) (31.26)
ln SSLS (FAR) 0.267
∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(60.03) (54.84) (56.29) (56.41)
Time fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Metro fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property type fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
RMSE 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable is
log of transaction price per sfl lnP . NOI is the properties net operating income, and SS is the size
of the structure (in square foot). CBD is the closest central business district, as defined by RCA.
For the IV models we instrument for the redevelopment dummy with the fitted redevelopment
potential. In the first IV (i) model we only use the fitted redevelopment potential estimated with
the log difference in NOI of the HBU properties and the target property, or lnN . In the second
model we use the fitted redevelopment potential estimated with the log difference in FAR between
the HBU and the current property, or lnF , and the percentage of properties built within our
defined area that are of the same property type as the target property. In the third IV (iii) we use
the fitted redevelopment potential estimated with all proxies.



























10Note that our proxy HBU property type similarity remains identical.
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We omit the discussion of the results of the probit model and the fixed effects
here. These are available upon request. Table 3.5.3 shows the results of our auxiliary
redevelopment option value model. We find that all the estimates remain robust.
The price of a property with 100 percent redevelopment potential increases between
11 percent and 21 percent. The fit does not change according to the adjusted R2,
and root mean squared error (RMSE) (see bottom of Table 3.5.3).
For our second auxiliary model, we utilize RCA data on renovations. RCA’s
definition of renovation is widely defined, and can be anything from a new lobby area
to an entirely new interior for a property. Still, there are many similarities between
renovations and redevelopments. Most importantly, they both entail considerable
capital expenditures that are not related to the day to day maintenance of the
property. However, there are also extensive differences. Renovations cannot redress
economic obsolescence. If HBU densities and property type use change, the property
owner will need to redevelop. Rather, renovations redress physical and functional
obsolescence (Francke and Van de Minne 2017), meaning modernizing the existing
structure in such a way that they match current day tastes and preferences (without
changing property type). Therefore, we see renovations as a competing risk to
redevelopments. In other words, at any time, an investor can decide whether to
renovate or redevelop a property (or sell it as an investment property obviously), but
not both simultaneously. This does not mean we expect similar signs or magnitudes
with this model. For example, properties that are very economically obsolete might
not be worth renovating. In contrast, more expensive properties - in the right area
- are expected to be renovated instead of redeveloped.
In our data, we find that approximately six percent of the properties were bought
to be renovated, slightly more than to be redeveloped (which is 5.5 percent, see
Table 3.4.1). We use the same procedures and proxies (i.e., the log of the absolute
differences in NOI and FAR to the HBU) as in our primary model. In general, we
expect that properties that are more disparate from their potential HBU, are not
worth renovating.
Determinants of renovations
Table 3.5.4 shows the results of the probit model for renovations. Comparing
the results from the probit model for redevelopments (Table 3.5.1) with the one
for renovations (Table 3.5.4) yields some interesting insights. Compared to the
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Table 3.5.3: Auxiliary redevelopment option value model
Variable IV (i) IV (ii) IV (iii)
(Intercept) 3.122∗∗∗ 3.122∗∗∗ 3.122∗∗∗
(99.21) (99.19) (99.20)





ln Distance to closest CBD -0.029∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(-10.93) (-12.07) (-11.87)
Age -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(-33.77) (-33.28) (-33.57)
(31.81) (31.23) (31.45)
ln SSLS (FAR) 0.285
∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(55.80) (56.22) (56.55)
Time fe Yes Yes Yes
Metro fe Yes Yes Yes
Property type fe Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93
RMSE 0.37 0.37 0.37
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable is
log of transaction price per sfl lnP . NOI is the properties net operating income, and SS is the size
of the structure (in square foot). CBD is the closest central business district, as defined by RCA.
For the IV models we instrument for the redevelopment dummy with the fitted redevelopment
potential. In the first IV (i) model we only use the fitted redevelopment potential estimated with
the log relative difference in NOI of the HBU properties and the target property, or ∆N . In the
second model we use the fitted redevelopment potential estimated with the log relative difference
in FAR between the HBU and the current property, or ∆F , and the percentage of properties built
within our defined area that are of the same property type as the target property. In the third IV
(iii) we use the fitted redevelopment potential estimated with all proxies.
redevelopment model, the renovation model estimates flip sign, are attenuated, or
are insignificant altogether. Remarkably, our NOI proxy (log N) does not impact
the renovation potentials. Nor does the current NOI. FAR has a positive effect on
the renovation potential, whereas it was negative on the redevelopment potential.
Larger structures are more costly to redevelop, and as such, the only way to increase
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Table 3.5.4: Probit model: Determinants of renovations
Variable (i) (ii) (iii)






























HBU property type similarity -0.261∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗
(-6.16) (-6.23)
ln NOILS 0.007 0.022 0.022
(0.33) (1.06) (1.03)
ln Distance to closest CBD 0.003 -0.006 -0.002
(0.21) (-0.39) (-0.16)
Age 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(2.60) (2.52) (2.45)
ln SSLS (FAR) 0.056
∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(2.16) (2.37) (2.35)
Time fe Yes Yes Yes
Metro fe Yes Yes Yes
Property type fe Yes Yes Yes
AIC 19,368 19,325 19,326
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable is
a 1/0 dummy indicating whether or not the property was bought with the intent of renovating it.
NOI is the properties net operating income, LS is the size of the land (in square foot), and SS is
the size of the structure (in square foot). CBD is the closest central business district, as defined
by RCA. HBU is the highest and best use, measured by looking at newly developed properties
surrounding the target property. The “HBU property type similarity” is computed by looking at
what percentage of the HBU properties is the same as the target property. AIC is the Akaike
Information Criterium.
NOI is by renovating the current property. An increase in the difference of FAR to
the HBU decreases the renovation potential. The competing risk of redevelopment
most likely causes this. If an investor can considerably increase its NOI by increasing
the FAR through redevelopment, she will likely not deem any renovations worth it.
Our third proxy, the proxy, HBU property type similarity, remains significant and
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negative, although the effect is attenuated (compared to redevelopment). If the
current structure has the same use as the HBU property, the renovation potential
decreases. Given that our NOI proxy (logN) is insignificant in all renovation models,
we can conclude that it is not relevant. For the sake of consistency, we still report
the results when using this proxy in the renovation model.
Price of renovation properties
In Table 3.5.5 we present the estimates for the renovation model. Note that the
variable “renovation” is a binary variable indicating properties that were bought
to be renovated and not properties that were recently renovated. The OLS model
(which ignores the endogeneity issues) yields a small but significant negative effect
of renovations on prices (see first column of Table 3.5.5). The results for the
first IV model (IV (i)) are insignificant. This is hardly surprising, given that the
proxy used in this column (log N) is insignificant in the probit model (see Table
3.5.4). Using the highly significant proxies in the second IV model (IV (ii)) we
find that a property that needs to be renovated (100 percent renovation potential)
trades with a 44 percent discount compared to a newly renovated property (zero
percent renovation potential). Since the renovation model captures the physical
and functional obsolescence channels, this is hardly surprising. This discount
represents the investment of financial capital needed to bring to reverse the physical
and functional depreciation. The final column shows the results if we use all the
proxies, including the insignificant one (log N). These results indicate that a 100
percent renovation renovation potential decreases the price by 28 percent. All
other estimates remain mostly unchanged compared to our earlier findings with
the redevelopment option value model. The fixed effects estimates (for both the
probit and renovation model) are available upon request.
3.6 Conclusions
As urban areas age, redevelopment and renovation become ever more critical. To
analyze how the redevelopment potential affects commercial property prices, we
employ a novel strategy that addresses the reverse causality and sample selection
bias. Moreover, we provide information on the determinants of redevelopment and
renovation.
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Table 3.5.5: Renovation model
Variable OLS IV (i) IV (ii) IV (iii)
(Intercept) 3.123∗∗∗ 3.121∗∗∗ 3.139∗∗∗ 3.133∗∗∗
(99.25) (98.64) (99.29) (99.07)
Renovation -0.032∗∗∗ 0.037 -0.441∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗
(-4.24) (0.45) (-5.50) (-3.49)
ln NOILS 0.785
∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗
(220.83) (220.51) (220.87) (220.73)
ln Distance to closest CBD -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(-13.22) (-13.23) (-13.13) (-13.16)
Age -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(-34.82) (-34.61) (-33.85) (-34.11)
(31.79) (30.75) (29.19) (29.74)
ln SSLS (FAR) 0.272
∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(61.19) (60.82) (61.41) (61.21)
Time fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Metro fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property type fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
RMSE 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable
is log of transaction price per sfl lnP . NOI is the properties net operating income, and SS is
the size of the structure (in square foot). CBD is the closest central business district, as defined
by RCA. For the IV models we instrument for the renovation dummy with the fitted renovation
potential. In the first IV (i) model we only use the fitted renovation potential estimated with the
log difference in NOI of the HBU properties and the target property, or lnN . In the second model
we use the fitted renovation potential estimated with the log difference in FAR between the HBU
and the current property, or lnF , and the percentage of properties built within our defined area
that are of the same property type as the target property. In the third IV (iii) we use the fitted
renovation potential estimated with all proxies.
We find that a larger difference to the HBU in NOI and FAR, as well as being
the wrong type of property, significantly increase the redevelopment potential for
commercial real estate. These three proxies capture the economic obsolescence
channel. Moreover, the redevelopment potential increases with the property’s NOI,
age, and proximity to the CBD. In contrast, higher FAR decreases the redevelopment
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potential because it leads to higher demolition costs. Industrial properties are most
likely to be redeveloped, followed by retail, office, and residential properties. Our
estimations suggest that having a 100 percent redevelopment potential increases the
property’s price by nine to 17 percent. We also find that the redevelopment option
value is very heterogeneous across American cities.
Further, we find that neither the difference to the HBU in NOI nor the property’s
NOI drives the renovation potential. Property’s FAR has a positive impact on the
renovation potential, while the difference to the HBU in FAR has a negative one.
As with redevelopments, being the wrong property type increases the renovation
potential, although the effect is much smaller. On average, a property that needs to
be renovated trades with a 28 to 44 percent discount compared to a newly renovated
property. This reflects the physical and functional obsolescence of the property.
Our results hold essential lessons for the understanding of the development of
urban economies. First, potential NOI is one of the main drivers of redevelopment
for commercial real estate. Second, high land values trigger redevelopments.
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3.A Fixed effect tables
Table 3.A.1: Probit model: Year and property type fixed effects
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) Obs.
Year of Sale
2000 (Ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 574
2001 0.062 0.064 0.064 730
2002 0.055 0.059 0.059 899
2003 0.199 0.193 0.194 1,127
2004 0.610∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 1,775
2005 0.995∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 3,893
2006 0.789∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 3,888
2007 0.533∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 3,675
2008 0.408∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 1,815
2009 0.295∗ 0.322∗ 0.323∗ 833
2010 0.251 0.281∗ 0.281∗ 1,282
2011 0.424∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 2,204
2012 0.431∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 2,998
2013 0.631∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 3,278
2014 0.402∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 3,557
2015 0.300∗∗ 0.310∗∗ 0.310∗∗ 3,819
2016 0.227 0.241 0.241 3,464
2017 0.105 0.106 0.106 3,085
2018 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 2,836
Property type
Apartment (Ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 23,491
Industrial 0.635∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 6,623
Office 0.214∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 8,038
Retail 0.224∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 7,580
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. This table shows the
year fixed effects results for the Probit model in Table 3.5.1. The frequency of the variables is also
given by Obs. Ref. gives the reference (omitted) category.
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Table 3.A.2: Probit model: Metro area fixed effects
Variable IV (i) IV (ii) IV (iii) Obs.
Metro area
Atlanta (Ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 2,221
Baltimore 0.059 0.075 0.076 375
Boston Metro 0.208∗∗ 0.228∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 580
Charlotte 0.100 0.117 0.118 512
Chicago 0.215∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 1,098
Co Springs 0.151 0.120 0.124 253
Dallas 0.036 0.006 0.007 1,289
Denver -0.128 -0.067 -0.066 1,475
Houston -0.089 -0.130 -0.129 832
Jacksonville 0.294∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 435
Los Angeles -0.107 -0.067 -0.068 7,990
Las Vegas -0.061 -0.046 -0.046 910
Miami/So Fla 0.489∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 2,041
Minneapolis 0.176∗ 0.176∗ 0.176∗ 515
Nashville 0.105 0.079 0.080 383
New York 0.054 0.060 0.059 3,897
Orlando 0.309∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 605
Philly Metro 0.042 0.053 0.053 545
Phoenix 0.200∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 2,669
Portland -0.252∗∗ -0.288∗∗ -0.287∗∗ 658
Raleigh/Durham -0.185 -0.192 -0.190 526
Rest 0.009 0.023 0.025 5,434
San Diego 0.099 0.110 0.110 1,476
Seattle 0.081 0.067 0.066 1,943
San Francisco -0.092 -0.115 -0.118 4,043
St Louis 0.207 0.200 0.203 200
Tampa 0.335∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 1,059
Tucson 0.036 0.042 0.044 388
Washington DC -0.081 -0.016 -0.018 1,380
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. This table shows the
metro area fixed effects results for the Probit model in Table 3.5.1. The frequency of the variables
is also given by Obs. Ref. gives the reference (omitted) category. We only include Metro areas
with at least 10 redevelopments. The remaining ones are are combined in the “rest” category.
Table 3.A.3: Redevelopment option value model: Year and property type fixed
effects
Variable OLS IV (i) IV (ii) IV (iii) Obs.
Year of Sale
2000 (Ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 574
2001 0.085∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 730
2002 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 899
2003 0.210∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 1,127
2004 0.329∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 1,775
2005 0.476∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 3,893
2006 0.540∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 3,888
2007 0.573∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 3,675
2008 0.531∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 1,815
2009 0.326∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 833
2010 0.287∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 1,282
2011 0.354∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 2,204
2012 0.381∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 2,998
2013 0.455∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 3,278
2014 0.543∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 3,557
2015 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 3,819
2016 0.681∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 3,464
2017 0.716∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 3,085
2018 0.780∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 2,836
Property type
Apartment (Ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00023,491
Industrial -0.243∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗-0.255∗∗∗*-0.256∗∗∗ 6,623
Office -0.160∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗-0.162∗∗∗ 8,038
Retail -0.029∗∗∗-0.032∗∗∗* -0.031∗∗∗-0.031∗∗∗ 7,580
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. This table shows the
year fixed effects results for the 2SLS model in Table 3.5.2. The frequency of the variables is also
given by Obs. Ref. gives the reference (omitted) category.
Table 3.A.4: Redevelopment option value model: Metro area fixed effects
Variable OLS IV (i) IV (ii) IV (iii) Obs.
Metro area
Atlanta (Ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2,221
Baltimore 0.108∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 375
Boston Metro 0.279∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 580
Charlotte 0.032∗ 0.032∗ 0.032∗ 0.032∗ 512
Chicago 0.076∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 1,098
Co Springs -0.029 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 253
Dallas -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 1289
Denver 0.132∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 1,475
Houston -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 832
Jacksonville -0.061∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ 435
Los Angeles 0.446∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 7,990
Las Vegas 0.030∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.033 0.033 910
Miami/So Fla 0.260∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 2,041
Minneapolis 0.050∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 515
Nashville 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005 383
New York 0.331∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 3,897
Orlando 0.055∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 605
Philly Metro 0.104∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 545
Phoenix 0.081∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 2,669
Portland 0.151∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 658
Raleigh/Durham 0.079∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 526
Rest -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 5,434
San Diego 0.400∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 1,476
Seattle 0.310∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 1943
San Francisco 0.498∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 4,043
St Louis -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 200
Tampa 0.046∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 1,059
Tucson -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 388
Washington DC 0.259∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 1,380
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. This table shows the
metro area fixed effects results for the 2SLS model in Table 3.5.2. The frequency of the variables
is also given by Obs. Ref. gives the reference (omitted) category. We only include Metro areas
with at least 10 redevelopments. The remaining ones are are combined in the “rest” category.
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4.1 Introduction
Local land-use regulations affect the extension, location, and architecture of
residential development. The existing literature establishes a clear relationship
between land-use regulations and inelastic housing supply.1 As documented by
Glaeser and Gyourko (2018), the inelastic housing supply has deep economic
implications. Inelastic housing supply leads to higher house prices (Cosman et al.
2018, Hilber and Vermeulen 2016), spatial misallocation of labor (Hsieh and Moretti
2019), and lower migration response of households (Diamond 2017). However,
land-use regulations also foster economic, environmental, and social goals. They
limit the negative externalities arising from congestion, pollution, and overbuilding.
Therefore it is essential that policymakers find the right balance in land-use
regulation. To analyze the impact of land-use regulation it is paramount to first
understand the regulatory environment. In this paper, I develop a methodology to
construct a residential regulatory constraints index for Switzerland.
Pendall et al. (2006) use a survey to discern how the 50 largest metropolitan
areas in the U.S. regulate land use and promote housing affordability. They find
that the instruments employed by these areas vary widely across space. Also
using a survey, Gyourko et al. (2008) develop a comprehensive residential land-use
regulatory index for over 2,600 communities across the U.S..2 The authors expound
that the coastal markets are more highly regulated. Gyourko et al. (2019) renew
this index with a new survey. The new results show that the Great Recession did
not lead to significant changes in regulation. Glaeser and Ward (2009) examine the
causes and consequences of land-use regulations in Greater Boston. Their analysis
establishes a positive link between historical density and regulations. Additionally,
they corroborate that regulations like minimum lot size requirements are associated
with reductions in new construction activity. Brueckner and Singh (2018) compute a
land-use regulatory stringency measure for five U.S. cities. Specifically, they estimate
the elasticity of the land price with respect to floor to area ratio (FAR). Their
estimates indicate that New York and Washington, D.C. suffer the stringiest height
regulations.
The literature for Switzerland is scarce. Kaiser et al. (2016) surveys Swiss
1See Gyourko and Molloy (2015) for a literature review.
2The authors call this measure the Wharton Residential Land-Use Regulation Index
(WRLURI).
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municipalities to identify how the 2014 revision of the Federal Act on Spatial
Planning (RPG 1) affected them. Their focus lies on the administrative structures,
and the instruments municipalities employ to regulate spatial planning. Buechler
et al. (2019) evaluate the role of geographic and regulatory constraints on the Swiss
housing supply elasticity. They distinguish between regulatory constraints on the
intensive and extensive margin. However, due to a lack of data, they rely on proxies
to quantify the intensive margin regulatory constraints. Unfortunately, there is still
no comprehensive and harmonized information on the local regulatory environment
for Switzerland. To help fill this gap, I develop a methodology to construct an
aggregate index that documents how regulation of residential buildings varies across
the 26 cantons and more than 2200 municipalities in Switzerland.
In Switzerland, cantons regulate land use by defining their zoning plans. These
zoning plans are subject to general guidelines dictated by the federal government.3
However, land-use regulations are primarily under the municipalities’ control.
Municipalities have a wide array of instruments to control residential development.
Most evidently, they can set regulation that simply bans development. However,
regulation can also obstruct development by restricting the intensity and type of
development, or by delaying a project. Moreover, regulation may be influenced
by local residents. To cover the most critical factors of this complex regulatory
environment, I propose an index that comprises several sub-indices. These sub-
indices concentrate on the processes, rules, and outcomes of local regulation. The
sub-indices can be combined into a single aggregate measure of regulatory constraint,
using factor analysis. I name this measure the CRED4 Residential Regulatory
Constraints Index (CRRCI). The methodology for this index builds on Gyourko
et al. (2008) and Gyourko et al. (2019).
In this paper, I describe the available regulation data and create a survey on
land-use regulation that provides the necessary information to construct the sub-
indices. The sub-indices are divided into three categories. The first one pertains
to the process of local regulation. In this category, I document who is involved
in the regulatory process and how much influence they have over it. The second
category captures the rules of extensive margin, intensive margin, and financial
3The concepts and plans set according to Article 13 of the Federal Act on Spatial Planning
(RPG) represent the most important spatial planning instruments of the federal government.
4Note that CRED stands for Center for Regional Economic Development of the University of
Bern.
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regulatory constraints. The last category relates to the outcomes of the regulatory
process and rules. By comprising these three categories the CRRCI indicates, with
a simple number, how restrictive the regulations of local housing markets are across
Switzerland. Note that a lower number indicates a less restrictive environment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
methodology to construct the sub-indices and the CRRCI. Section 4.3 presents the
land-use regulation data. Section 4.4 briefly concludes.
4.2 Methodology
To outline the most crucial aspects and the heterogeneity of local land-use
regulations, I proceed as follows. First, I document the process, rules, and outcome
of land-use regulations with ten sub-indices. To construct these sub-indices, I suggest
using land-use regulation data (see Section 4.3) and answers from a comprehensive
survey (see Appendix 4.A). Second, using factor analysis, these sub-indices can be
combined into a single index. This final index, named CRRCI, captures the degree of
land-use restrictiveness across municipalities. My methodology is based on Gyourko
et al. (2008) and Gyourko et al. (2019).
4.2.1 Land-use regulation process
The involvement of actors and stakeholders in the land-use regulation process differs
across municipalities and cantons. The following three sub-indices reflect this
involvement.
Citizens involvement index (CII): The CII measures how citizens influence the
regulatory process. As argued by Frieden (1979), what we today know as NIMBYism
can be a significant deterrent of development. I use the answers to the following
questions to construct this index. Question 1 item (d) asks how involved voting
citizens are in affecting residential building activities and/or growth management
processes. Question 2 item (c) asks how important the cooperation/coordination
with voting citizens is, for spatial planning in the municipality. Question 5 item (f)
asks the importance of citizen opposition to growth for the regulation of residential
housing developments for single-family and multi-family dwellings. Question 10 asks
how many objections to building permit applications did the municipality receive in
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the year 2019. The first component of the CII is based on the sum of the individual
responses to Question 1 item (d), Question 2 item (c), and Question 5 item (f). The
second component is the number of objections to building permit applications in
2019 (Question 10) divided by the number of building permit applications (provided
by Documedia).
Municipality involvement index (MII): Switzerland’s federalist structure leaves
municipalities considerable freedoms in affecting the regulatory process. This index
captures the municipalities’ involvement in this process. The following questions
provide the basis for the MII. Question 1 items (a), (b), (c), and (e) ask how
involved the municipality executive body, legislative body, municipal secretary, and
municipal administrative unit are in affecting residential building activities and/or
growth management processes. Question 2 items (a) and (b) ask how important the
cooperation/coordination with municipalities in the same canton and in neighboring
cantons is, for spatial planning in the municipality. Question 5 item (e) asks the
importance of municipality executive body opposition to growth for the regulation of
residential housing developments for single-family and multi-family dwellings. The
index is composed of the sum of the individual responses to Question 1 items (a),
(b), (c), and (e), Question 2 items (a), (b), and Question 5 item (e).
Cantonal involvement index (CII): The CII looks at the cantonal involvement in
the regulatory process. This index only varies at the cantonal level. I use the answers
of the following questions to construct the index. Question 1 items (f), (g) and (h)
ask how involved the inter-municipal administrative unit, cantonal administrative
unit, and external planning office are in affecting residential building activities
and/or growth management processes.5 Question 5 item (g) asks the importance
of monument protection for the regulation of residential housing developments
for single-family and multi-family dwellings. Note that the cantons manage the
monument protection authorities. To construct the CII, I first sum up the individual
responses to Question 1 items (f), (g), and (h) and Question 5 item (g). Second,
I average these sums at the cantonal level because municipalities may view the
cantonal involvement differently. For example, a municipality in the country
side may underestimate the cantonal involvement because the restrictions are not
5Note that the inter-municipal administrative unit is technically not managed by the cantons.
Nonetheless, I include it in the CII because the cantons often coordinate these units.
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binding.
4.2.2 Rules of regulatory constraints
Land-use regulations affect residential developments on the extensive, intensive,
and financial margin. Extensive margin regulatory constraints are measures that
prevent new construction on developed land. One example is the protected forests.
Intensive margin regulatory constraints govern the intensity and type of residential
development. They include regulations on, e.g., height restriction or open space
requirements. Financial regulatory constraints include, e.g., affordable housing
requirements or the requirement to pay for pertinent infrastructure. The following
six sub-indices capture the rules of regulatory restrictions.
Zoning approval index (ZAI): This index captures the required organizations to
approve a zoning or rezoning change. The answers to Question 3 provide the basis
for the ZAI. The listed organizations range from the municipal executive body to the
environmental examining board. The ZAI is the simple sum of the organizations
required to approve a zoning or rezoning change. The more organizations have
approval rights, the higher the potential of denial. Thus, a higher value for this
sub-index indicates a stricter regulatory environment.
Project approval index (PAI): The PAI looks at the required organizations to
approve a new construction project. The answers to Question 4 provide the basis
for this sub-index. The listed organizations range from the municipal executive
body to the monument protection authority. The PAI is the simple sum of the
organizations required to approve a new construction project that does not need a
rezoning. Like the ZAI, a higher value for the PAI indicates stricter regulations.
Extensive margin regulation index (EMRI): An important form of regulation is
the protection of certain areas from development. The regulations on the extensive
margin include crop rotation areas, forests, high amenity value areas, and UNESCO
cultural and natural heritage sites (see Section 4.3 for a detailed description). The
first component of the EMRI is the share of land that is protected by the regulations
on the extensive margin (provided by Büchler et al. (2018)). The second component
is the response to Question 5 item (a). This question asks the importance of land
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supply for the regulation of residential housing developments for single-family and
multi-family dwellings.
Density restrictions index (DRI): Density restriction comes in many forms. In
Switzerland, the most prevalent density restrictions are height restrictions, limits to
the number of floors, FAR restrictions, and limits to boundary distances. The DRI
has two components. The first one, relies on harmonized zoning data. This data set
describes the land use attributed to undeveloped plots (see Section 4.3 for a detailed
description). The second component relies on a series of questions about how binding
these density restrictions are. Question 5 item (b) asks the importance of density
restrictions for the regulation of residential housing developments for single-family
and multi-family dwellings. Question 6 specifies and asks which of the prevalent
density restrictions are the most important for the regulation of residential housing
developments for single-family and multi-family dwellings. Question 7 items (a) and
(b) ask if developers have to meet minimum lot size and/or FAR requirements to
be able to build.
Open space and affordable housing index (OSAHI): The OSAHI is the sum of
two dummy variables. The first variable takes the value of one if a developer has
to include affordable housing to be able to build (Question 7 item (c)). The second
variable takes the value of one if a developer has to supply mandatory open space
requirements to be able to build (Question 7 item (d)).
Cost index (EI): Another important facet of local land-use regulations is the
costs concerning development. Developers have to pay for the building permit and
allocable share of the expenses of infrastructure improvement. A study conducted
by the Swiss Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research
(EAER), shows that these costs vary widely across municipalities (Preisüberwacher
2014). The CI comprises two components. The first component uses the data
from the study Preisüberwacher (2014). This set includes the building permit
fees, sewerage connection fees, and water connection fees, for the 30 most populous
municipalities.6 The second component relies on the answers to a set of questions
about the fees concerning development. Question 5 items (c) and (d) ask the
6The first component only relates to the 30 most populous municipalities. The CI for the
remaining municipalities only comprises the second component.
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importance of new infrastructure costs, and fees and duties for the regulation
of residential housing developments for single-family and multi-family dwellings.
Question 7 item (e) asks if developers have to pay an allocable share of the costs
of infrastructure improvement to be able to build. Question 9 asks for the criteria
for determining the building permit fees. Question 11 asks how much the building
permit and infrastructure access fees increased in the last ten years.
4.2.3 Outcomes of regulation process and rules
The third category focuses on the outcome of the regulation process and rules. It
quantifies, e.g., how easy it is and how long it takes to get a building permit. This
category comprises the following index.
Outcome index (OI): The OI comprises two components. The first component is
the building permit refusal rate. To construct this rate at the municipality level, I
use the building permit data provided by Documedia. The second component builds
on the answers to the following questions. Question 5 items (h) and (i) ask the
importance of the duration of the review process for zoning and land development
plan and the review process for building permits for the regulation of residential
housing developments for single-family and multi-family dwellings. Question 14
asks how the duration from the review to the approval of development changed for
single-family and multi-family dwellings in the last ten years. Question 15 asks how
long a building permit procedure currently takes for single-family and multi-family
dwellings.
4.2.4 CRED residential regulatory constraints index (CR-
RCI)
To combine the ten sub-indices into the final CRRCI, I suggest using factor analysis.
Specifically, to use the first factor form each sub-index. Factor analysis ensures that
the variation of the ten-sub indices does not reflect the variation in unobserved
variables. This methodology allows capturing the local regulatory environment
for each municipality in a single dimension. Moreover, it enables the ranking
of municipalities according to their regulatory restrictiveness regarding residential
development. The CRRCI should be standardized and have a sample mean of zero
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and a standard deviation of one. A higher (lower) value in the CRRCI implies more
(less) regulation. The readers interested in the different dimensions of the regulatory
environment can exploit the sub-indices.
4.3 Data
Regulatory constraints limit housing development. In this section, I describe the
available data on the extensive and intensive margin regulatory constraints. Table
4.3.1 summarizes the data sources, definitions, and importance of these data sets.
Regulations on the extensive margin include crop rotation areas, forests, high
amenity value areas, and UNESCO cultural and natural heritage sites, as illustrated
in Panel A of Table 4.3.1. Figures 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 show the spatial extent of these
restrictions. Note that in general, regulations on the extensive margin are not
mutually exclusive. For example, the UNESCO classification of an area of particular
natural value might partly overlap with the boundary of a regional park.
Figure 4.3.1: Forests and crop rotation areas
Notes: Forests and crop rotation areas may overlap due to imprecision of the FFF data. In total
only 1.2% of the forest area overlaps with the FFF.
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Table 4.3.1: Data on regulatory constraints
Data Description Area share of
Switzerland
Source
Panel A: Regulatory constraints - extensive margin
Crop rotation areas Areas best suited
for agriculture
12.3% Cantonal offices for
spatial development


















towns, and sites created
by the emergence of
industrialisation







2.8% Federal Office for the
Environment (FOEN)
Panel B: Regulatory constraints - intensive margin
Building zone
statistics
















Notes: Regulations on the extensive margin are not mutually exclusive. Overall, these protected
areas cover approximately 60 percent of the Swiss territory.
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Crop Rotation Areas (FFF, Fruchtfolgeflächen) are plots of land best suited
for agriculture use. These areas comprise approximately 4,400 km2 of cultivable
land. Their purpose - as stipulated by the Swiss Federal Law on Spatial Planning
(Bundesgesetz über die Raumplanung) from 1979 - is to secure nutrition in
Switzerland in the long run and case of emergency. In 1992, the Swiss Federal
Council fixed the minimal amount of FFF for each canton according to stringent
soil quality criteria relating to the physical and biological properties, such as soil
texture, arable suitability, pollutant load, and the shape of the land parcel. For
example, alpine cantons having high shares of unproductive surfaces typically have
smaller FFFs. Cantons were then responsible for defining the precise location
of FFFs within their boundaries. Since FFFs are allocated for agricultural use,
they must not be developed. Cantons can make exceptions in this regard provided
that the municipality in which the FFF is located manages to replace it with an
equivalent plot of land fulfilling soil quality criteria. Given the stringency of such
rules, developers rarely employ this burdensome process.
Figure 4.3.2: UNESCO, BLN, and Parks
Notes: With the exception of lakes, colored areas correspond to extensive margin regulations.
They may overlap
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In response to industrialization in Europe and Switzerland, in 1876, Switzerland
passed a law prohibiting further deforestation, de facto freezing forest areas to the
level observed at that time. The law has remained mainly unchanged to the present
day.7 As a result of these laws, the forest area in the highly populated regions has
remained practically unchanged since 1876.
The Federal Inventory of Landscapes and Natural History (BLN, Bundesinventar
der Landschaften und Naturdenkmäler) classifies the most typical and most valuable
landscapes in Switzerland. The aim of the inventory - which was progressively
introduced from 1977 to 1998 - is to protect Switzerland’s scenic diversity and to
ensure that the distinctive features of these landscapes are preserved.
Parks of national importance are characterized by beautiful landscapes, rich
biodiversity, and high-quality cultural assets. The communities and cantons preserve
these values and ensure their sustainment for the economic and social development
of their regions.
One of the objectives of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is to protect the cultural and natural heritage
of outstanding universal value. Currently, UNESCO recognizes 981 cultural or
natural heritage sites worldwide, 11 of which are located in Switzerland. These
areas mostly consist of buildings of particular architectural interest, historic towns,
and areas with valuable natural amenities. Overall, areas protected by FFF, forest,
UNESCO, regional and national parks or BLN regulations cover approximately 60
percent of the Swiss territory (see Figures 4.3.1 and 4.3.2).
Governments also regulate the intensity of residential development in Switzer-
land. In particular, Cantons define zoning plans - which typically regulate the
intensity of residential development - according to general guidelines dictated by the
federal government. Municipalities have to comply with cantonal plans and adapt
their zoning policies accordingly. However, there is no source of comprehensive
information about the type of zoning policies implemented across cantons and
municipalities. Panel B of Table shows 4.3.1 the few available data sets on intensive
margin regulatory constraints.
7The law was revised in 1991 as part of the Federal Act on Forestry (Bundesgesetz über den
Wald). The revision introduced minor exceptions allowing development. For example, buildings
with public utility - such as rangers’ cabins - can be built within forest areas. However, the
construction of such buildings is very infrequent because i) the federal government very rarely
grants building permits and ii) cleared forest areas must be replaced with new equally sized plots
of land.
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The 2012 official zoning data, harmonized for the whole of Switzerland, reveals
the land use attributed to undeveloped plots of land (ARE 2012). More specifically,
the data differentiates between nine different building zone types.8
Documedia provides data to compute building refusal rates at the municipality
level. This refusal rate is defined as the number of refused buildings and renovation
permits divided by their total number. It reflects the effective restrictiveness of local
governments regarding residential development.
Finally, Preisüberwacher (2014) compares the building permit, sewerage connec-
tion, and water connection fees for the 30 most populous municipalities. They collect
the data for three pre-defined house types: a single-family house, a multi-family
dwelling with five apartments, and a multi-family dwelling with 15 apartments.
4.4 Conclusions
Land-use regulations can have far-reaching consequences for the economy. However,
the heterogeneity in land-use regulation in Switzerland complicates the assessment
of these regulations. To this day, Switzerland does not have harmonized information
on the local regulatory environment across municipalities.
This paper provides a methodology and the corresponding survey to construct
a land-use regulation index for the over 2200 Swiss municipalities. First, I propose
the construction of ten sub-indices that capture the different aspects and degrees
of local regulation. These indices provide harmonized information about what local
regulation entails. Second, I suggest factor analysis to combine these indices into a
single index documenting how regulation of residential buildings varies across space.
8The zone types are residential, commercial, mixed, central business districts (CBD), public,
restricted, tourism, traffic, and others. Note that residential (47 %) and commercial (14%) comprise
more than 60 percent of the building zones.
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4.A Survey
1. In your municipality, how involved are the following organizations/stakeholders
in affecting residential building activities and/or growth management pro-
cesses? Please rate the importance of each on a scale from 1 to 10. (1 =
not involved at all; 10 = very involved)
(a) Municipality executive body
(b) Municipality legislative body (community assembly or parliament)
(c) Municipal secretary
(d) Voting citizens
(e) Municipal administrative unit (e.g. local planning office)
(f) Inter-municipal administrative unit (e.g. inter-municipal planning office)
(g) Cantonal administrative unit (e.g. cantonal planning office)
(h) External planning office
2. How important is cooperation/coordination with the following organiza-
tions/stakeholders for spatial planning in your municipality? Please rate the
importance of each on a scale from 1 to 10. (1 = not important at all; 10 =
very important)
(a) Municipalities in the same canton
(b) Municipalities in neighboring cantons
(c) Voting citizens
(d) Others (Please specify which ones)
3. In your municipality, which of the following are required to approve a zoning
or rezoning change?
(a) Municipality executive body
(b) Municipality legislative body (community assembly or parliament)
(c) Voting citizens
(d) Municipal administrative unit (e.g. local planning office)
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(e) Inter-municipal administrative unit (e.g. inter-municipal planning office)
(f) Cantonal administrative unit (e.g. cantonal planning office)
(g) External planning office
(h) Environmental examining board
4. In your municipality, which of the following are required to approve a new
construction project (which does not need rezoning)?
(a) Municipality executive body
(b) Municipality legislative body (community assembly or parliament)
(c) Voting citizens
(d) Municipal administrative unit (e.g. local planning office)
(e) Inter-municipal administrative unit (e.g. inter-municipal planning office)
(f) Cantonal administrative unit (e.g. cantonal planning office)
(g) Environmental examining board
(h) Monument protection authority
5. On a scale of 1 to 10, please rate the importance of the following factors for
the regulation of residential housing developments in your municipality for
single-family and multi-family dwellings. (1 = not important at all; 10 = very
important)
(a) Supply of land
(b) Density restrictions (e.g. height restrictions, number of floors, floor area
ratio, and boundary limit distances)
(c) New infrastructure costs (e.g. infrastructure access costs)
(d) Fees/duties
(e) Municipality executive body opposition to growth (e.g. due to crowded
schools)
(f) Citizen opposition to growth
(g) Monument protection
(h) Duration of the review process for zoning and land development plan
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(i) Duration of the review process for building permits
6. On a scale of 1 to 10, please rate the importance of the following factors for
the regulation of residential housing developments in your municipality for
single-family and multi-family dwellings. (1 = not important at all; 10 = very
important)
(a) Height restrictions
(b) Number of floors
(c) Floor area ratio
(d) Boundary limit distances
(e) Green space requirements
7. In your municipality, do developers have to meet these requirements to be able
to build? (Yes or no)
(a) Meet minimum lot size (e.g. 1000 square meters) requirements
(b) Floor to area ratios requirements
(c) Include affordable housing (however defined)
(d) Supply mandatory open space
(e) Pay allocable share of costs of infrastructure improvement
8. In your municipality, how does the supply of zoned land compare to the
demand for the following land uses? (Far more than required; More than





9. In your municipality, what are the criteria for determining the building permit
costs?
(a) Construction costs (How many percent)
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(b) Others (Please specify which ones)
10. Approximately how many objections to building permit applications did your
municipality receive in the year 2019?
11. In the last 10 years, how much have the building permit and infrastructure
access fees increased in your municipality? (0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%,
41-50%, >50%)
12. In the last 10 years, how much have the costs of a single-family house increased
in your municipality? (0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%, >50%)
13. In the last 10 years, how much have the costs of an apartment increased in
your municipality? (0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%, >50%)
14. In the last 10 year, how has the duration from the review to the approval




15. In your municipality, how long does a building permit procedure for the




1. Wie stark sind die folgenden Organisationen in Ihrer Gemeinde an den Wohn-
bauaktivitäten und/oder Wachstumsmanagementverfahren beteiligt? Bitte
bewerten Sie die Wichtigkeit auf einer Skala von 1 bis 10. (1 = überhaupt
nicht beteiligt; 10 = sehr beteiligt)
(a) Exekutivorgan der Gemeinde
(b) Legislativorgan der Gemeinde (Gemeindeversammlung oder -parlament)
(c) GemeindeschreiberIn
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(d) Die StimmbürgerInnen
(e) Kommunale Verwaltungseinheit (z.B. Bauamt)
(f) Interkommunale Verwaltungseinheit (z.B. interkommunales Bauamt)
(g) Kantonale Verwaltungseinheit (z.B. kantonales Amt für Raumplanung)
(h) Externes Planungsbüro
2. Wie wichtig ist die Kooperation/Koordination mit den folgenden Organisa-
tionen für die Raumplanung in Ihrer Gemeinde? Bitte bewerten Sie die
Wichtigkeit auf einer Skala von 1 bis 10. (1 = überhaupt nicht wichtig; 10 =
sehr wichtig)
(a) Gemeinden im selben Kanton
(b) Gemeinden in einem Nachbarskanton
(c) Die StimmbürgerInnen
(d) Andere (Bitte geben Sie an, welche)
3. Das Einverständnis welcher der folgenden Organisationen ist erforderlich, um
eine Umzonung/Einzonung in Ihrer Gemeinde zu genehmigen?
(a) Exekutivorgan der Gemeinde
(b) Legislativorgan der Gemeinde (Gemeindeversammlung oder -parlament)
(c) Die StimmbürgerInnen
(d) Kommunale Verwaltungseinheit (z.B. Bauamt)
(e) Interkommunale Verwaltungseinheit (z.B. interkommunales Bauamt)
(f) Kantonale Verwaltungseinheit (z.B. kantonales Amt für Raumplanung)
(g) Externes Planungsbüro
(h) Umweltprüfungsausschuss
4. Das Einverständnis welcher der folgenden Organisationen ist erforderlich,
um ein neues Bauprojekt (für das keine Umzonung erforderlich ist) in Ihrer
Gemeinde zu genehmigen?
(a) Exekutivorgan der Gemeinde
(b) Legislativorgan der Gemeinde (Gemeindeversammlung oder -parlament)
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(c) Die StimmbürgerInnen
(d) Kommunale Verwaltungseinheit (z.B. Bauamt)
(e) Interkommunale Verwaltungseinheit (z.B. interkommunales Bauamt)
(f) Kantonale Verwaltungseinheit (z.B. kantonales Amt für Raumplanung)
(g) Umweltprüfungsausschuss
(h) Denkmalschutz
5. Bitte bewerten Sie auf einer Skala von 1 bis 10 die Bedeutung der folgenden
Faktoren für die Regulierung der Wohnsiedlungen in Ihrer Gemeinde für
Einfamilienhäuser und Mehrfamilienhäuser. (1 = gar nicht wichtig; 10 = sehr
wichtig).
(a) Landangebot
(b) Dichteeinschränkungen (z.B. Bauhöhe, Anzahl Stockwerke, Ausnützungsziffern,
und Grenzabstände)
(c) Kosten für neue Infrastruktur (z.B. Erschliessungskosten)
(d) Gebühren/Abgaben
(e) Widerstand des Gemeinderats gegen Wachstum (z.B. wegen überfüllte
Schulen)
(f) Bürgeropposition gegen Wachstum
(g) Denkmalschutz
(h) Dauer des überprüfungsverfahrens für Einzonung und Landentwicklungs-
plan
(i) Dauer des überprüfungsverfahrens für Baugenehmigungen
6. Bitte bewerten Sie auf einer Skala von 1 bis 10 die Bedeutung der folgenden
Dichteeinschränkungen für die Regulierung der Wohnsiedlungen in Ihrer
Gemeinde für Einfamilienhäuser und Mehrfamilienhäuser. (1 = gar nicht
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(d) Grenzabstände
(e) Grünflächenanteil
7. Müssen Bauherren diese Anforderungen erfüllen, um in Ihrer Gemeinde bauen
zu können? (Ja oder nein)
(a) Anforderung von Mindestgrundstückgrösse (z.B. 1000 Quadratmeter)
(b) Anforderung von Nutzungsziffern
(c) Gemeinnützingen Wohnungsbau einbeziehen (wie auch immer definiert)
(d) Obligatorische Freiflächen zur verfügung stellen
(e) Anrechenbaren Anteil an den Kosten der Infrastrukturverbesserung
zahlen
8. Wie steht das Angebot an Baufläche für die folgenden Landnutzungen im
Vergleich zur Nachfrage in Ihrer Gemeinde? (Weit mehr als erforderlich; Mehr






9. Nach welchen Kriterien werden die Baubewilligungskosten in Ihrer Gemeinde
festgesetzt?
(a) Baukosten (Wie viel Prozent)
(b) Andere (Bitte geben Sie an, welche)
10. Ungefähr wie viele Einsprachen gegen Baugesuche sind im Jahr 2019 in Ihrer
Gemeinde eingegangen?
11. Wie stark sind in Ihrer Gemeinde die Baugenehmigungs- und Erschliess-
ingskosten, in den letzten 10 Jahren gestiegen? (0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%,
31-40%, 41-50%, >50%)
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12. Wie stark sind in Ihrer Gemeinde die Kosten für Einfamilienhäuser, in den
letzten 10 Jahren gestiegen? (0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%, >50%)
13. Wie stark sind in Ihrer Gemeinde die Kosten für Stockwerkseigentum, in den
letzten 10 Jahren gestiegen? (0-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%, >50%)
14. Wie hat sich in Ihrer Gemeinde die Dauer von der überprüfung bis zur
Genehmigung eines Wohnprojektes, in den letzten 10 Jahren verändert?
(Keine änderung; Etwas länger; Erheblich länger)
(a) Einfamilienhaus
(b) Mehrfamilienhaus
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